

DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

MASTER OF ARTS-POLITICAL SCIENCE

SEMESTER-II

**APPROCHES TO THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

CORE-202

BLOCK-1

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

Postal Address:

The Registrar,

University of North Bengal,

Raja Rammohunpur,

P.O.-N.B.U., Dist-Darjeeling,

West Bengal, Pin-734013,

India.

Phone: (O) +91 0353-2776331/2699008

Fax: (0353) 2776313, 2699001

Email: regnbu@sancharnet.in ; regnbu@nbu.ac.in

Website: www.nbu.ac.in

First Published in 2019



All rights reserved. No Part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from University of North Bengal. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this book may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

This book is meant for educational and learning purpose. The authors of the book has/have taken all reasonable care to ensure that the contents of the book do not violate any existing copyright or other intellectual property rights of any person in any manner whatsoever. In the even the Authors has/ have been unable to track any source and if any copyright has been inadvertently infringed, please notify the publisher in writing for corrective action.

FOREWORD

The Self Learning Material (SLM) is written with the aim of providing simple and organized study content to all the learners. The SLMs are prepared on the framework of being mutually cohesive, internally consistent and structured as per the university's syllabi. It is a humble attempt to give glimpses of the various approaches and dimensions to the topic of study and to kindle the learner's interest to the subject

We have tried to put together information from various sources into this book that has been written in an engaging style with interesting and relevant examples. It introduces you to the insights of subject concepts and theories and presents them in a way that is easy to understand and comprehend.

We always believe in continuous improvement and would periodically update the content in the very interest of the learners. It may be added that despite enormous efforts and coordination, there is every possibility for some omission or inadequacy in few areas or topics, which would definitely be rectified in future.

We hope you enjoy learning from this book and the experience truly enrich your learning and help you to advance in your career and future endeavors.



APPROCHES TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BLOCK 1

Unit 1: End Of Cold War	7
Unit 2: Post Cold War Issues	35
Unit 3: The Concept Of Justice In International Relations	71
Unit 4: Emerging Powers	95
Unit 5: Human Rights And International Politics	124
Unit 6: Human Rights And International Trade	151
Unit 7: India In The New Global Order	175

BLOCK 2

Unit 8: Liberal internationalism: English School of International Relations	
Unit 9: Contemporary Approaches: Constructivism	
Unit 10: Cultural Theory	
Unit 11: Feminist Theory	
Unit 12: Understanding of post-colonial international relation	
Unit 13: Transnational Movements: Cultural and Civilizational	
Unit 14: Theories of global political economy- Liberal Marxist approaches	

BLOCK 1 : APPROCHES TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Introduction to the Block

Unit 1: End of Cold war deals with the meaning and Nature of Cold War and to discuss the origin and Evolution of Cold War.

Unit 2: Post Cold War Issues deals with know Features of the Post-Cold War World and to discuss Changing Dimensions of Security.

Unit 3: The Concept of Justice in International Relations deals with understands the Diplomacy as Injustice and to know the Globalisation, Human Security and Justice.

Unit 4: Emerging Powers deals with the Middle Powers as Emerging Powers: Some Definitional Issues.

Unit 5: Human Rights and International Politics deals with various issues and developments in Human Rights and International Politics.

Unit 6: Human Rights and International Trade deals with Growth of World Trade, to know about the Role of World Trade Organisation and to understand the Transnational Corporation's Accountability of Human Rights.

Unit 7: India in New Global Order deals with Old Order and its Characteristics and implication of World order to India.

UNIT 1: END OF COLD WAR

STRUCTURE

- 1.0 Objectives
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 The Cold War
 - 1.2.1 Meaning and Nature of Cold War
 - 1.2.2 Origin and Evolution of Cold War
- 1.3 Towards the End of Cold War
 - 1.3.1 Detente
 - 1.3.2 P.T.B.T. and N.P.T.
 - 1.3.3 Process of Normalization
 - 1.3.4 Helsinki Conference
 - 1.3.5 New Cold War
- 1.4 The Cold War Ends
 - 1.4.1 Reagan and Gorbachev
 - 1.4.2 I.N.F. Treaty
 - 1.4.3 Peace Process in West Asia
 - 1.4.4 The Fall of Berlin Wall and Reunification of Germany
- 1.5 Gulf War and East-West Cooperation
- 1.6 Peaceful End of the Cold War
 - 1.6.1 Identification for the Future
- 1.7 Let us sum up
- 1.8 Key Words
- 1.9 Questions for Review
- 1.10 Suggested readings and references
- 1.11 Answers to Check Your Progress

1.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit we can able to know:

- To understand the meaning and Nature of Cold War;
- To discuss the origin and Evolution of Cold War.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Notes

When the Second World War ended in 1945 with the victory of Allies, it was expected that the scourge of the war would be overcome by a new atmosphere of peace and cooperation. Unfortunately, that did not happen. Italy had been defeated in 1944 before the second front was opened against Germany. Hitler, finding his defeat imminent, committed suicide in April 1945 and just after a week Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allies, and four main victors occupied it by temporarily dividing it into four military zones. As peace treaty eluded the victors, the United States dropped two atom bombs on a defiant and yet undefeated Japan in August 1945. The humiliated Japanese surrendered soon afterwards, and the Second World War came to an end. But the conclusion of war did not usher in an era of cooperation and friendship. It turned the erstwhile allies into foes. However, the hostility between two major victors, the United States and the Soviet Union, finally bore fruit when on the last day of 1989 the US president George Bush Sr. and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev declared the formal end of the Cold War. In this unit, you will read very briefly about the meaning and origin of the Cold War, for one cannot understand the end of an event without knowing about its origin. You will also have a brief idea of detente, before analyzing the developments leading to the end of Cold War.

1.2 THE COLD WAR

Political changes in the former USSR

This map charts the change from the single communist nation of the USSR into the confederation of smaller independent nations once dominated by Russia.

The fall of the Berlin Wall. The shredding of the Iron Curtain. The end of the Cold War. When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the reins of power in the Soviet Union in 1985, no one predicted the revolution he would bring. A dedicated reformer, Gorbachev introduced the policies of glasnost and perestroika to the USSR.

GLASNOST, or openness, meant a greater willingness on the part of Soviet officials to allow western ideas and goods into the USSR. PERESTROIKA was an initiative that allowed limited market incentives to Soviet citizens.

Gorbachev hoped these changes would be enough to spark the sluggish Soviet economy. Freedom, however, is addictive.

The unraveling of the SOVIET BLOC began in Poland in June 1989. Despite previous Soviet military interventions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland itself, Polish voters elected a noncommunist opposition government to their legislature. The world watched with anxious eyes, expecting Soviet tanks to roll into Poland preventing the new government from taking power.

The Berlin Wall falls

Here, crews of German troops tear down the Berlin Wall. While many had taken axes and picks to the Wall upon the collapse of Communism in Germany in 1989, the official destruction of the Berlin Wall did not begin until June, 1990.

Gorbachev, however, refused to act.

Like dominoes, Eastern European communist dictatorships fell one by one. By the fall of 1989, East and West Germans were tearing down the BERLIN WALL with pickaxes. Communist regimes were ousted in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. On Christmas Day, the brutal Romanian dictator NICOLAE CEAUSESCU and his wife were summarily executed on live television. Yugoslavia threw off the yoke of communism only to dissolve quickly into a violent civil war.

Demands for freedom soon spread to the Soviet Union. The BALTIC STATES of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania declared independence. Talks of similar sentiments were heard in UKRAINE, the CAUCASUS, and

Notes

the CENTRAL ASIAN states. Here Gorbachev wished to draw the line. Self-determination for Eastern Europe was one thing, but he intended to maintain the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. In 1991, he proposed a Union Treaty, giving greater autonomy to the Soviet republics, while keeping them under central control.

Mikhail Gorbachev

When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power of the Soviet Union in 1985, he instituted the policies of glasnost and perestroika in hopes of sparking the sluggish economy. What resulted from this taste of freedom was the revolution that ended the Cold War.

That summer, a coup by conservative hardliners took place. Gorbachev was placed under house arrest. Meanwhile, Boris Yeltsin, the leader of the Russian Soviet Union, demanded the arrest of the hardliners. The army and the public sided with Yeltsin, and the coup failed. Though Gorbachev was freed, he was left with little legitimacy.

Nationalist leaders like Yeltsin were far more popular than he could hope to become. In December 1991, Ukraine, Belarouse and Russia itself declared independence and the Soviet Union were dissolved. Gorbachev was a president without a country.

Americans were pleasantly shocked, but shocked nonetheless at the turn of events in the Soviet bloc. No serious discourse on any diplomatic levels in the USSR addressed the likelihood of a Soviet collapse. Republicans were quick to claim credit for winning the Cold War. They believed the military spending policies of the Reagan-Bush years forced the Soviets to the brink of economic collapse. Democrats argued that containment of communism was a bipartisan policy for 45 years begun by the Democrat Harry Truman.

Others pointed out that no one really won the Cold War. The United States spent trillions of dollars arming themselves for a direct

confrontation with the Soviet Union that fortunately never came. Regardless, thousands of American lives were lost waging proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam.

Most Americans found it difficult to get used to the idea of no Cold War. Since 1945, Americans were born into a Cold War culture that featured McCarthyist witch-hunts, backyard bomb shelters, a space race, a missile crisis, détente, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Star Wars defense proposal. Now the enemy was beaten, but the world remained unsafe. In many ways, facing one superpower was simpler than challenging dozens of rogue states and renegade groups sponsoring global terrorism.

Americans hoped against hope that the new world order of the 1990s would be marked with the security and prosperity to which they had become accustomed. The Cold War was an unarmed peacetime conflict. It was a war in which armed forces did not engage themselves in battles, guns were not fired, the tanks did not roll and the bombs were not dropped. The Second World War had begun in 1939 with the German attack on Poland and consequent declaration of war by the British Empire, its Dominions and France against Germany. Hitler's Germany was joined by Italy and Japan. Together these three powers were known as the Axis Powers. The opponents, called Allies led by the UK and France were joined in June 1941 by the Soviet Union (after German attack on it), and the United States in December 1941 following Japanese bombardment at Pearl Harbor. As the war drew to a close the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two Super Powers as their combined might had defeated the enemy. The other victors lost much of their military and economic capabilities. It hastened decolonization, and yet many East European countries were brought into communist fold. They were led by the USSR, and known as the Eastern or Communist Bloc. Several Western capitalist countries came under the American wings and were called Western or American Bloc. The emergent international system featured distribution of powers between many European and non-European sovereign States. "In addition", wrote

Notes

Kegley Jr, and Wittkopf in World Politics, "the advent of nuclear weapons radically changed the role that threats of warfare would play henceforth in world politics. Out of these circumstances grew the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for hegemonic leadership."

1.2.1 Meaning and Nature of Cold War

The term Cold War was first used for hostile attitude adopted by the United States and its friends on one side, and the Soviet Union and its allies on other, soon after the Second World War. Unlike traditional wars, this was a diplomatic conflict, without the use of armed forces. The two sides maintained normal diplomatic relations, yet behaved like enemies. Walter Lippmann, in 1947, used the term "diplomatic war". The Cold War was defined by Flaunting as "a war that is fought not in the battle field, but in the minds of men; one tries to control the minds of others." Jolul Foster Dulles, US secretary of state in early 1950s, a leading critic of the USSR, had said that, "The Cold War was a moral crusade for moral values-for good against bad; right against wrong; religion against atheism." Giving a moral dimension to the Cold War. Dulles thus described the Soviet Union as bad, wrong and atheist. Louis Malle in his book *The Cold War As History* described the Cold War as a situation of light tension between two power blocs, it was more dangerous than an armed conflict; the parties to the Cold War tried to complicate the issues rather than attempt to resolve them; and all disputes and conflicts were used as pawns in the Cold War.

- The periods of intense conflict alternated with periods of relative cooperation; and reciprocal, action-reaction exchanges were also evident. Both actors (US and USSR) were willing to disregard their respective professed ideologies whenever their perceived national interests rationalized such inconsistencies, for example, each backed allies with political systems antithetical to its own when the necessities of power politics seemed to justify doing so.

- Throughout the Cold War contest: both rivals consistently made avoidance of all-out war their highest priority. Through a gradual learning process involving push and shove, restraint and reward, tough bargaining and calm negotiation, the Super Powers created a security system, or rules for the peaceful management of their disputes. Thus, Cold War was a state of peacetime unarmed welfare.

Both the Super Powers had constructed their blocs, mostly on ideological basis. There indeed were several unattached or non-aligned countries, but Cold War was essentially fought between two power blocs. Each side used ideological weapons against the other. The two Super Powers tried to weaken the other block, to generate defections, and to strengthen their own position. Both gave liberal economic aid and established military bases in the territories of smaller allies. Propaganda, espionage, military intervention, military alliances, regional organizations and supply of armaments were some of the tools used to promote the bloc interests. Such actions aggravated the cold War. The Super Powers and their close allies looked at every issue from their ideological and bloc viewpoint. Attempts were made to encourage industrial unrest, ethnic conflicts, and feelings of narrow nationalism to weaken the opposite bloc. Thus, as Louis Halle said, the Cold War was even worse than a regular armed conflict.

1.2.2 Origin and Evolution of Cold War

In this unit dealing with end of the Cold War, it is neither necessary nor possible to go into details of origin and evolution of the Cold War. However, a brief mention may be made here to highlight the major events. Nobody could say for certain as to the Cold War began. Blame was put on the US by the Soviet Union for having started the conflict by not opening the second front against Germany till mid-1944, leaving USSR alone to fight the enemy. The West was also suspected of hidden agenda to seek destruction of both Nazi-Fascist dictators and the Soviet Union so that the Western countries could alone enjoy the fruits of victory.

Notes

The Soviet Union felt strongly upset at the secret development of atomic bomb by the United States and its use against Japan when the USSR was just about to declare war against it. After the war, the United States created anti Soviet front through Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. The Fulton speech of Winston Churchill in March 1946 (preceding Truman Doctrine) signaled hate campaign against the Soviet Union. Churchill had condemned the USSR for violation of Yalta Agreement to hold democratic elections in liberated countries, and been having erected an "iron curtain" at the East-West dividing line. He called for a campaign to protect freedom, Christian civilization and democracy, and to contain communism. The Western countries, on the other hand, blunted the USSR for violation of pledge to allow liberated countries to elect government of their choice and for installing puppet communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

1.3 TOWARDS THE END OF COLD WAR

The period between 1945 and 1962 is identified with the Cold War. However, it does not mean that during this period there was a constant rise in the level of tension between the two power blocs. There were also interim periods of easing of tensions. For example, the period 1953-56 showed improved relations between East and West. There were signs of détente during the Camp David summit in 1959: but there was a sudden increase in the temperature from 1960 (U-2 incident) to 1962 (the Cuban Crisis). After the Cuban Crisis, the world experienced an extended period of relaxed tension, called détente, for about 12-13 years. Improved relations evicted in several arcs after Stalin's death in 1953. In July 1953, a cease-fire was declared in Korea. Next year, peace agreement was concluded for Indo-China at Geneva. In 1955, the Austrian question was resolved, its neutral status was recognised and Soviet Union withdrew troops. The USSR also withdrew from Porkkala in Finland. There were signs of easing of tension between West Germany and the Soviet Union. The German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer was invited to Moscow, and diplomatic relations was established between USSR and West Germany. Next year Japan and USSR also established diplomatic relations. There

is a gap of ten years, the Four pioneer Summit was held in 1955 at Geneva. It was attended by US president Eisenhower, Soviet Union Khrushchev and prime minister Bulganin, British prime minister Anthony Eden, and Edgar Faure, prime minister of France.

1.3.1 Détente

Detente may be described as a situation of reduced international tension. Detente is not normalcy. The term was used for relaxation in East-West conflict. During the period of detente: Cold War had not ended, but the level of tension had gone down and there were signs of understanding. The reduced tension or fall in the temperature could not be measured as it was the civilization of change for the better in East-West conflict. Thus, for him detente is the outcome of effective and deliberate management of the opponent in the interest of relaxation of tension. Coral Bell's analysis of diplomatic underlines relaxation not only between Soviet Union and the United States, but also between these two Powers and China. She says that if it takes two to make a quarrel it takes two or three to maintain distinct. "I propose to look at detente as the American diplomatic strategy consciously deployed civilian a triangular power balance vis-à-vis both China and the United States." Further, according to Bell, "detente with China was notable achievement that the clearance with the United States", because "level of tension with China had been far higher . . . that with the United States."

1.3.2 P.T.B.T. and N.P.T.

The Cuban Missile Crisis had convinced world leaders that it had the "potential" of a Third World war. Until the Super power are convinced by that time, that a nuclear war would be fatal for both of them. It was realized that wisdom was a better part of valour. The Cuban Crisis had demonstrated the need for swift contacts between American and Soviet leaders to avoid recurrence of similar crisis. A hot line was, therefore, unskilled to link Washington with Moscow. It would enable direct contact between leaders of two powers when time was of essence. In the post-1962 period a number of agreements were concluded and several contacts established to ease the tension. One such agreement was the

Notes

Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). It was signed in July 1963 by Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. Negotiations for test ban were carried out since 1955. The Cuban Crisis hastened the agreement. The nuclear tests were causing serious damage to the environment and threat to humankind. The Partial Test Ban Treaty banned all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, on the ground and under water including the high seas. But, it proved impossible to agree on a control system to ban underground testing. Thus, underground testing and nuclear weapons manufacturing continued. But, the three Powers who originally signed the treaty agreed to limit the possession of nuclear weapons to the "bare minimum France refused to sign the treaty. By 1964 China had exploded its first bomb and it also refused to sign the treaty. In spite of Partial Test Ban Treaty, France and China continued with their tests in the atmosphere. The continued French nuclear testing in the Pacific region even in 1995 caused grave anxiety. In 1968, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed by UK, USA, and USSR. It was ratified and enforced in 1970. The nuclear powers promised to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and nuclear technology to countries not having them, and the non-nuclear Powers, in turn, promised not to accept or develop such weapons. France and China did not sign the NPT for 11 1/2 years. It was only in 1992 that China signed the NPT. India has not signed it on the ground that it is discriminatory. It allowed the nuclear powers to retain the weapons, but barred other countries from developing them. India is willing to sign only a non-discriminatory NPT.

1.3.3 Process of Normalization

The central element of the policy of detente was normalization in Europe. The tension began to ease towards the end of the 1960s. The most significant was the problem of two Germanys and of Berlin. The change of West German government in 1969 helped in relaxation of tension. Under the chancellorship of Willy Brandt, West Germany initiated. This German word is used to indicate a 'policy for the East'. Brandt government renewed normal relations with Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. Treaties with USSR and Poland were concluded in 1970. Other agreements were finalized in 1971-72. Both German states recognized

each other and were recognized by the Super Powers. To begin with, West Germany tried to extend relations with countries of Eastern Europe. The United States and West Germany by their treaty of August 1970 promised not to use violence to alter the existing boundaries in Europe. This was a major concession by West Germany: which had always maintained that these boundaries were not final. The four-power agreement Berlin was concluded in 1971. Neither East nor West abandoned its formal position on Berlin, yet many complicated questions were sought to be regulated. Access to West Berlin from West Germany was approved by providing easier rail, road and water Communication, and West Berlin was recognized as a part of Federal Republic. The access of the residents of West Berlin to East Berlin and East Germany was improved. However, the Berlin Wall remained intact as dividing line between two parts of Berlin. The East-West summit was held during the period of détente. US president Kennedy and the Soviet leader Khrushchev had met only once in Vienna in 1961. Similarly, President Johnson and Prime Minister Kosygin met once at Glassboro in 1967. During 1970s summits became annual feature. The biggest success was Nixon's visit to Moscow in 1972, where a number of agreements were signed. One of these agreements was: "The Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." In 1973, the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war was also concluded. The efforts made by Nixon administration, and particularly the steps taken by secretary of state Kissinger eased the tension between United States and China. Kissinger paid a secret visit to China in 1971. On 26 October 1971, People Republic of China was allowed representation in the United Nations, and Taiwan was expelled. As Coral Bell says this part of détente was more important because there was much greater conflict between the United States and China than between the Super Powers. In fact US-China detente did not nonnative relations between the two largest communist countries-China and USSR. After China was allowed representation in the UN, President Nixon himself visited that country in February 1972 and helped in the relaxation of US-China tension. With continued 'Cold War' between

China and the USSR, a third pole appeared to be vaguely emerging in the international system.

1.3.4 Helsinki Conference

The Cold War had subsided when on the first day of annual session of UN General Assembly in 1973 both the Germany were admitted. The famous Helsinki Summit of 35 countries in 1975, and the signing of its Final Act were regarded, for the time being, as burying the Cold War. Lulldestad refers to achievements of the Helsinki Conference as a symbolic culmination of detente in Europe. The principal concern of West European countries in 1970s in the field of security was to combine the Western alliance (with USA) with the improved relations with the Soviet Union. Improvement in relations talent to a relaxed mood, more cultural and commercial and personal exchanges, and a reduction in the forces deployed by both sides. The Soviet Union also had similar aims. The USSR proposed a European Security Conference. The West European countries agreed to attend the Conference provided the United States and Canada also participated in it. The Conference met at Helsinki (Finland) between 1972 and 1975. The deliberation lasted in all 15 months and resulted in the signing of Helsinki Final Act. 35 countries attended this European Conference on Security and Cooperation (ECSC), including 33 European nations, Canada and the United States. Albania was the only European country; did not attend the Conference. Those who attended were from both the Power Blocs as well as Yugoslavia, the non-aligned. The apparent aim of the; Soviet Union was to secure general endorsement of the post-Second World War frontiers of the European nations, and .secondly, to discuss the security issues. The approach of the Western Bloc countries, to begin with, according to Peter Gorbachev, was "a mixture of bored and cynicism." But, later they tried to achieve maximum concessions from the USSR. The West and non-aligned insisted that the European frontiers could not be declared final, but the Conference declared that they should not be altered by force. The Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975 by all the 35 countries, curtailed

declarations not legally binding, yet formal and normative, The Final Act contained ten principles. These were:

- (i) sovereign equality of all nations;
- (ii) respect of rights of all, in national sovereignty;
- (iii) neither to use nor threaten the use of force;
- (iv) inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of states;
- (v) peaceful settlement of international disputes;
- (vi) non-interference in the internal affairs of each other;
- (vii) freedom of expression and of faith and worship and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- (viii) equality and people's right of self-determination;
- (ix) Cooperation among states; and (s) observance of responsibilities implied in international law. The Final Act established certain Principles for economic and cultural cooperation.
- (x) The participants promised to promote basic human rights and contacts across the national borders were to be made easier. The critics pointed out that the USSR and East European countries had failed to abide by their promises.

1.3.5 New Cold War

The process of détente was at its peak at the time of Helsinki Conference, 1975. But after that it lost its momentum. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union again became so sore that by 1980 it appeared that the Cold War had come back. The new tension came to be described as the New Cold War. It was visible when Soviet armed forces intervened and occupied Afghanistan in December 1979. USSR was willing to accept status quo in Europe, but not elsewhere. America's disappointment over new conflicts in Indo-China, Horn of Africa and Afghanistan, gave ammunition to those who had opposed cooperation with the Soviet Union. Conflicts outside Europe now assumed greater significance than before. Even when détente was at its peak Soviet paper Pravda wrote: "The Soviet Union will continue to rebuff any aggressive attempts by the forces of imperialism and render extensive help to the

Notes

patriots of Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa. In 1976, Soviet Communist Party chief Brezhnev said in the 27th Party Congress that, "détente does not in the slightest way abolish or change the laws of the class struggle. We do not conceal the fact that we see detente as a way to create more favourable conditions for peaching socialist and communist construction." The Soviet Union became more active in the export of armaments. Normally, American weapon exports had been much greater than those of the Soviet Union. This trend changed and the two Powers openly competed in arms sale. By early 1980s, the Soviet Union was responsible for a little over 30 per cent of the world's arm exports, whereas US share was slightly less than 30 per cent. By 1977, in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia had changed to a more pre-Soviet policy; Somalia was drifting towards the United States. The Soviet plans for a socialist federation of Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti were turned down. Soviet influence had increased in South Yemen since the British left in 1967. In February 1979 the South invaded North Yemen. Despite substantial assistance given by USSR to South, the latter tried to maintain normal relations with North Yemen also. The United States offered to send supplies and advisers to North. USA cooperated with Saudi Arabia in criticizing the Soviet Union. Even radical Arab countries spoke out against the invasion. A cease-fire was declared, but the guerilla combat continued until 1982. In Indo-China, Soviet Union backed Vietnam whereas the latter's relation with China was strained. Pol Pot regime of Cambodia was being backed by China. But, it was perhaps the most brutal regime that the world had seen since 1945 in January 1979 Vietnam, with Soviet backing, attacked Cambodia and deposed the Pol Pot regime. But, Vietnamese action was certainly a violation of sovereignty of neighbours. Once again many people in the West spoke of Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (Kamyuchia). In February 1979 China marched its troops into Vietnam. The war went badly for China and it withdrew its troops after some time. But, it showed serious tension between China, USSR and the West. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had resulted in stationing of over 90,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union stayed on for nearly nine years. It was only in 1988 that Gorbachev realised the utility of

continued occupation of an unwilling people. Large numbers of Afghans had, meanwhile, fled to neighbouring Iran and Pakistan where they were trained as guerrillas. Throughout Soviet occupation, and even, internal fighting became a normal feature and peace kept evading the war-torn country.

When the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan (1989), the power was transferred to the noncommunist leadership, which lay been fighting for removal of the "Soviet invaders." Dr. Najibullah, the pro-Soviet president, who had replaced Babrak Karmal three years earlier, agreed to transfer the power in accordance with the Geneva Agreement (1988) concluded between various parties interested in ending the Afghan crisis. The New Cold War was also reflected in not so successful SALT talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both the countries got busy in the development of neutron bomb, and their rivalry in Indian Ocean area threatened the peace of this region. After the arrival of Gorbachev on the scene (1985) with his determination to reform the Soviet society and polity and reduce tension in the world, Cold War began once again moving towards fresh détente and finally ended on the eve of Soviet disintegration. During the New Cold War, the conflict had been virtually in three blocs-the US Bloc, the Soviet Bloc and the Chinese Bloc. Interestingly, a "non-aligned" Pakistan was virtually aligned both with China and the United States. India was already very close to the Soviet Union. The New Cold War was different from the old Cold War in regard to the area of conflict. Europe was the main theatre of the first Cold War; now it was essentially outside Europe that the New Cold War was being witnessed. It was either Afghanistan, or Arab-Israel conflict, or the trouble in the Horn of Africa, or the clash in Indo-China. The New Cold War was thus global in nature. Another area of conflict during the New Cold War was the Indian Ocean. The Super Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean was threatening the peace in the region. During the New Cold War, as in the Cold War, struggle was witnessed in the United Nations also.

Check Your Progress 1:

Notes

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1) Trace the nature and origin of the cold War.

.....
.....
.....

2) Write a note on detente.

.....
.....
.....

3) Describe briefly the PTBT and NIIT.

.....
.....
.....

4) Write in brief on the New Cold War.

.....
.....
.....

1.4 THE COLD WAR ENDS

The Cold War had begun at a time when the Allies, including the United States and USSR, had successfully defeated the Nazi Germany and her Axis partners. The world had expected lasting friendship among the victors when they split aid foiled two hostile camps. The Cold War ended (1990) at a time when the common man had come to live with it and it was expected that (despite ups and downs and detente) the East-West conflict would become permanent. When the Cold War suddenly ended, the Western Bloc had not expected 'victory' and the Eastern Bloc was still determine of self-destruction of capitalism. The end of the Cold War can under 'The aegis of two rather improbable collaborators'- Ronald Reagan and Miklail Gorbachev. The American president had been elected to reaffirm~ the traditional values of America1 exceptionalism. He was expected to continue to contain communism, not lo defeat it. He represented the "right" in the US society. Gorbachev was

determined to reinvigorate what he considered a superior soviet ideology. Reagan and Gorbachev both believed in the ultimate victory of their side. Henry Kissinger compared the two men and concluded that while "Reagan understood the mainsprings of his society; whereas Gorbachev had completely lost touch with his society." But, the trouble erupted when Soviet president Gorbachev could not fulfill his dream of a free and democratic system in the former Soviet Union. He precipitated the demise of the system he represented by deluding reform of which it proved incapable.

1.4.1 Reagan and Gorbachev

At the time when Reagan had begun his administration (1981) American prestige was going down rapidly. Putlericans had failed in Vietnam and retreated from Angola. The Soviet Union by extra ordinary serge of expansion had managed to spread Cuban military forces from Angola to Ethiopia in tandem with thousands of Soviet combat advisers. Afghanistan had been occupied by over 90.000 Soviet troops. The pro-West Iranian government of the Sllah Pehelvi had collapsed and was replaced by radically anti-American Islamic regime, which seized 52 Americans as hostages in the US embassy at Tehran. At that moment of US weakness (which saw defeat of sitting President Carter), communist was all ready to hit hard and it appeared that communist momentum might sweep all before it. But, Gorbachev's reforms misfired and all his good intentions proved that. The entire Eastern Bloc collapsed like a pack of cards as Soviet Union itself disintegrated in 1991. No world power had ever disintegrated so totally or so rapidly without losing a war. Henry Kissinger, in his work Diplomacy, has described Reagan as a president who hardly had any knowledge of history and that destiny helped him to win the Cold War. The details of foreign policy bored Reagan. "He had absorbed a few basic ideas about the dangers of appeasement, the evils of communism, and the greatness of his own country, but analysis of substantive issues was not his forte." Kissinger pays tribute to his speechwriters. Reagan had a wish to take Gorbachev on a tour of the United States so that he could see how people were

Notes

happy in a capitalist system. The workers would tell him how wonderful it was to live in America. Reagan believed that it was his duty to see that Gorbachev recognized that communist philosophy was an error. Meanwhile, Reagan had pledged US support to anti-communist insurgents who sought to overthrow Soviet-supported governments in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua. In addition, American leaders had been speaking of "viability" of nuclear war by a threat of "first use" of nuclear weapons in a conventional war in 1985, Soviet leader Gorbachev summarized the tense situation (in view of Afghan crisis) by saying: "The situation is very complex, very tense. I would even go so far as to say it is explosive." However, the situation did not explode. Gorbachev decided on his; 'new thinking" in order to relax the tension. He tried to reconcile the Soviet Union's differences with the capitalist West, in order to check the deterioration of his country's economy. Gorbachev emphasized "the need for a fundament break with many customary approaches to foreign policy." During his visit to the US in 1987, to sign the INF Treaty, Gorbachev accepted that there were serious differences between two Super Powers, yet, he said: "Wisdom of politics today lies ill not using those differences as a pretext for confrontation, elite and angles race." An aide of Gorbachev, Georgi Arbator told the Punericans that, "we are going to do a terrible thing to you-we are going to deprive you of an enemy." Within next two years, the two poultries ceased to be enemies, and brought the Cold War to an end.

1.4.2 I.N.F. Treaty

Reagan had .also dreamt of freeing the world from the fear of nuclear war. He and Gorbachev worked hard, at summit level four times in four years and finally concluded a treaty to destroy certain types of intermediate level ballistic missiles. At one stage (at Reykjavik: Iceland: 1986) the two leaders agreed to reduce all strategic forces by 50 per cent within five years and to destroy all ballistic missiles within ten years. Reagan had almost accepted the Soviet offer to abolish nuclear weapons altogether. But, what would happen if other nuclear powers did not go along. The Reykjavik deal failed at the last moment because of

Gorbachev's insistence that US should give up its star wars project. The US was not willing to accept this condition. Finally, it was agreed in 1987 to destroy Soviet and American intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles. This paved the way for an understanding between the two Super Powers, which in turn contributed to the end of Cold War. Mikhail Gorbachev enjoyed unprecedented power and prestige in the Soviet Union. Yet, he was destined to "preside over the demise of the empire built with so much blood and pressure."

When he assumed office in 1985, Gorbachev was the leader of a nuclear Super Power, which was in a state of economic decay. When he lost power in 1991, the Soviet army had thrown its support behind his rival Boris Yeltsin, the Communist Party had been declared illegal and the 'empire', which had been assembled after so much of bloodshed, by every Russian ruler since Peter, the Great, had disintegrated. Gorbachev led one of the most significant revolutions of his time. He destroyed the Communist party, which had controlled every aspect of Soviet life. The country disintegrated and Gorbachev was blamed for the debacle of his reforms Glasnost and Perestroika. Despite ultimate debacle, Gorbachev deserves the credit for being willing to face the Soviet Union's dilemma, He knew that it would take a long time for Soviet Union to reach a level of industrialization that could even remotely be regarded competitive with the capitalist world. So he tried to gain time, and attempted a major resilient of Soviet foreign policy. He worked hard to reach agreement with America in nuclear missiles and to end the Cold War and succeeded in both. The United States was determined since 1947 to contain communism. It, however, did not know that it would be able to defeat communism in the country of its origin. Kissinger pays unique tribute to George Kenlian (US diplomat in Moscow in 1947). He says: "The ending of the Cold War ... was much as George Kenlian had foreseen in 1947." The Soviet system had needed a permanent outside enemy to sustain it. When the Twenty Seventh Congress of Communist Party led by Gorbachev, changed the policy from co-existence to interdependence, the moral basis for Cold War had ended. Gorbachev had ended domestic repression.

1.4.3 Peace Process in West Asia

Ever since Israel was created in 1948, the Palestine in particular and Arabs in general adopted hostile attitude towards the Jewish State. The Birth of Israel had uprooted large number of Palestinians who were forced to live as displaced persons out of their homeland. The hostility was so ill tense that Israel on one side and one or more Arab countries on the other, fought four wars in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, but Israel could not be hulled. In fact every time Israel came to occupy several neighbouring territories namely the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights. Jerusalem, the holy place of Christians, Jews and Muslim was now fully controlled by Israel. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) under the leaders of Yasser Arafat was recognized by many of Eastern Bloc and Third World countries, including India. The West was fully to back, which had been in belligerent mood; in the context of Cold War, Israel was the principal Western outpost in the Middle East, whereas the Soviets and the Arab World supported Palestinians. The peace process in the West Asian conflict was finally initiated by the United States. An agreement concluded at Camp David in 1978, in the presence of President Carter, opened the doors for isolation of relations. Agreement signed by them president of Egypt and prime minister of Israel enabled the two hostile neighbours to work for peace.

1.4.4 The Fall of Berlin Wall and Reunification of Germany

One of the first developments of the end of Cold War was reunification of Germany. The wall that was built to separate East Berlin from the West was contacted at the Soviet initiative, but was strongly resented by people living on either side. Families and friends were forcibly separated simply because they were living in two different parts of the city. People from East were not allowed even to visit ailing relatives on the other side. At times, persons trying to go to the other side, without authority, were shot. It was even in a position to give aid to many Third World countries. East Germany (GDR), on the other hand, though consulted to

socialism, had not been able to achieve economic prosperity. As soon as US-Soviet relations become nominal, strong desire for unite of two Germany was expressed in all quarters. The Berlin Wall was first to be pulled down (1989) with so much enthusiasm that the end of Cold war could be easily noticed. Negotiators were initiated between the two countries-one was a member of NATO, and the other of Warsaw Pact (which has since been abolished). After the fall of Berlin Wall, tile next step taken in 1990 was to introduce West German currency in the East also. Finally, the two Germany were reunited. The chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany was chosen as lied of the government of unified country, which adopted market economy and Western type of democratic system. That a, while the division of Germany in 1940s marked the beginning of bitterness of Cold War, the unification was outcome symbolic of the end of Cold War.

Check Your Progress 2:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

- 1) Analyze the role of Reagan and Gorbachev in the termination of Cold War.

.....
.....
.....

- 2) Write note on INF Treaty'?

.....
.....
.....

1.5 GULF WAR AND EAST-WEST COOPERATION

As the East-West Conflict, called the Cold War ended in December 1989: the international communities was faced with a new crisis. On 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded the neighbouring tiny, but oil rich: Kuwait.

Notes

Within hours, Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait as the Emir (ruler) of the small Arab country fled. Kuwait was arguments into Iraq as its nineteenth province. The UN authorized the US-led military action and liberated Kuwait in February 1991. The Gulf War II (the first being Iran-Iraq was fought earlier for several years) turned out to be an example of East-West cooperation in the post-Cold War world. In less than six hours of complement of invasion, America had made its position, clear. The White House cadmic Iraq's invasion ad called for "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi debris." But, the US had not made up its mind on the nature of action to be taken. The next day president Bush said: "We are not ruling any options in, but we are not ruling any options out." Bush did not say miring: about the use of force for the simple reason that he did not washer he wheeled have to use force. The UN Security Council debated of Iraqi invasion, and the subsequent annexation of it. From the time Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2nd August; hectic diplomatic and other activities were initiated to pressurize Iraq to vacate Kuwait. Saudi Arabia was among the main critics of Iraq. On 16 August, took stands of foreigners-British, French, Americans and Japanese as hostages; on 21 September 1990 Iraqi Revolutionary Cortland Council (RCC) called upon the people to be prepared r "the mother of all battles." By that time Iraq had about 4,30,000 troops in the south and in Kuwait. As the UN decided to impose economic sanctions Iraq threatened to attack Saudi oil fields, unfriendly Arab countries and Israel. The inevitability of UN authorized war against Iraq was evident by mid-November 1990. As there were no signs of Iraq's compliance with the Security Council resolutions, the United States went about building a coalition of countries who were opposed to Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. While the 28 countries contributed to military build-up against Iraq in support of UN resolutions and to use force, if necessary, only six were actively involved in the war against Iraq. These were: the United States, Saudi Arabia, Britain, France, Egypt and Syria.

The war that took place from 17th January to 28th February 1991 was generally a trial of strength between Iraq and the United States. On the other side, Iraq was supported by Jordan, Yemen and the PLO

diplomatically, political aid economically, but none fought on the side of Iraq. The Soviet Union, faced with growing troubles at home, had joined the coalition and supported the UN resolutions and the determination to expel Iraq from Kuwait; but refused to participate in a military build-up in the Gulf or join the war against Iraq; and made a high profile attempt to mediate between the two conflicting sides. The Soviet Union was aware of likely repercussions among the Muslim Republics of USSR in case it actively engaged itself in the hostilities. Besides, it had been giving massive aid to Iraq for two decades, and the Gulf was too closely situated to the then Soviet territory. For most of the countries Iraq's action had created a dilemma -how to respond to the destruction of sovereignty of one of the Arab League members by another. To support Iraq would mean undermining the core principle of territorial integrity and national sovereignty. To support the US against Iraq would mean letting down a fellow Arab State. Therefore, most of them either remained neutral or expressed rhetoric sympathy either with Iraq or the coalition. Meanwhile, after all the efforts of the Soviet Union had failed to bring about a diplomatic solution and liberation of Kuwait, it agreed to support Security Council Resolution No. 678 which called upon Iraq to vacate Kuwait by 30 November 1990 failing which use of force could be resorted to (compel it to vacate the aggression).

1.6 PEACEFUL END OF THE COLD WAR

The world had become so used to the Cold War politics for nearly forty-five years that when it suddenly ended, the people could hardly believe that the world was now a different place. The end of Cold War had coincided with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, fall of the Berlin Wall, reunification of Germany and establishment of democratic regimes in erstwhile socialist countries. Gorbachev succeeded in concluding the INF Treaty with the United States, and ending the Cold War. He introduced several economic and political reforms in the USSR, but could not take them to their logical conclusion. As the former Communist, Boris Yeltsin got elected as president of Russia; the authority of Soviet president began to be eroded. While several Republics of USSR began demanding secession, and Congress of

Notes

People's Deputies conceded the denial for multi-party democracy in the USSR, conservative Communist "removed" Gorbachev in August 1991. But, Yeltsin, fearing his own fall, rallied behind detained Gorbachev and the short-lived conservative coup failed. But, "rescued" Gorbachev was unable to hold the country together. It disintegrated in December 1991 into fifteen sovereign countries. Thus, the end of Cold War not only Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, but also brought demise to once mighty Super Power, the Soviet Union. The failed coup of August 1991 against Gorbachev was said to have "put the nail in the coffin of Communist Party control in Moscow." With the retreat of Communism, massive changes swept the post-Cold War world politics. Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf concluded thus: "The abrupt end of the Cold War suggested something quite different from the lesson of two World Wars that great powers rivalries are doomed to end in armed conflict. The Cold War was different; it came to an end peacefully. This suggests that great powers are capable of settling their struggles without bloodshed, and that it is something possible for them to manage their competition and resolve their disputes."

1.6.1 Identification for the Future

The developments related to the post-Cold War period are not within the scope of this Unit. However, some indications towards possible future may be briefly mentioned here. According to Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf "The peace end of Cold War does not ensure a peaceful future. On the contrary, the insights of long-cycle and realist theories predict pessimistically that prevailing trends in the diffusion of economic power will lead to renewed competition, conflict, and perhaps even warfare among the great powers, and that the range of new problems and potential threats will multiply." This prediction is indeed too pessimistic. Nevertheless, nothing can be said with certainty because any environmental change can occur at any time. By the early 21st Century not only had Germany and Japan become economic giants, but also a small country like South Korea was aggressively moving ahead in the direction of becoming an economic power. Besides, India and Pakistan

had become nuclear powers with the threat of intentional or accidental use of nuclear bomb by Pakistan large. India, with its rapidly liberalizing economy and the growing strength in the field of information technology, was surely involving towards the status of a major player in international relations.

Hence, the post-Cold War world need not necessarily be assumed to be a guarantee for 50 years peace. To conclude, we fully agree with Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf. They argue: "In the long run, Russia could again emerge as a super-power if it overcomes its long-neglected domestic problems. Lying in the heartland of Eurasia, a bridge between Europe and the Pacific Rim, with China and India to the South, Russia stands militarily tall ..." However, the present Russia, or for that matter no other country appears to pose a serious challenge to the American hegemonic leadership.

Check Your Progress 3:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

- 1) Write about the Gulf war and its implications.

.....
.....
.....

- 2) Write about the peaceful end of Cold War.

.....
.....
.....

1.7 LET US SUM UP

In order to properly understand the end of the Cold War, it is essential to have some idea about the Cold War-what was the Cold War, how it began and why it began? Therefore, in this Unit, you have read about the meaning and origin of the Cold War. It was a "diplomatic war", fought

Notes

not on the battlegrounds, but in the minds of men. The armed forces did not participate in the Cold War; only the diplomatic actions maintained high degree of tension between the East and West, which means the Soviet Bloc and the American Bloc respectively. Soon after the Second World War, the erstwhile friends and allies turned into the foes. Two power blocs were soon formed led by the two Super Powers. 130th sides blamed each other for the Cold War. Nobody knows the exact date of the commencement of Cold War. There were periods of acute conflict and also periods of relative calm and cooperation. The easing of tension was termed as *détente*. Following the most serious crisis of Cuba, efforts were initiated for *detente*, which saw the signing of PTBT and NPT. The Final Act of Helsinki, 1975 created hopes of ending the Cold War, but it erupted again around 1979, particularly with the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet Union. The hope of terminating the Cold War was again expressed in the efforts made by US presidents Ford, Reagan and finally George Bush on the one side, and Brezhnev and president Gorbachev on the other. Numerous factors were responsible for ending the Cold War. Gorbachev's attempts for internal reforms in the Soviet Union, as also the efforts of the two sides to curtail their nuclear weapons (INF Treaty of 1987) and to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons, besides other factors, contributed to the end of the Cold War.

The rapid collapse of communist regimes in East European countries combined with the demand of several Union Republics of Soviet Union hastened the end of Cold War. Enthusiastic people of the city pulled down the wall that had divided East and West Berlin in 1989, and in 1990 the two Germanys were united saying farewell to socialist ideology. All this enabled the two Super Powers to reach out to each other. The authority of Soviet president was eroded when he agreed to have multiparty democracy in the country, and when Boris Yeltsin was directly elected as the president of Russia and he challenged the Soviet president. Republics declared their independence. But, by that time Cold War had been finally declared to have ended by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, Different scholars expressed their different views and tried to theories the peaceful end of the Cold War. Most of them-

realists, neo-realists, neo-liberals, argued as to how different factors made for a peaceful end of the Cold War, without any mass destruction. Peaceful end of the Cold War raised doubts whether there would be lasting peace and a new world order or new power centers would emerge and challenge the hegemonic position of the United States.

1.8 KEY WORDS

Cold war: The Cold War was a period of geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union with its satellite states, and the United States with its allies after World War II. The historiography of the conflict began between 1946 and 1947. The Cold War began to de-escalate after the Revolutions of 1989

Gulf War: The Gulf War, codenamed Operation Desert Shield for operations leading to the buildup of troops and defense of Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Storm in its combat phase, was a war waged by coalition

1.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

- 1) Trace the nature and origin of the cold War.
- 2) Write a note on detente.
- 3) Describe briefly the PTBT and NIIT.
- 4) Write in brief on the New Cold War.
- 5) Analyze the role of Reagan and Gorbachev in the termination of Cold War.
- 6) Write note on INF Treaty'?

1.10 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Victoria, William L. Cleveland, late of Simon Fraser University, Martin Bunton, University of (2013). A History of the Modern Middle East (Fifth ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. p. 450. ISBN 978-0813348339. Last paragraph: "On 16 January 1991 the air war against Iraq began

Notes

- Bourque, Stephen A. (2001). Jayhawk! The 7th Corps in the Persian Gulf War. Center of Military History, United States Army. ISBN 2001028533. OCLC 51313637.
- Desert Storm: Ground War by Hans Halberstadt
- Col H. Avery Chenoweth (2005) Semper Fi: The Definitive Illustrated History of the U.S. Marines

1.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) See Sub Section 1.2.1
- 2) See Sub Section 1.3.1
- 3) See Sub Section 1.3.2
- 4) See Sub Section 1.3.5

Check Your Progress 2

- 1) See Sub Section 1.4.1
- 2) See Sub Section 1.4.2

Check Your Progress 3

- 1) See Section 1.5
- 2) See Section 1.6

UNIT 2: POST COLD WAR ISSUES

STRUCTURE

- 2.0 Objectives
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Features of the Post-Cold War World
 - 2.2.1 Uni-polarity
 - 2.2.2 Challenges to Nation-State
- 2.3 Changing Dimensions of Security
- 2.4 Initiatives for Peace and Development
 - 2.4.1 Efforts for Peace
 - 2.4.2 Activities in Development
 - 2.4.3 Institutionalizing human-rights based peacebuilding
- 2.5 Restructuring of the UN
 - 2.5.1 Composition of Security Council
 - 2.5.2 Development Bodies
- 2.6 Let us sum up
- 2.7 Key Words
- 2.8 Questions for Review
- 2.9 Suggested readings and references
- 2.10 Answers to Check Your Progress

2.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to understand:

- To know Features of the Post-Cold War World
- To discuss Changing Dimensions of Security
- To know initiatives for Peace and Development
- To discuss the Restructuring of the UN.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

International politics is dynamic in nature, not static or frozen forever. As you may have noticed while watching television or reading newspapers, developments occur virtually on a day-to-day basis. Many

Notes

of them are routine, whereas some are regarded as turning points with major consequences. The dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 are among the relevant examples. They become the defining moments for the study of international politics. One such notable development was the end of the Cold War some 13 years ago, during 1989- 90. You have already learnt in the previous Unit the process of the end to the Cold War. The end of the Cold War between the United States and the then Soviet Union marked an end to one era and the beginning of a new era affecting nearly every aspect of international relations. While the long persisting danger of direct military confrontation between the two superpowers has fizzled out with its welcome fall out in many suppliers of world affairs, durable peace has remained a distant dream for much of the world. New threats to peace have emerged in a big way not only in the local theatres but also shaking the foundations of the human civilization itself. The spin-offs from the advances in information and communication technologies have brought fortunes to a few, but reduced the bulk of world's poor countries and peoples to irretrievable destitute. States by themselves are unable to find answers, pointing to the need for enhanced framework for international cooperation. But ironically international organisations like the United Nations are facing the challenges of autonomy, accountability and effectiveness.

The first thinker to anticipate both the unipolar world and the American Primacy seems to be British politician William Gladstone (Alexis de Tocqueville in the mid-nineteenth century had expected the bipolar world centered on America and Russia but had not advanced beyond bipolarity). In 1878, Gladstone wrote:

While we have been advancing with portentous rapidity, America is passing us by as if a canter. There can hardly be a doubt, as between America and England, of the belief that the daughter at no very distant time will ... be unquestionably yet stronger than the mother ... She

[America] will probably become what we are now—head servant in the great household of the world.

French Economist Michel Chevalier, writing in 1866, did not address the possibility of a unipolar world, but envisaged that the “political colossus who is being created at the other side of the Atlantic” would overshadow Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. Unless Europe united, he wrote, it would be “weak and exposed to disastrous defeats” in the confrontation with the New World.

In 1885, the Chinese Philosopher, K'ang Yu-wei published his One World Philosophy, where he based his vision on the evidence of political expansion which began in the immemorial past and went in his days on. He concludes:

Finally, the present Powers of the world were formed. This process [of coalescing and forming fewer, larger units] has all taken place among the 10,000 countries over several thousand years. The progression from dispersion to union among men, and the principle [whereby] the world is [gradually] proceeding from being partitioned off to being opened up, is a spontaneous [working] of the Way of Heaven (or Nature) and human affairs.

No factor, he believed, in the long run could resist the "laws of empires." K'ang Yu-wei projects the culmination of the ongoing world unification with the final confrontation between the United States and Germany: "Some day America will take in [all the states of] the American continent and Germany will take in all the [states of] Europe. This will hasten the world along the road to One World."

K'ang Yu-wei belonged to a civilization, which experienced the millennia-long unipolar order. He knew how in his civilization it emerged and several times reemerged. Naturally, his theory is very realist, deep, and developed relatively to his Western contemporaries

Notes

convinced in the universality of the balance of power or, at most, having abstract ideas of the "Parliament of men, the Federation of the world."

Another early scientist who drew a hypothesis of the forthcoming unipolar world order and the American primacy was the French Demographer, Georges Vacher de Lapouge, with his *L'Arjen: Son Role Social* published in 1899. Similarly to K'ang Yu-wei, he outlined the logistic growth of empires from the Bronze Age till his days, when "six states government while in three quarters of the globe," and concluded: The moment is close when the struggle for the domination of the world is going to take place.

Vacher de Lapouge did not bet on Washington and Berlin in the final contest for world domination like K'ang Yu-wei. Similarly to de Tocqueville, he guessed the Cold War contenders correctly but he went one step further. He estimated the chances of the United States as favorite in the final confrontation:

The reign of Europe is over, well over... The future of France seems less certain but it is unnecessary to become illusioned... I do not believe by the way that Germany might count for a much longer future... We could... envisage... the possibility that England and her immense Empire comes to surrender to the United States. The latter... is the true adversary of Russia in the great struggle to come... I also believe that the United States is appealed to triumph. Otherwise, the universe would be Russian.

The year after Vacher de Lapouge published his vision, H. G. Wells in *Anticipations* (1900) envisaged that "the great urban region between Chicago and the Atlantic" will unify the English-speaking states, and this larger English-speaking unit, "a New Republic dominating the world," will by the year 2000 become the means "by which the final peace of the world may be assured forever." It will be "a new social Hercules that will strangle the serpents of war and national animosity in his cradle." Such a synthesis "of the peoples now using the English tongue, I regard not only

as possible, but as a probable, thing.” The New Republic “will already be consciously and pretty freely controlling the general affairs of humanity before this century closes...” Its principles and opinions “must necessarily shape and determine that still ampler future of which the coming hundred years is but the opening phase.” The New Republic must ultimately become a "World-State." Wells' compatriot, Journalist William Thomas Stead, titled his 1901 book *The Americanization of the World or the Trend of the Twentieth Century*.

The visions of William Gladstone, Vacher de Lapouge, H. G. Wells and William Thomas Stead were borne out. The United States is the only country in the early 21st century that possesses the ability to project military power on a global scale, providing its full command of the global commons. With no viable challenger on the horizon in the short term, the current distribution of power overwhelmingly favors the United States, making the world order it set out to construct in 1945 more robust. The question that remains for international relations theorists is how long this “unipolar moment” will last. Sean M. Lynn-Jones, editor of *International Security*, provides a summary of arguments put forth by Kenneth Waltz, John Ikenberry, and Barry Posen.

2.2 FEATURES OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

Post-Cold War era is the period after the end of the Cold War. Because the Cold War was not an active war but rather a period of geo-political tensions punctuated by proxy wars, there is disagreement on the official ending of this conflict and subsequent existence of the post-Cold War era. Some scholars claim the Cold War ended when the world’s first treaty on nuclear disarmament was signed in 1987, the end of the Soviet Union as a superpower amid the Revolutions of 1989 or when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. Despite this ambiguity, the end of the Cold War symbolized a victory of democracy and capitalism giving a boost to the rising world powers of the United States and China. Democracy became a manner of collective self-validation for countries hoping to

Notes

gain international respect: when democracy was seen as an important value, political structures began adopting the value.

The era has mostly been dominated by the rise of globalization (as well as nationalism and populism in reaction) enabled by the commercialization of the Internet and the growth of the mobile phone system. The ideology of postmodernism and cultural relativism has according to some scholars replaced modernism and notions of absolute progress and ideology. The Post-Cold War era has enabled renewed attention to be paid to matters that were ignored during the Cold War. The Cold War has paved the way for nationalist movements and internationalism. Following the nuclear crises of the Cold War, many nations found it necessary to discuss a new form of international order and internationalism.

The period has seen the United States become by far the most powerful country in the world and the rise of China from a relatively weak developing country to a fledgling potential superpower. Reacting on the rise of China, the United States has strategically sought to "rebalance" the Asia-Pacific region. It has also seen the merger of most of Europe into one economy and a shift of power from the G7 to the larger G20. Accompanying the NATO expansion, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems were installed in East Europe. These marked important steps in military globalization.

The end of the Cold War intensified hopes for increasing international cooperation and strengthened international organizations focused on approaching global issues. This has paved way for the establishment of international agreements such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the Paris Climate Agreement. Environmentalism has also become a mainstream concern in the post-Cold War era following the circulation of widely accepted evidence for human activity's effects on Earth's climate. The same heightened consciousness is true of terrorism, owing largely to

the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and their global fallout.

2.2.1 Uni-polarity

Polarity in international relations is any of the various ways in which power is distributed within the international system. It describes the nature of the international system at any given period of time. One generally distinguishes three types of systems: **unipolarity**, **bipolarity**, and **multipolarity** for four or more centers of power. The type of system is completely dependent on the distribution of power and influence of states in a region or globally.

It is widely believed amongst theorists in international relations that the post-Cold War international system is unipolar: The United States' defense spending is "close to half of global military expenditures; a blue-water navy superior to all others combined; a chance at a powerful nuclear first strike over its erstwhile foe, Russia; a defense research and development budget that is 80 percent of the total defense expenditures of its most obvious future competitor, China; and unmatched global power-projection capabilities.

Unipolarity in international politics is a distribution of power in which one state exercises most of the cultural, economic, and military influence.

Nuno P. Monteiro, assistant professor of political science at Yale University, argues that three features are endemic to unipolar systems:

- Unipolarity is an interstate system and not an empire. Monteiro cites Robert Jervis of Columbia University to support his claim, who argues that "unipolarity implies the existence of many juridically equal nation-states, something that an empire denies." Monteiro illustrates this point further through Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright, who state that "in empires, inter-societal divide-and-rule practices replace interstate balance-of-power dynamics."

Notes

- Unipolarity is anarchical. Anarchy results from the incomplete power preponderance of the unipole. Columbia University's Kenneth Waltz, whom Monteiro cites, argues that a great power cannot “exert a positive control everywhere in the world.” Therefore, relatively weaker countries have the freedom to pursue policy preferences independent of the unipole. The power projection limitations of the unipole are a distinguishing characteristic between unipolar and hegemonic systems.
- Unipolar systems possess only one great power and face no competition. If a competitor emerges, the international system is no longer unipolar. In 1964, Kenneth Waltz maintained that the United States is the only “pole” to possess global interests.

Apart from excelling in indicators of power such as population, resource endowment, economic capacity, and military might, unipoles are associated with certain foreign policy behaviors like actively participating in binding regional institutions; building ad hoc coalitions of the willing to deal with major security or economic challenges; struggling for legitimacy without applying much coercion; and respecting the sovereignty of second-tier states, who are considered crucial partners.

Wohlforth believes unipolarity is peaceful because it “favors the absence of war among great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state’s power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance of power politics among the major states.” “Therefore one pole is best, and security competition among the great powers should be minimal.” Unipolarity generates few incentives for security and prestige competition among great powers. This idea is based on hegemonic stability theory and the rejection of the balance of power theory. Hegemonic stability theory stipulates that “powerful states foster international orders that are stable until differential growth in power produces a dissatisfied state with the capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership. The clearer and larger the concentration of power in

the leading state, the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be." The Balance of power theory, by contrast, stipulates that as long as the international system remains in balance (without unipolar power), peace is maintained.

Nuno P. Monteiro argues that international relations theorists have long debated the durability of unipolarity (i.e. when it will end) but less on the relative peacefulness unipolarity brings among nations within an international system. Rather than comparing the relative peacefulness of unipolarity, multipolarity, and bipolarity, he identifies causal pathways to war that are endemic to a unipolar system. He does not question the impossibility of great power war in a unipolar world, which is a central tenet of William C. Wohlforth in his book *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*. Instead he believes "unipolar systems provide incentives for two other types of war: those pitting the sole great power against a relatively weaker state and those exclusively involving weaker states." Monteiro's hypothesis is influenced by the first two decades of the post-Cold War environment, one that is defined as unipolar and rife with wars. "The United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the end of the Cold War. Put another way, the first two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10 percent of U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nation's total time at war."

The earliest prophet of unipolarity seems to be Fichte, although he did not use the term (using instead "Universal Monarchy"). Paradoxically, the Father of the German nationalism and convinced adherent of the balance of power, he appears to be the path-breaker. Back in 1806, Fichte wrote *Characteristics of the Present Age*. It was the year of the battle at Jena when Napoleon overwhelmed Prussia. The challenge of Napoleon revealed to him the precarious nature of the balance of power and a much deeper and dominant historical trend:

There is necessary tendency in every cultivated State to extend itself generally... Such is the case in Ancient History ... As the States become

stronger in themselves and cast off that [Papal] foreign power, the tendency towards a Universal Monarchy over the whole Christian World necessarily comes to light... This tendency ... has shown itself successively in several States which could make pretensions to such a dominion, and since the fall of the Papacy, it has become the sole animating principle of our History... Whether clearly or not—it may be obscurely—yet has this tendency lain at the root of the undertakings of many States in Modern Times... Although no individual Epoch may have contemplated this purpose, yet is this the spirit which runs through all these individual Epochs, and invisibly urges them onward.”

2.2.2 Challenges to Nation-State

In highly developed Western countries, popular notions run rampant about a weakening of the nation-state’s sovereignty. Among the state’s supposed destroyers are: post-modern economic globalism, tribalistic ethnic nationalism, pressures for international human rights, and supranational imperatives. These ‘challenges to the nation-state’ are given thorough examination and critique in this edited volume on immigration and immigration policy in the U.S. and countries of the European Union. Though the title may lead the reader to believe otherwise, the volume asserts that the nation-state, in fact, is not in decline, and does not face any serious challenge to its existence from international migration. All chapters are well referenced and are grounded primarily in the examination of immigration politics and law, *de jure* and *de facto*, in the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany. *Challenge to the Nation-State* lacks a concluding chapter, although the introduction is sufficient in providing a framework for understanding the research presented in the other chapters. By ‘nation-state,’ Joppke intends a territorially sovereign polity defined largely by the ability to grant and deny citizenship to individuals in order to guarantee continuity in the relationship between state and individual. Joppke’s introduction offers a fine summary of the findings of contributing authors, but also doggedly maintains a unifying theoretical framework, and attempts to take discussions on immigration further than

any of the individual chapters. His basic thesis is that the nation-state can and still does maintain sovereignty over its borders, its affordance of rights and privileges, and its affordance of citizenship, often balancing a change in one with an opposite change in another. In the end, citizenship always has been and always will be granted by a territorially sovereign polity. Challenge to Sovereignty, the first section following the introduction, addresses territorial sovereignty—one of the two political bases for the modern nation-state. The authors in this section note changes in the decision-making arena for states in recent years, but resoundingly conclude that decision-making tools and ultimate authority over the movement of people (while experiencing new constraints) still lie with national governments, not extra-national bodies. And while Soyak's *Limits of Citizenship* (1995) continues to have an influence over this discussion, as it is referenced by some of the authors, few are entirely sympathetic to Soyak's polemic stance about the reach of post-nationalism. Saskia Sassen is the single author in the volume who asserts that immigration is a serious challenge to the state. The others are more skeptical. Sassen's globalizing economy paradigm dichotomizes regulations for information, capital, and goods vs. regulations for migrants and labor, the former more transnational, the latter more international. In this model, the state has the twofold goal of globalizing the economy while maintaining state sovereignty, thereby undermining state authority and power. This chapter uncritically cites many global processes (e.g., judicial tools, deregulation, bond-raters, and international commercial arbitration) as evidence for the dissolution of statehood. However, it is also the only chapter to devote much attention to the relation between state sovereignty and the governance of global economic practices. Sassen's chapter, though a minority viewpoint, also considers international economics, which is found lacking in the other chapters.

In the European Union (E.U.) after WWII, migration regimes originated from rights granted to workers, not individuals. Now individuals, not workers, should be the locus of rights according to some analysts and international bodies, though this was not the original intention of the

Notes

European Community. Border checks remain, however, and the E.U. does not require that thirdparty non-nationals be granted rights similar to citizens—evidence that national sovereignty is alive and well. Rey Koslowski (Ch. 5) also notes the lack of democratic institutions in the E.U. political structure, a situation which would provide even less guarantee of civil rights. The second section, *The Challenge to Citizenship*, includes four papers concerned with the distinctions between citizen and non-citizen, and whether these distinctions will remain useful and operative for Western governments. In the U.S., the institution of citizenship might see growing challenges because of increasing domestic divisions between federal and state jurisdictions, and a devolution of responsibilities and jurisdiction from the federal government to the states. Despite variation in welfare benefits between states, however, some Americans, when at their most jingoistic, find the distinction between citizen and non-citizen to be found here (e.g., only citizens should be entitled to welfare benefits, health benefits and public education). This nationalistic sentiment revolves around the idea that citizenship should count for more than just the right to participate politically—it should be only through citizenship that welfare provisions are allotted. Peter Schuk, also in the second section, finds that the debate on citizenship in the U.S. is due to multicultural pressure, technological change, expansion of the welfare state, the loss of a unifying ideology, and a perceived devaluation of citizenship. While anti-immigrant sentiment is high in many countries, and clearly visible to the government, national policy almost never goes to such extremes. Nonetheless, Schuk's concern is that a greater risk may be that the normative foundation of a post-national citizenship is so thin and shallow that it can easily be swept away by the tides of tribalism or nationalism, because post-national citizenship possesses only a limited institutional status, largely confined to some courts.

Race relations in Great Britain are the subject of the book's final chapter. Adrian Favell agrees with Feldblum's suggestion that minority citizens in Great Britain are hurt by further integration into the E.U., because of the lack of a written constitution. Also, there seems to be a breakdown in

Great Britain's 25-year history of locally-based multiculturalism, occurring somewhat independently of international developments. This volume is concerned with the U.S. and a few European countries only. However, these countries are highly sought as migrant destinations, especially by workers and families of workers, and a rigorous study of actual policy outcomes is an important one. Why it is that states are not becoming more restrictive and that their powers over borders and citizenship are intact? Most of these authors attribute this to either domestic politics or weak international bodies. I would push those findings to contend, also, that domestic politics are partially the result of the economic structural adjustment discussed by Sassen and the globalization of capitalism.

I would argue, also, that it is exactly this process that is responsible for the maintenance of state functions (e.g., monitoring pluralism), as some world systems theorists contend, and the maintenance of the state as a powerful social institution. Challenges to the Nation-State serves as a source for case studies in the development of the modern state's political institutions. Professors of sociology, political science, history, anthropology, cultural studies and international relations at graduate and undergraduate levels, can utilize these studies to provide data for disciplinary methodologies for investigation of the world system, international relations and immigration. The authors are political scientists, and provide convincing evidence for their claim that the state is quite resilient in the face of the challenge posed by international immigration. However, a perspective unifying these autonomous states in a system of political and economic relations would be welcomed. Ecological anthropologists interested in the state, and others, would be quick to point out that the role of the state includes domestic resource extraction, guarantee of property rights, participation in international economic organizations, control of the minimum wage, and the like.

Check Your Progress 1:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. What is Uni-Polarity?

.....
.....
.....

2. Write about Challenges to Nation-State.

.....
.....
.....

2.3 CHANGING DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

Changing dimensions of security in post-cold war period

An impactful outcome of the end of cold war on global security affairs is the world where military interventions were became the only threats to the security. There came the era where security affairs have to be thought in relation to environment, economy, culture and perhaps least in relation to military interventions. Changing dimensions of security in post-cold war period cab be discussed efficiently under the following broad topic heads:

- Rise in conflicts related to separatism and ethnic nationalism.
- International terrorism threatening global peace.
- Change in approaches to inter-state competition since economic worries get the centre stage.
- Rise in threats to environment.

The post-cold war era can be predominantly termed as modern era of civil wars. The established peaceful lines separating a state from the other were and are being challenged. Apart from more conflicts are of intra state nature than interstate. In the middle east, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Yemen, Pakistan etc. in the Africa, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Niger, Congo etc. are few of the states badly affected by advent of civil wars. In civil wars, there

nothing 'civil' in that. Few of the deadliest weapons of modern era are being used against so called enemy mainly ending us hurting innocent citizens. The highest lose is of innocent civilians and their property. It seems the paradigm of security is now changed to human centric than state centric especially after cold war. Human security is prime is issue now.

Experiences of religious and radical intolerance have been gradually developed as form of terrorism. Radicalisation of religious beliefs is one of the gravest worries especially after the end of cold war. Amalgamation of drug and trafficking mafia grouping with radical religious fronts with the blessings of selfish political outfits have created cross border networks of important supplies threatening the security of the state. The havoc and charged atmosphere created after every successful terror attacks do weaken the state's credulity and subsequently authority. This sort of atmosphere fuels the civil wars.

The most threatening establishment that has got its profound presence is international terrorist organisation. Majority of 35 odd terrorist organizations designated by the United Nations have come into existence after the end of cold war. The signature event showing the malicious and dangerous idea of these organizations was 9/11 in the US. It showed how the mightiest military power in the world could be shaken and faith of millions of peaceful people can be trembled. It is considered as a turning point in global security regime. The London bombings, attacks on embassy, Indian and Afghan parliaments and strong emergence of radical terrorist organization Al Qaeda under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden were few of the grave happenings that have defined the new state security realities in early 2000s. Recent advent of emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levan (ISIL) is considered dangerous threat than the earlier to world peace.

Non-military threats to security are important aspects arose mainly after end of the cold war. There are two main subjects of a state with which threats to state security are being thought:

Notes

1. Matters related to economic stability and growth and
2. Matters concerning environmental degradation. Financial stability of a country, foreign flows, energy supplies are few of the most important sectors of economy that are now target in new world order.
3. Economic insecurities are pushing for radical change in political regime as for example the Suhurto regime. It has ignited revolutions too many a times. States like Nauru, Fiji, Kiribati, Borabora and entire Caribbean are under existential threats due to global environment degradation. The United Nations has recognised this fact for small developing islands. These nations are at the blink of submergence.

The post-cold war era has seen qualitative change and shift in the perception about threats to security. Non-military dimensions occupy considerable space in the imagination of security policy makers. That is a sea change and significant too along with worries for speedily rising civil wars and international terrorism.

Check Your Progress 2:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. What is the Challenging dimension of security after Cold war era?

.....
.....
.....
.....

2.4 INITIATIVES FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

The first has to do with the importance of democratic culture. In the aftermath of the First World War, Ozaki-san fought to expand voting rights and opposed his own party when it watered down a suffrage bill he supported. He was expelled from his party and reluctantly came to the conclusion that before Japan could have an effective party system, it

would be necessary to promote the political development of the Japanese people, meaning that the attitudes of the people towards politics and society as a whole, and their understanding of the responsibilities of democratic citizenship, would have to change. He became a partyless politician, a conscience to the government, and a voice for democratic principles.

Following the Second World War, Ozaki saw his chance to fulfill his dream of educating the Japanese people about the philosophy and practice of democracy. In 1946, therefore, he wrote *Kokumin Seiji Tokuhon*, or “People’s Political Reader,” which was, in effect, a civic education manual for post-war Japan. In it, Ozaki drew on historical incidents, well-known problems, and his own experiences to explain the foundations of democratic constitutional government. *Kokumin Seiji Tokuhon* was described by the historian Jon Dawson Sucher as Yukio’s Ozaki’s “expression of faith in the Japanese people.” It was written to them and for them, explaining how past thinking had led to disaster and how looking at issues in the light of modern democratic experience could lead them to fulfill their personal hopes and national goals. This vision, which expressed the political beliefs Ozaki-san accumulated during his long life — he was 88 years old when he wrote this book — can still guide us today as we seek to give new strength to the democratic idea.

The second lesson to be learned from Yukio Ozaki is the importance of democratic internationalism. Ozaki saw very early on that modern technology was creating a totally different world. Writing in 1933, he observed that the progress of civilization and new inventions had “reduced time and space” and had broken down barriers until “the world grew to resemble a human body in that an injury to one part of it caused suffering to the whole.” He was deeply troubled that people in every country were increasingly “looking at things from the narrow point of view of nationalism, and in so doing are sacrificing the greater interests of the world...If we continue in this way of thinking,” he warned prophetically, “we shall surely witness a second world war.”

Notes

Japan, he said, faced a cross-roads – it could choose isolation or cooperation, nationalism or internationalism. He believed that Japan, by virtue of its economic and territorial circumstances, was utterly unsuited to isolation. It needed the free circulation of wealth and people and should, therefore, take advantage of “the progressive tendency of civilization” to become a pioneer for a policy of “Open Doors.” He believed that Japan, if inspired by “a noble and divine spirit,” could “lead the way along the road to Greater Justice,” and “by helping the weak and small nations” also “save her.”

It is almost 70 years since Yukio Ozaki wrote “Japan at the Crossroads,” in which these thoughts appear. As we try to deal with the awesome challenges of a world divided not only by wealth and culture, but also by hateful emotions and violent actions, his words have lost none of their relevance or force.

The third lesson that we can learn from the life of Yukio Ozaki is that democracy cannot exist without democrats. His whole life was a model of democratic activism. It is democratic idealists like Yukio Ozaki who give democracy its spark of life. And it is democratic citizens who must take upon themselves the responsibility to give life and energy to everyday democratic processes. Democracy does not come about automatically. It is not the natural state of mankind. It requires hard work to build its structures, to renew its possibilities, and to defend its values.

2.4.1 Efforts for Peace

The end of the Cold War around 1990 saw a new practice of using peace settlements to end protracted social conflict within states. This article attempts a brief narrative account of the key shifts and controversies in the relationship between peace building and human rights with reference to this practice. It does so with a view to addressing the current context, which I suggest is one in which disillusionment with peace building is married with cynicism and retreat from human rights as generally accepted international norms.

I trace the practice of human rights-based peace building through three decades: the first, 1990–2000, was a decade of heady experimental approaches to conflict resolution and human rights; the second, 2000–2010, a decade of institutionalization and normativization of peace settlement practice; and the third, now under way, of frustration and disillusionment with peace processes, transitions, and indeed human rights. I suggest that the move from the first to the second decade saw a move from a local political practice of human rights, which international actors attempted to accompany and support, to an increasingly formalized approach of international legal regulation of peace processes through human rights standards. This second decade saw specific peace process applications of human rights norms given institutionalized forms within the international legal system in an attempt to regulate particular outcomes to persistent peacebuilding dilemmas. I suggest that this shift from human rights as a political practice to human rights as a regulator of peace processes had a price. The practice of human rights-based peacebuilding moved from an approach to human rights that understood rights as an integral part of political negotiations to one that saw human rights as a set of norms which stood above and outside of the political process. The move to institutionalization and normativization paved the way to the current decade which is one of disillusionment, in which both peacebuilding and human rights practices are being questioned in a move that risks jettisoning what has been one of the most successful practices in ending violent conflict globally.

My main overarching purpose is to inform this current context of disillusionment. I approach this context deliberately with both sober realism and high optimism, suggesting that it may open the way to a more political practice of human rights again. Realism and optimism can be married by a return to understanding the political nature of human rights practice as part of a much more creative localized, political and constructive peacebuilding project. As a constructive project, peacebuilding involves negotiating local concepts of the ‘just peace’ as at once a normative legal and pragmatic political project, which attempts to

Notes

create a space of dialogue in which to accommodate contested local and global visions of what justice and peace require and entail.

The early 1990s saw a rapid proliferation of peace processes due to three main factors relating to the end of the cold war: first, a rise in intra-state conflicts and associated peace efforts to resolve them; second, new possibilities for ending long-standing conflicts that had had geopolitical dimensions which had now shifted; and third, increased international attention and new possibilities for institutional responses such as peacekeeping that the end of the cold war enabled (see Bell 2008: 28–31). The end of the cold war produced clear changes in how international and local actors engaged with intra-state conflict, that is, conflict arising primarily within the borders of states. The term ‘intra-state’ is preferred to the traditional distinction of ‘internal’, because such conflict had strong regional and even international dimensions. The key changes between the post-1990 practice of conflict resolution and earlier practices were threefold.

The first distinctive element of the post-cold war approach involved a move to resolve such conflicts not through strategies of military victory, or co-optation of key moderates in processes of pacification, but through face-to-face negotiations between states and their armed non-state opponents that took seriously the need to fundamentally revise the state to make it more inclusive. The post-cold war approach to intra-state conflict involved the use of formalized negotiations between states and their armed opponents, and sometimes also other stakeholders such as wider political parties and social movements. Attempts to negotiate ends to conflict in the post-cold war period were not a completely new practice. Informal negotiations between governments and armed opposition groups had often been used to end protracted social conflict, including in the negotiations between the UK and the IRA in the early 1970s, or the Italian state’s negotiations with the Red Brigades in the 1980s (see Moloney 2002; Meade 1990). However, by and large, these negotiations processes were secret or semi-secret, and focused on the state’s offer of mechanisms for demobilization in return for amnesty and

minor legal adjustments related to returning combatants to ‘normal life’. In contrast, post-1990, conflict contexts saw more ambitious efforts at restructuring the state with a view to moving it from being ‘owned’ by one section of a very divided society, to a more inclusive structure capable of incorporating those who contested the state’s legitimacy into a fundamentally revised set of political and legal institutions to which human rights and equality protections were central.

The second defining feature of post-cold war peacemaking was that peace negotiations aimed to result in a formalized written publicly available ‘contract’ between the state and its non-state armed opponents. Across many varied conflict types and geographies, these processes involved the coupling of commitments to ceasefire and demobilization to new more inclusive constitutional frameworks. The idea of a ‘peace process’ as a process aimed at reaching ‘a peace agreement’ was born and became an international phenomenon.² The peace agreements concluded typically involved quasi-constitutional commitments establishing shared political institutions using mechanisms such as power-sharing; fundamentally revised legal institutions reflecting human rights safeguards; and mechanisms aimed at both ‘undoing the past’—enabling displaced people to return, releasing prisoners—and ‘repairing the past’, through processes of truth-telling, accountability and reparation.

Finally, the third common characteristic that distinguished post-cold war peacemaking from earlier efforts was the acceptance, both by states and increasingly by international actors, that human rights law and humanitarian law had relevance to peace negotiations and provided at least a regulatory influence over negotiations (and their outcome). Rather than being viewed as a legal framework that was in tension with practices of conflict resolution, human rights and humanitarian law were viewed as facilitative of the practice, and perhaps even generative of it in varied ways. The end of the cold war in its ‘end of history’ version (Fukuyama 1992) was understood as the triumph of concepts of liberal democracy to which human rights were foundational: peacemaking

Notes

served as a kind of realization of the Kantian peace (Kant 1795). Further, a post-cold war rise in intra-state conflicts created pressure to resolve them, not least because greater capacity for human rights monitoring of conflict meant that atrocities by all sides were ever more visible and exposed. To little fanfare the prior decade had seen increasing civic mobilization engaging with human rights monitoring in terms of domestic and international rights standards, which had gone far in debunking the idea that states were always perfect and automatically legitimate and non-state armed actors were purely and simply terrorists driven by a commitment to violence. Human rights monitoring told a more nuanced story as to the root causes of violence as connected to a complex breakdown of the social contract in which human rights abuses were both causes and symptoms of violent conflict, and therefore required to be addressed if conflict was to be ended. As regards humanitarian law, states in conflict often presented internal conflict not as conflict, but as a massive crime wave which required a state of emergency (Ní Aoláin and Gross 2006: 328–9, 359–63). While they did this because they feared giving status and recognition to their armed opponents, at the point of seeking a settlement they often found that reference to humanitarian law standards was useful to peacemaking. Humanitarian law standards applicable to non-international conflict, such as common article 3 and Protocol II (and to a lesser extent Protocol I) of the Geneva Conventions 1949, were useful to states seeking ends to armed conflict precisely because—unlike human rights law—they applied not just to states but to non-state armed actors and appeared to underwrite politically matters such as amnesty.

The three distinctive characteristics of peace processes that emerged in the post-cold war period also set the ground for a parallel series of political, moral, and legal tensions that occupied the years to come and still lie at the centre of both theory and practice.

First, the new approach to peacemaking put those who were at the heart of the conflict at the heart of the new political dispensation. Those most responsible for the conflict were often those placed at the heart of post-

conflict governance structures in ways that were responsive to human rights challenges to the state's inclusiveness, for example through power-sharing arrangements. Yet this form of inclusion also raised new questions as to the legitimacy and competence of both state and non-state actors who had been at the heart of the conflict to be builders of a new rule of law state capable of good government in the future. While the peace/justice debate is currently especially associated with tensions between amnesty and accountability (discussed further below), in fact it burst onto the scene in academic terms in an article by 'Anonymous' relating to Bosnia which did not focus on lack of accountability and transitional justice but dealt with the entire peace process and political settlement itself (Anonymous 1996; see also Gaer 1997). Writing about the conflict in Bosnia in 1996, just after the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) had been signed, 'Anonymous' pointed to how human rights advocates had opposed draft peace agreements on the ground that their constitutional arrangements conceded too much territory and power to those responsible for ethnic cleansing (Anonymous 1996). The author castigated the human rights community for prolonging the war in former Yugoslavia by insisting on requirements of justice. By judging every peace blueprint primarily in terms of whether it rewarded aggression and ethnic cleansing, human rights 'pundits' and negotiators, it was argued, had rejected pragmatic deals which, with hindsight, were as good or better than the eventual settlement reached in Dayton. The accusation against human rights actors was stark: '[t]housands of people are dead who should have been alive—because moralists were in quest of the perfect peace' (ibid: 258).

Closely related to the first tension, a second tension arose from the common approach of combining ceasefires with new constitutional frameworks. This approach meant that the short-term demands of peacemaking focused on 'negative peace'—ending conflict, demobilizing combatants and stabilizing the security situation—were coupled with the longer-term demands of peacebuilding focused on 'positive peace'—establishing inclusive state structures based on fundamental reform of political and legal institutions, establishing the

Notes

rule of law, and repairing the past. Short and long-term requirements of peacebuilding often appeared to be in tension with each other.

Third, a tension between the letter of human rights standards and the compromises necessary to peacebuilding played out with reference to diverse issues implicated in peace negotiations. For example, with regard to transitional justice, short-term demands of peacemaking, often with a human rights imperative of ending the conflict, seemed to require forms of amnesty and inclusion of those fighting the war. Longer-term attempts to build societies based on the rule of law, however, seemed to require a measure of accountability however 'soft'. Other tensions included tension over whether the political settlement would focus on liberal democracy or group participation. A political settlement focused on liberal democracy understands a singular political community to comprise the polis within an agreed territory, with elections and individual equality rights to be central to the concept of unified demos. In contrast a political settlement based on group accommodation using forms of complex power-sharing understands equality to require equal participation at the centre of the state's political and legal structures. Group equality measures can be in tension with individual equality measures. Similarly, tensions were also present in how return of refugees, displaced persons, and land were managed. While issues associated with return could not be achieved easily in the short term, in the longer term if conflict-fuelling Diasporas were not to persist, or localized disputes around return and land to re-ignite national conflict, then some sort of provision needed to be put in place. Yet return of the displaced can destabilize political settlements as well as stabilize them, in particular when it stands to rework ethnic demographics around which the new territorial divisions agreed in the peace process have been based.

Over the next decade each of these debates went on its own journey, from experimental practice influenced by normative standards, to attempted normative guidance, to normativized regulation, to retreat and disillusionment. Through this journey the attempted application of human rights law and humanitarian law to dilemmas of transition for

which they had not been designed, saw legal standards reshaped by political settlements, as much as shape them (see further Bell 2011, 2014). I set out this trajectory in three phases—somewhat caricatured—with their exact temporal boundaries of course more flexible than the caricature suggests

2.4.2 Activities in Development

If the first decade of the practice involved a creative attempt to use human rights to challenge simple deals of ‘splitting the difference’ between state and non-state actors, the second decade saw both peacebuilding and human rights having to negotiate their place in an ever more complex global landscape. I suggest that this landscape was characterized by contradictory moves to normalize and institutionalize human rights-based peacebuilding on the one hand, and increased international use of force-based solutions that simultaneously co-opted and dismantled human rights discourse on the other hand.

2.4.3 Institutionalizing human-rights based peacebuilding

As regards human rights, the second decade saw institutionalization of human rights-based approaches to mediation. Attempts to provide specific guidance as to the application of human rights in conflict saw standards developed in a process that continues to the present day, addressing the role of women (UN Security Council Resolution 1325 2000), the treatment of children (UNICEF 2007), return of displaced persons and refugees (UN Commission on Human Rights 1998), housing issues (UN Commission on Human Rights 2005), and, of course, transitional justice (UN Commission on Human Rights 1997: Annex II; UN Commission on Human Rights 2004). Over the decade these human rights agendas in relation to conflict often became almost new ‘regimes’ within the international legal system (for example the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda). Most notably, the attempt to embrace human rights and peacebuilding generated new international institutionalization. This ranged from the new peacebuilding architecture provided by

Notes

restructuring of the United Nations around the Peacebuilding Commission, and similar restructuring of regional organizations (for the African Union, see Engel and Porto 2010), to specific innovations such as the new UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.⁶

In some senses this normativization and institutionalization of human rights-based peacebuilding was a vindication of human rights arguments that mediation required some normative basis. Yet this approach sat uneasily with any sense of the politics of human rights practice as having to be negotiated into local political settlement processes rather than imposed. The increasing bureaucratization of the practice began to silo the practice into different institutions: for example, the UN Department of Political Affairs led mediation efforts; peacekeeping was the responsibility of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, with UNIFEM and later UN Women serving as the lead on women, peace and security, and matters such as constitution-making often lying with the UN Development Programme. Further, new normative initiatives, such as the responsibility to protect or the women peace and security agenda, often had an unclear relationship with long-established human rights treaties, risking undermining the standing of the treaty system and its enforcement mechanisms by becoming almost parallel regimes whose rights basis was much less clear.⁷

The new decade saw a ground-shift so that justice issues were placed centre stage. However, the tensions between human rights and peacebuilding had not been eliminated or accommodated; rather the pendulum had swung from a peacebuilding-first approach to a human rights first-approach. As a senior member of staff in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights proudly announced at a meeting I attended towards the end of the decade, ‘the peace/justice debate is over, and justice has won’. Except, of course, that the debate was not over—it had been driven by real dilemmas of how to create peace through getting those involved in violence to negotiate, and then to broaden and sustain

the peace agreement into a wider more normative constitutional framework. The shift towards the primacy of justice risked missing an opportunity to successfully manage the tensions between human rights and peacebuilding. Rather than a victory for human rights-first over mediation/peacebuilding-first approaches, what was needed was a nuanced practice of understanding rights and peacebuilding as a combined political practice. This practice needed to be rooted in the recognition that human rights always have to be negotiated into being in country- contexts, using complex political bargaining processes, if they are to be effective in addressing power. The apparent victory of human rights discourse was in a sense a defeat of this more political approach to human rights. It risked blueprinted approaches to human rights-based peacebuilding as a simple project of requiring liberal democratic frameworks, whether these had any traction or relevance to the power games being played within states or not.

2.5 RESTRUCTURING OF THE UN

2.5.1 Composition of Security Council

The Security Council of the United Nations has primary responsibility under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and its resolutions are binding on all member states. During the first forty-five years of its existence, the Council was largely paralysed by the Cold War, but since 1990 and the thawing of the global political climate, it has been very active.

The Security Council is composed of fifteen UN member States, five of which are permanent members -- United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation, and China. The permanent members have the power to 'veto' a substantive decision of the Council by voting against it. The veto is cast much less often now than it was during the Cold War, but it is still very much in use as a threat which blocks Council action.

Notes

The other ten members of the Council are elected by the General Assembly to two-year non-renewable terms, with five new members elected each year. The ten elected members, known in Charter language as "non-permanent members," are selected according to a distribution formula from each of the world's major regions. The Security Council meets formally in both private and public sessions. The meetings normally take place in the Security Council Chamber at UN headquarters in New York and there the Council votes on resolutions and conducts other official business. The Security Council meets occasionally in private, mainly to decide on its recommendation of a candidate for the position of the UN Secretary-General. Since 1990, the Council has conducted most of its business in private "consultations" (informal and off-the-record meetings) which are held on most weekdays during the year. Meetings are chaired by the powerful President, an office that rotates each month on an alphabetical basis among the Council's membership.

In addition to recommending the name of new secretary-general, the Council recommends new State members of the UN, and it elects judges to the International Court of Justice, jointly with the General Assembly. In the key realm of peace and security, it performs three main functions. It assists in the peaceful settlement of disputes. It establishes and oversees UN peace-keeping forces. And it takes enforcement measures against recalcitrant States or other parties.

Acting under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Council 'shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties' to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement (Article 33). And it may, if all the parties to a dispute request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a peaceful settlement (Article 38). In practice, the Council often asks the Secretary-General or one of his Special Representatives to mediate or negotiate under guidelines the Council has established. Increasingly the Council members themselves have travelled to conflict areas in an effort to directly negotiate settlements or mediate conflicts.

Though the first UN peace-keeping force was established by the General Assembly, subsequent forces have been established by the Security Council, which exercises authority and command over them. The Council delegates to the Secretary-General its powers to organize and to exercise command and control over the force, but it retains close management and oversight -- too much so in the view of many Secretariat officials and military commanders. Though the Charter does not expressly provide powers to the Council for peace-keeping forces, the International Court of Justice in a 1962 case found that the Council has an implied power for this purpose.

Peacekeeping forces are usually deployed by the Council only after ceasefires have been agreed upon and so the peacekeepers are only lightly armed and should not be confused with an army fighting an opposing force. In the post-Cold War period, with greater consensus among its members, the Council has established far more peacekeeping operations than in the past. At a peak in the mid-1990s there were over 70,000 peacekeepers deployed. Some large and complex operations not only include soldiers but also civilian police, election monitors, demining and demobilization experts, and civilian administrative personnel.

The Security Council may also take enforcement measures which are more robust than peacekeeping. These enforcement powers are contained in Chapter VII of the Charter, which authorises the Council to determine when a threat to, or breach of, the peace has occurred, and authorises it among other things to impose economic and military sanctions.

The 'peace' referred to in Article 39 may involve conflicts other than those between states. At the time the Charter was established, it was envisaged that conflicts within the borders of a state could also constitute a threat to or breach of the peace, and thus that the Council could order the use of enforcement measures. The Council has broadened its definition of these cases over time, so that gross violations of human

Notes

rights may now be seen as a threat to the peace, as was the case with the genocide in Rwanda.

In exercising its enforcement powers, the Security Council has imposed economic sanctions against a number of States and other parties. The great majority of these sanctions regimes have been imposed in the post-Cold War period. The Council imposed general trade sanctions on Iraq in 1990, but since then the Council has preferred to impose more "targeted" sanctions such as arms embargoes, travel bans, restrictions on diplomatic relations, and bans on key commodities like petroleum and diamonds.

Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the power to order the use of force to maintain or restore peace and security. However the collective use of force as a military sanction does not operate in the way originally intended. It was envisaged that States would conclude agreements with the United Nations, enabling the Council to require troop contributions to create and carry out military enforcement operations. Due to the Cold War this procedure was not implemented, and more recently there has not been the political will to return to the original intentions of the Charter.

Nonetheless the Security Council has delegated its Chapter VII powers to member States who volunteer their forces to carry out the enforcement action. These delegations of power include a delegation of a power of command and control over such forces, usually to those volunteering. Recently, the Council has delegated its enforcement powers to NATO in certain Balkan conflicts, to a force assembled by the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and to a multinational force led by Australia in East Timor. These are sometimes referred to as "coalitions of the willing." The best-known case is the coalition led by the United States that assembled under Resolution 678 in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The Council has delegated its Chapter VII powers to member States for the attainment of various objectives including to counter a use of force, to carry out a naval interdiction against a state, to achieve humanitarian objectives, to protect UN declared 'safe areas,' and to ensure implementation of a peace agreement. Member states are often less than satisfied with the results of these operations, which are frequently seen as reflecting the interests of the powerful states taking part, and not sufficiently reflecting the will of the Council or the international community as a whole. But as long as the United Nations is relatively weak and short of resources, such compromises in the face of urgent crises are likely to continue.

States and non-state actors have made a wide variety of proposals concerning potential reform of the work, size, and composition of the Security Council. Concerning size and composition, the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/26 in 1993 which established an Open-ended Working Group to 'consider all aspects of the question of increase in the membership of the Security Council'. The non-permanent membership of the Security Council has already been enlarged once in 1965 from six to its present ten. However any changes in the membership of the Security Council require an amendment of the Charter which can only take place with the consent of 'all the permanent members'. As such, it is highly unlikely that any formal changes concerning membership of the permanent members or their veto powers will be adopted.

- to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
- to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;
- to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
- to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;

Notes

- to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;
- to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
- to take military action against an aggressor;
- to recommend the admission of new Members;
- to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in "strategic areas";
- to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.

2.5.2 Development Bodies

Since its inception, the UN General Assembly has been a forum for lofty declarations, sometimes audacious rhetoric, and rigorous debate over the world's most vexing issues, from poverty and development to peace and security. As the most representative organ of the United Nations, the assembly holds a general debate in the organization's New York headquarters from September to December and convenes special sessions at other times to address a range of issues.

Global Governance to Combat Illicit Financial Flows

The seventy-fourth session of the General Assembly opened on September 17, 2019, with leaders convening for the general debate beginning September 24. U.S. President Donald J. Trump is scheduled to make his third appearance in front of the assembly and host numerous bilateral meetings with world leaders, including from India, Pakistan, South Korea, and Ukraine.

In their speeches, leaders will likely address issues such as the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and the dispute between India and

Pakistan over Kashmir. Additionally, the United States is expected to press its case against Iran amid rising tensions following recent attacks on an oil facility in Saudi Arabia. Climate change is also on the agenda this year, with a special Climate Action Summit taking place on the day before the general debate.

Check Your Progress 3:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. What are the Initiatives for Peace and Development?

.....
.....
.....

2. What is the Institutionalizing human-rights based peace building?

.....
.....
.....

3. Discuss about Composition of Security Council?

.....
.....
.....

2.6 LET US SUM UP

During most of the latter half of the 20th century, the two most powerful states in the world were the Soviet Union (USSR) and the United States (US). These two federations were called the world's superpowers.

Faced with the threat of growing German and Italian fascism, Japanese Shōwa statism, and a world war, the western Allies and the Soviet Union made an alliance of necessity during World War II. The pragmatic nature of this alliance and the underlying ideological differences between the

Notes

powers led to mutual suspicions between the allies after the Axis powers were defeated.

This struggle, known as the Cold War, lasted from about 1947 to 1991, beginning with the second Red Scare and ending with the Dissolution of the Soviet Union. Prominent Historian of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, wrote at the dawn of the post-Cold War era that the characteristics of the new era are not yet certain but it is certain that it will be very different from the Cold War era and it means that a turning point of world-historical significance took place:

The new world of the post-Cold War era is likely to have few, if any, of these [Cold War] characteristics: that is an indication of how much things have already changed since the Cold War ended. We are at one of those rare points of 'punctuation' in history at which old patterns of stability have broken up and new ones have not yet emerged to take their place. Historians will certainly regard the years 1989–1991 as a turning point comparable in importance to the years 1789–1794, or 1917–1918, or 1945–1947; precisely what has 'turned,' however, is much less certain. We know that a series of geopolitical earthquakes have taken place, but it is not yet clear how these upheavals have rearranged the landscape that lies before us

2.7 KEY WORDS

Article: An article is a word that is used with a noun to specify grammatical definiteness of the noun, and in some languages extending to volume or numerical scope. The articles in English grammar are the and a/an, and in certain contexts some.

UN: United Nation

Security Council: The United Nations Security Council is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, charged with ensuring international peace and security, accepting new members to the United Nations and approving any changes to its charter.

Uni-Polarity: Unipolarity in international politics is a distribution of power in which one state exercises most of the cultural, economic, and military influence.

2.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What is Uni-Polarity?
2. Write about Challenges to Nation-State.
3. What is the Challenging dimension of security after Cold war era?
4. What are the Initiatives for Peace and Development?
5. Write about Institutionalizing human-rights based peace building
6. Discuss the Composition of Security Council.

2.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Aziz, Nusrate, and M. Niaz Asadullah. "Military spending, armed conflict and economic growth in developing countries in the post-Cold War era." *Journal of Economic Studies* 44.1 (2017): 47-68.
- Henriksen, Thomas H. *Cycles in US Foreign Policy Since the Cold War* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
- Jones, Bruce D., and Stephen John Stedman. "Civil Wars & the Post-Cold War International Order." *Dædalus* 146#4 (2017): 33-44.
- Menon, Rajan, and Eugene B. Rumer, eds. *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order* (MIT Press, 2015).
- Peterson, James W. *Russian-American relations in the post-Cold War world* (Oxford UP, 2017).
- Sakwa, Richard. *Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order* (Cambridge UP, 2017) 362pp online review
- Wood, Luke B. "The politics of identity and security in post-Cold War Western and Central Europe." *European Politics and Society* 18.4 (2017): 552-556.

2.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) See Sub Section 2.2.1
- 2) See Sub Section 2.2.2

Check Your Progress 2

- 1) See Section 2.3

Check Your Progress 3

- 1) See Section 2.4
- 2) See Sub Section 2.4.3
- 3) See Sub Section 2.5.1

UNIT 3: THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

STRUCTURE

- 3.0 Objectives
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Diplomacy as Injustice
- 3.3 Scholarship of Injustice
- 3.4 Globalisation, Human Security and Justice
- 3.5 Let us sum up
- 3.6 Key Words
- 3.7 Questions for Review
- 3.8 Suggested readings and references
- 3.9 Answers to Check Your Progress

3.0 OBJECTIVES

After finishing up this unit 3 we can able to understand:

- To understand the Diplomacy as Injustice;
- To know about the Scholarship of Injustice;
- To know the Globalisation, Human Security and Justice.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Justice as a concept in International Relations is age-old and encompasses all spheres of state activity. It is of considerable relevance to resolve many critical problems in International Relations. Yet it may be noted at the very outset that, both at the diplomatic plane and within its mainstream scholarship, there is considerable insensitivity to the concern for justice in International Relations. Historically, the guiding principles of international regimes have been stability, predictability and order, but generally at the cost of justice. Today, despite increasing globalisation and its many implications for human security, this inadequacy persists. The present study would address the problems that confront the issue of justice in International Relations by examining and

analysing instances of injustice both at the diplomatic level and within its mainstream scholarship, and the reasons for its abiding continuity. It would review the causes of the disjunction in the behaviour of states as actors within the national and international arena analysing issues of diplomatic injustice and partisan scholarship in the present era of globalisation and their symbiotic link in breeding global inequality and insensitivity towards issues of human security. Overall, various dimensions of the issues of structural inequality of states, injustice, mainstream partisan scholarship and the manipulation of International Relations as a policy science insulated from the universal humanist heritage, within its contrived construction of a one-dimensional history in the service of the dominant and the powerful, would be investigated.

3.2 DIPLOMACY AS INJUSTICE

Injustice in International Relations has been persistent since the origins of relations between states. Empirically, it appears that states that generally abide by such elementary principles of justice like equality before law in their domestic politics tend to be less scrupulous about such principles in their international conduct. The example of the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of PoWs is a good case in this context. While the humanitarian laws codified in it manifested some concern for justice, they seem to have been inspired more by the pragmatism of its signatories to avoid reciprocal retribution, than the concern for universal justice per se. Besides, many of the same signatories showed no particular concern for justice in their demand for punishing reparations after the Second World War from the peoples of defeated states who had themselves been victims of their regimes' revanchist proclivities. The "war crimes" trial at Nuremberg and Tokyo are examples of "victors' justice" rather than universal justice, as Radhabinod Pal, the Indian judge stated in his dissenting judgement at Tokyo. More recently, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait even after the Cold War had ended, the United Nations' sponsored "police action" against Iraq, or even the bombing of civilian targets in Afghanistan, are examples of scant respect for the principles of justice. The United Nations' collective action in Iraq may have conformed to International Law within the

Charter provisions, and the victory may have made general Schwarzkopf, its Commander in Chief, a hero in his country, when he should at least have been tried for “war crimes” in the interests of justice for the sufferings that he brought on the innocent Iraqi peoples. Besides, the UN sanctions imposed against defeated Iraq aggravated the peoples’ sufferings without receiving much attention either within International diplomacy or its scholarly discourse. These are only random examples of insensitivity to the concern for justice in recent International Relations.

Besides, conceptual innovations and theoretical insights by the scholars of International Relations are also largely conceived within its historically rooted “statist fetishism,” and clichés of ‘legitimacy’, ‘balance of power’, ‘collective security’ and more strikingly ‘balance of terror’ to ensure order and enforcement of law rather than justice that would spontaneously motivate observance of law. This becomes counter-productive in the absence of any sovereign authority in International Relations to enforce law. An overview of International Relations in a historical perspective indicates scant respect for justice in an abiding sense. The period of colonisation, the Cold War, and the present phase of globalisation are all replete with instances of injustice. Even democratic states with established traditions of justice as the guiding principles of domestic governance have shown little concern for justice at the international plane. During the colonial era, for example, while almost all of Africa and Asia, still remained enslaved under colonial rule, US president Abraham Lincoln expressed his disapproval of slavery only within the United States; he lampooned the incongruity of “a nation consisting of half slaves and half free” citizens involved in the Civil War. European democracies in that era also limited their concern for “liberty, equality and fraternity,” and the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, as also the ideals of the Magna Carta within their respective nation-states. For example, Britain in this era waged the “opium war” against China in support of the East India Company’s right to smuggle opium. In India, it amputated fingers of silk weavers of Bengal to promote British textiles. The “massacre” of peaceful protesters at Jalianwalabagh (Amritsar) is a more telling example of injustice. Even some post-

Notes

colonial states after their national liberation, flying the flag of a global struggle for freedom and justice, as “nation-states” have swiftly conformed to the prevalent dismal standards of international justice, if not worse in some cases. Through the Cold War, most of the states within the global system, irrespective of their record of justice at home, generally conformed to the two Super Powers’ poor standards of international conduct, as role models. “The reluctance of democracies to extend their models of governance to interstate relations”, as David Held argues, had led to the striking paradox within the global system in which “the increase in the number of democratic states has not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in democracies among states.”

Overall, the running theme through all these incidents, together with the theoretical trends of the post-Cold War era that suggest the “end of history”; and the ahistorical predictions about a possible new “clash of civilisations”, seem to suggest renewed attempts to enforce universal order and stability within one’s own rules of the game by the dominant global power at the expense of universal justice. Krauthammer’s endorsement of this conception is indeed revealing. According to him: “We are in for “abnormal times.... Our best hope of safety in such times, as in difficult times past, is in the American strength and will—the strength and will to lead a unipolar world—unashamedly laying down the rules of the world order and being prepared to enforce them.”

Such prioritisation of justice between the realm of national and international politics is operationally hazardous. This became obvious with the unpredicted collapse of the post-war global system despite its obsessive concern for stability and order. Scholarship and diplomacy of contemporary International Relations seems incapable of learning from its failure to provide stability to the Cold War global system, or ensure its orderly transition. Besides, the concern for human rights as justice, despite its widespread legitimacy, still remains an instrument of international diplomacy as in the Cold War era, than for the emancipation of humanity to universal freedom and dignity. Such abiding insensitivity to the concern for universal justice constitutes the

original fault-line of International Relations, both at the diplomatic plane and its scholarship.

The abiding continuity of this disjunction in the concern for justice between the sphere of the domestic and international needs to be explored. If, empirically, this disjunction is more pronounced in the case of non-democracies-as seems to be the prevalent assumption-then the case for encouraging democracies within states, as actors within the global system assumes some importance to promote justice in International Relations. But this assumption appears to be empirically flawed, as we would argue. Yet this new orthodoxy of the international funding agencies of development (IMF and IBRD) is being pursued with the same zeal with which “Third World modernisation” was pursued by the Western powers during the Cold War through the “military and bureaucracy as its main vehicle.” Even among the available options, democracy remains the least unjust form of government; the importance of the democracy-variable as an instrument of international justice remains questionable. To explore this point further, we assume for the sake of argument that wars are the most extreme manifestation of unjust international conduct. Empirically, we find that most of the major wars across the world through the colonial era were among the European democracies, or initiated by them in their colonies in Asia and Africa. The significant exception was the Second World War plotted by Nazi Germany and the militarist Japan. Since then, however, in the Cold War era, most wars shifted from their predominantly European location to the Third World-various studies indicate-that the largest number of actual wars involved the United States either directly or by proxy. Above all, not all these wars by democracies were inspired by the principles of universal justice, as for example, the “colossal mistake” of the Vietnam War by the United States. Two equally distinguished democracies England and France-initiated wars, jointly against Egypt, and separately against Argentina, Iceland, Indo-china and Central Africa. As for preparations for war, like stockpiling of armaments, arms supply to civil wars across the world, involvement in “low intensity” insurgency operations, subversion of popular regimes, or illegal intelligence

Notes

operations and “proxy wars”, as examples of unjust international conduct, the record of the “free world” through the Cold War period most convincingly undermines the assumption of democracy within the state as a critical variable in the context of our present concern for justice in International Relations.

Even within the Third World, the record of the few democratic states does not lend much support of any great importance to the democracy variable for our purpose. The assumption that it is difficult for open democratic systems to secretly prepare for wars is also only partially true. For example, democratic US during “the McCarthy era” in the early 1950s devised constitutional and extra-constitutional arrangements to insulate the privileged status of “national security” from the transparency of democratic scrutiny, to launch the Cold War. Besides, apart from nuclear weapons, informed democratic discourse on most strategic armaments, including missiles, chemical and bacteriological weapons, still remains inadequate because of being shrouded in secrecy on grounds of national security. On this score the record of the more established democracies is not very different from the non-democracies. Thus for example, the US policy of global “military alignment” as an instrument of the Cold War, along with “security checks” on American citizens, was announced by president Harry Truman’s executive decree (NSC -68), and the war in Vietnam that involved 500,000 citizens as troops, was never declared by the US Senate, the only constitutionally empowered authority.

Similarly, the Anglo-French War against Egypt in 1956, or Britain’s military nuclearisation, was never discussed in the Cabinet, much less in the public arena. Such significant examples of dealing with ‘national security’ by democratic states undermine any possibility for a priori assumption of democracy as a critical variable in the concern for justice in the sovereign states’ international conduct. On the basis of our assumption that wars are the most extreme form of unjust international conduct, the historical record of democracies does not qualify this least unjust form of governance howsoever desirable otherwise-as self-

sufficient instruments for promoting justice in International Relations. At any rate, absence of war may be a necessary, but never sufficient, condition for peace, and much less for justice. Peace like justice has a more positive connotation, in terms of liberating human consciousness from the use or threat of force, as Prime Minister Attlee said at the San Francisco Conference in 1947. Given the weak empirical base of democracy as such, to explain the abiding disjunction between the sovereign states' concern for justice at the domestic and international plane, the need to analyse International Relations at the systemic level for possible clues needs to be pursued. As of now, this has been inadequately done at the scholarly plane.

Check Your Progress 1:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. Discuss the Diplomacy as Injustice.

.....

3.3 SCHOLARSHIP ON INJUSTICE

The disjunction in the concern for justice between the sovereign states' behaviour at the national and international plane, is not only reflected in the mainstream scholarly discourse, but by implication, it is even endorsed as part of Realism. As a reflection of reality to a certain extent it may be historically valid, but to the extent that the real is not always the rational, much less just, this sterile version of empiricism of mainstream scholarship in International Relations, with inadequate normative concern, has only helped in widening this disjunction. It has augmented the amorality of the global system across the board and in the field of its scholarship. As a policy science, to the extent its prescriptive formulations have conformed to such realism, International Relations has been an amoral instrument in the pursuit of power and, as an ally of the powerful, it has reinforced, dominance of the amoral and thus of injustice

Notes

within the international plane in general, and in some cases at the national plane under the pretext of ‘national security.’ This is how “Realism” in International Relations, both in scholarship and diplomacy, originating as instruments to promote the “national interests” of the post-Second World War era’s dominant economic and military Super Power, with nuclear monopoly, have been the flip side of injustice within the global system through the Cold War. This was predictable from the origins of the post-war global system, which simultaneously spawned the Realist hegemony at the intellectual plane and the Cold War within International Relations.

Since then, the symbiotic relationship between International Relations, and its mainstream scholarship, has remained a vicious circle at the cost of justice in diplomacy, and the concerns of this policy science. In fact, the emergence of International Relations as an autonomous field of scholarship in the United States, from its earlier moorings in diplomatic history, within the social base of the world’s dominant military and economic Super Power, has been quite fateful for its future, both at the diplomatic and scholarly plane. The spatial and temporal context of its origin shaped its priorities, hierarchy of concerns, and its future trajectory from its inception. It is yet to liberate itself from the constraints of its origin.

The same context shaped its scholarly identity as a policy science, de-linked from the social and human sciences, as well as International Law, and its domination by military strategic studies. This historical legacy still constrains its scholarship. From such origins, at the service of the policies of the “power elite” of the world’s dominant military and economic power, having the least in common with the rest of the world, International Relations has become an attractive career option by virtue of its professional rewards. But its intellectual inadequacies as a policy science, within the imponderables of its universe of discourse, have not improved its scientific legitimacy. The operational hazards of the Realist paradigm, in particular, its persistence with ahistorical predictions based on sterile empiricism, its inadequate sensitivity to normative concerns,

and its prioritization of stability and order at the cost of justice to begin with, were full of uncertainties. Such inadequacies are now part of universal common sense, as derived from the social and human sciences with established intellectual legitimacy. The unpredicted collapse of the Cold War global system built on the Realist paradigm again forcefully substantiated this universal common sense. Yet mainstream International Relations remains insensitive to learn from these lessons, and continues to be obsessed with such Realism.

Particularly striking in this context is the insularity of this scholarship from the intellectual resources of the social and human sciences. In Western political theory Plato's concept of Justice and Aristotle's analysis of Democracy, still remain classics that have historically inspired the upsurge of the liberal and democratic theories of the State, thus helping the democratic transformation of the European autocracies. The landmarks in the social history of the Western civilisation, the Reformation, Renaissance, the English, French and Russian Revolutions, as well as the American War of Independence, were all inspired by the idea of justice. Similarly John Locke's "possessive individualism," the Benthamite "felicific calculus," Mill's utilitarian version of the "greatest good of the greatest number," Rousseau's "General Will," Voltaire and Montesquieu's "Republican Agenda," de Tocqueville and Jefferson's ideas of democracy, Kant's treatises on "perpetual peace," and Hegel's idea of the "civil society" have inspired economists, sociologists and moral philosophers towards the blueprint for a just social order. The same concern for justice has been the mainspring of artistic and literary creativity across the world. Even in more recent times, the political scientist John Rawls' theory of justice and the economic philosopher Amartya Sen's idea of "entitlement" are rooted in the historical concern for justice derived in most academic disciplines from the philosophical traditions of the Western Enlightenment. They may have as much relevance within International Relations as they have proved to be in the democratisation process of sovereign states in the Western civilisation. Yet, Western scholarships on International relations refuse to draw from this vast reservoir of intellectual resources to promote justice.

Notes

Beyond this Western tradition, even in the Oriental civilisations, intellectual discourses on politics and statecraft, within the religious texts, literary epics and philosophical treatises have all been marked by the concern for justice. The Chinese revolution, for example, was also influenced by the Confucian ideas of justice along with that of Marx and Mao. The Indian literary epics, like the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, how ever fictional in their empirical base, powerfully portray the triumph of justice as a rational order in statecraft and war; they still remain alive within contemporary India's intellectual and political discourse to underscore the anomie of its modernity. The Gandhian vision of India's post-colonial state-to some extent reflected within its constitutional goals-was aimed to replicate the fictional ramrajya, howsoever utopian, in modern India. The colonial liberation movements in Asia and Africa, and the "Liberation Theology" of Latin America, have also been inspired by the ideals of universal freedom and justice. Not that justice has always triumphed, but has nevertheless remained a universal ideal of social transformation and political mobilisation for human emancipation.

Even at the popular plane, folk heroes of fiction and reality have been idolised for their struggle against injustice across the cultural and civilisational divide of humanity. From the fictional Spartacus leading the slave revolt in Roman times to the equally mythical Robin Hood in medieval England; Galileo and Garibaldi in Italy; Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King in America; Gandhi in India and Nelson Mandela in Africa, within their diverse temporal and spatial contexts, constitute a part of the universal human heritage of the struggle for justice, just as the Declaration of the Rights of Man, Statue of Liberty and the Tien Men Square are its universal metaphors. Yet, Western Realism in post-war International Relations opted for the "struggle for power" as the basis of "politics among nations". Its policy implications of "global military containment" of a diabolical ideological adversary, "in defence of national interest," are as much the classic tracts of their spatial and temporal context during the origin of the Cold War, as the 'end of history' after it. Similarly, the Military and the Bureaucracy as the

“vehicles of modernisation” for “political order” in the Third World, was the specific compulsion of US foreign policy in its search for allies in the Cold War, as the search for a new “clash of civilisations” after it. They have historically represented the national interests of the dominant and the powerful, which have appropriated the universal in their own terms.

As a policy science, International Relations have thus remained insulated from the universal humanist heritage, within its contrived construction of a one-dimensional history in the service of the dominant and the powerful. Its mainstream professionals have selectively opted for intellectual support from a narrow view of Machiavelli’s concept of the “Fox and the Lion” in statecraft, and his separation of politics from ethics delinked from the historical context; from the obscure Clausewitz’s cynical concept of war as “diplomacy by other means,” in the era of nuclear weapons. Others have opted for the amoral Nietzsche’s version of the “Superman” as a role model for the Super Power inspired by the Bismarckian diplomacy of “blood and iron” and Metternich’s alliance system. With such a selectively amoral intellectual base, Realism spawned the Cold War global system with inadequate concern for justice. From the same Western intellectual tradition, international relations could as well have drawn on Emmanuel Kant who systematically argued that the greatest evils which affect civilised nations are brought about by war, and not so much by actual wars in the past or the present as by “never ending and indeed continually increasing preparations for war.” Also, that citizen’s rights can prevail if the rule of law is sustained in all states as well as in International Relations; and that democracy within any political community is only possible when unimpeded by threats from other communities or from networks inter-community (international relations). This could have provided another version of reality for the Realist theory to draw upon in the interest of justice.

Meanwhile, selective manipulation of history as Realism continues to remain the critical instrument in the transformation of the post-war era’s dominant economic and military power to the postCold War era’s

Notes

hegemonic power, now encompassing the cultural domain. The intellectual hegemony of Realism within the global system and its mainstream scholarship has reinforced the history of its own construction, as a self-fulfilling prophecy. For its Super Power patron, it has reproduced a magnified “looking glass image” of itself, which has been rewarding for its national interest, as also for its professional academics as protagonists of Realism across the world. But this has been at the cost of justice within the global system and its consequent instability, and the weak scientific credentials of International Relations as a field of scholarship.

The primacy of the Realist version of “national security” has marginalised the UN-system built on the principles of collective security and universal justice as the basis for a durable and rational order. Its social, economic and humanitarian agencies have been particularly under siege by the global power structure. Its main economic instruments of post-War global reconstruction—the World Bank and the IMF—were from their inception delinked from the hazards of the democratic principles of the UN-system, as originally envisaged, and brought firmly within the control of the United States’ Administration. The UN-system survived through the Cold War by generally conforming to the global power hierarchy, at the cost of its ideals of universal justice. After the end of the Cold War, there have been new pressures, against this institution to reform itself to conform to the new reality of a unipolar world. Meanwhile, the World Bank and the IMF have emerged as the dominant actors shaping the form, content, and rules of the game within the post-Cold War process of globalisation. The operational hegemony of “national security” over collective security in the Cold War system, and the new mystique of the “global market” appear to be flip sides of the continuity of dominance, through the appropriation of the universal by the powerful. The “interdependence” of the military alliances of the Cold War, and the global “interdependence” promoted by the new trading blocs across the world, appears to some as comparable. Such perceptions impede universal justice in the new era, in the absence of any move towards democratising the global system.

Overall, the global system emerging from the Cold War has also remained structurally unjust as the colonial system preceding it. Whether assessed on the Gandhian principles of justice, based on the “needs of the poorest among the poor;” or, John Rawls’ principle of “justice as fairness,” based on the “greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” and not devised within “a veil of ignorance”; or even Amartya Sen’s concept of “entitlement”-as justice; the global system has been unjust for the majority of humanity, consisting of the poor and the disadvantaged. Historically, this majority drawn from the post-colonial Afro-Asian states, as “Third World,” found itself integrated at the periphery of the global system which, for the first time, became universal, but with unequal options for the individuals, groups and states constituting the system. After the Cold War, the global system, with new distortions emerging from its unplanned collapse remains a historical liability in the context of our concern for justice. The recurrent disjunction in the concern for justice in the sovereign states’ behaviour at the national and international level may be better explained by the endemic injustices historically inherited within the global system. Emanuel Kant may be more relevant to explain and provide the recipe for its reform, than the Realists who perpetuate it to thrive of it.

As an instrument of injustice, rather than a catalyst of human emancipation like other sciences, the moral legitimacy of International Relations has remained compromised. Its conceptual, methodological and theoretical resources, empirically rooted in the historical experience of a temporally, spatially, numerically and culturally limited segment of humanity, largely in Europe, appears inadequate to deal with the complexities of a global system that is now universal and more globalised. Its structural inadequacies have been reinforced through the Cold War. Its empiricist obsession has made scholarship in International Relations particularly vulnerable to misinformation and disinformations around “colossal mistakes” and *raison d’etat*. Theories and concepts, rooted in such distortions, constitute its intellectual and moral liabilities. Consequently, “the scientific credentials of International Relations as a

field of scholarship remain somewhat overstated.” Fred Halliday, with greater analytical rigour, perhaps overstates it: “Academic study of International Relations is a sub-field of news commentary...the world of International affairs is a carnival of the bluff and philistine.”

Check Your Progress 2:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. Discuss the Scholarship of Injustice.

.....
.....
.....

3.4 GLOBALISATION, HUMAN SECURITY AND JUSTICE

The breathing space conjuncturally created for normative concerns within International Relations by the sudden collapse of the Cold War global system is refreshing, in the context of its historical record. While such an opportunity cannot be allowed to lapse by default, it may be prudent to be cautious against the temptation to be over-ambitious. For, many options for universal justice, either in the Kantian, Gandhian or Rawlsian sense, remain historically non-viable in the foreseeable future. It may be more realistic to direct our concern towards optimising such incremental potentials for justice within the global system as long as the new milieu lasts.

We know from universal history, beyond mainstream International Relations that the process of globalisation did not begin with the end of the Cold War; nor did International Relations begin with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) between the European Powers. Each phase of the long historical process of globalisation has left its trail of social, economic, political and humanitarian complexities in an interwoven web across the world. They have varied contemporary relevance in the different regions, and have been documented in the many traditional disciplines with

established intellectual legitimacy, like History, Economics, Anthropology, Sociology and Political Science. These are established disciplines with conceptual, theoretical and methodological resources, unlike the limited scientific resources of International Relations.

From such sources, it is evident that the process of globalisation through military conquests, religious proselytisation and maritime trade had considerable historical relevance centuries later at the time of the transformation of the European nation-state as secular democracies in relatively more recent times. Similarly, globalisation of Buddhism in Asia as well as of Islam and Christianity across the world; of mercantile capitalism leading to the Spanish and Portuguese immigration to South America and Europeans in North America; or, the Soviet system of globalisation in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Central Asia during the Cold War; and the Japanese globalisation in Asia have differing relevance in these diverse regions' complexities after the Cold War. There has also been globalisation of the African slave trade, indentured Indian labour and mercenary soldiers of British colonies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. More recently, globalisation of the criminal under-world, hand-in-glove with the military-civilian oligarchies of the Cold War, and transnational banks like the liquidated Pakistan-owned BCCI involved in drug traffic and money-laundering have played their specific globalising roles in crime and terrorism. These are among the historical legacies of the process of globalisation, with varied relevance to contemporary problems in the different regions of the world, and the security concerns of individuals, groups and communities as citizens of diverse sovereign states. The different components of this historical process have been analysed by social and economic historians and portrayed in literary classics and visual arts, as expressions of the reality.

Admittedly, globalisation ushered in by the Cold War has been significantly different from all its predecessors, in terms of its scale, pace and momentum. This is because of the unequalled levels of economic, military and technological power at its behest. But while the Cold War

Notes

had territorially limited the process of globalisation broadly within two global ideological divides-just as it was restricted within their different colonial systems in the preceding era-the collapse of the socialist system has universalised the global capitalist market. The disadvantaged groups perceive this market as an extension of the global power structure with one hegemonic power, as envisaged by the US “power elite” at the outset of the Cold War. Consequently, there is absence of any global consensus around the neo-liberal ideological offensive towards economic globalisation through “structural adjustment” of the national economies. There exists thus scepticism and hostility against globalisation as a continuation of the dominance of the powerful in a new garb across the world. Resultantly the present phase of globalisation raises doubts about the durability of the normative concerns spawned by it.

With the sovereign state still relevant in International Relations, the post-Cold War power hierarchy remains as skewed in favour of the dominant few as in the earlier system. This is also particularly true in the Third World with its unequal regional, sectoral and individual beneficiaries of the Cold War developmental model. The consequent global market and its subsidiary regional trading blocs, generally reflect their respective power hierarchy. The World Bank and the IMF, the apex global funding regime, monitoring the globalisation process of the national economies to the world market, reflect the same power structure; their chief executives are still nominated by the US president, approved by the US Senate, on behalf of the world capitalist market.

The fund-strapped UN-system of collective security across the world has been under pressure to reform itself to conform to the same hierarchy by the United States as the hegemonic power, its richest member, largest contributor and biggest defaulter. Within this empirical reality, the new ideology of globalisation seeking to legitimise the hegemony of the world market over state sovereignty, and its extension to the national markets, is unlikely to have strikingly different consequences for justice and human security within the global system than its predecessor. On the contrary, in the changed context, economic rationality appears to be the

updated version of new Realism. The economic rationality of the unequal capitalist market is unlikely to create a different version of “interdependence,” or social justice than the “national security” of the Cold War era. The new rationality, insulated from any special concern for universal justice, is more likely to reinforce at the global level, the experience of early capitalist development within the European national economies, in the absence of any sovereign global authority as a substitute for the state. The disjunction in the concern for justice at the national and international plane may even increase within this new version of globalisation as some trends after the terrorist strike on the New York Twin Towers already indicate. A way out of this depressing scenario may be to draw upon the historical resources of traditional scholarship to promote justice in International Relations.

Historically, mainstream Western social and human sciences, drawing upon its moral and intellectual resources, laid the foundations for Liberal Democracy, the welfare state, as well as the Socialist state in their concern for justice within the ongoing process of globalisation. The relevance of this historical experience to International Relations, in the context of our concern for justice within the present global system, still remains largely unexplored. Incidentally, while the empirical base of Realism in “national security” was rooted in the European experience, the neo-realist mystique of market justice is almost singularly rooted in the unique American experience. Consequently as a universal principle, realism of national security and the neo-realism of market justice, appear to be flip sides of the recurrent reality within International Relations of the universal being appropriated by the powerful, at the cost of justice. This appropriation has manifested itself also at the level of concepts with built-in policy priorities and consequent hierarchies.

For example, the universalisation of the Post-Second World War as the historical “post-war” era was a conceptual trivialisation of the concerns of the vast majority of the “post-colonial” era’s humanity, with an abiding impact on the priorities of the global system and its hierarchy. For, the concept structurally prioritised between the historically

Notes

asymmetrical concerns of post-war reconstruction in Europe and Japan and the post-colonial agenda of nation building. The agenda involving the social, economic, political, institutional and humanitarian transformation constituted their critical security concerns, rather than the Realist version of “national security” directed against an identified external threat. This Realist version as mainstream International Relations spawned the “Third World,” to which the European Cold War was extended, as in the case of the two earlier “world wars”. The historical asymmetry in the priorities of post-war reconstruction, and post-colonial nation-building, was operationally manifested when the Cold War global system enabled relative security, economic prosperity, and political stability in North America, Europe and Japan at the cost of wars, threats of war, political instability and domestic repression in the Third World was accompanied by such economic growth as possible through foreign aid to regimes of military and civilian oligarchies. This was not conducive to justice within the global system.

The end of the Cold War is yet to manifest itself through any significant dent in the entrenched ancien regimes of the Cold War within the “Third World,” or within many countries of the former “Second World” despite their regime changes through some form of “elections.” This may explain the continuity of wars, its threats and preparations, ethnic divisiveness, religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, social violence, crime, drugs, and threat of famine in these regions, coexisting with economic prosperity and political stability within the states, which have been the apparent victors of the Cold War. That explains the abiding attraction of migration from the disadvantaged to the affluent parts of the global system causing new complexities. Consequently, the end of this history cannot be a cause for universal celebration, nor inspire universal confidence about the concern for justice within the new global order. For, the process of globalisation of the Cold War era, built on the historically inherited disparities of the earlier phase, has reinforced its structural asymmetry with new distortions. The new globalisation through economic liberalisation and cultural homogenisation has spawned fresh

complexities, at the cost of justice and human security within the global system.

The transnational corporations as instruments of the new globalisation process have created networks of global interdependence within hierarchies of national sovereignties. Global transnationals still fly their national flags, with the State as its ally. General Motors, Enron, IBM, Rolls Royce, Siemens, Sony and Toyota, for example, are still their respective national ‘flagships,’ and as diplomatic instruments have assumed greater legitimacy in the new era of globalisation. Such corporate power, controlling technology, management, capital, and consumer preferences, have an unequal leverage on many weaker states with raw materials and labour as their only bargaining instruments while competing with others for corporate favours. Obviously, this unequal leverage cannot be the basis for global inter-dependence. On the contrary, they have spawned hierarchies of state sovereignties within the post-Cold War global order as before. Overall, the consequences of unequal options, within the global market with free trade, cannot be conducive to universal equality, much less justice.

Within the new dispensation of the Intellectual Property Rights Convention, some oriental traditional medicines, like neem and turmeric have already been appropriated by Western patents, despite Indian protests. In return, Western consumer preferences, American culture and taste have flooded the world market undermining many ancient lifestyles among the younger generations across the world. Within this process of globalisation through free trade, the global cultural attractions of the West are more a product of its technology and communication, than necessarily its aesthetic content or moral concerns. It has accentuated the ‘generation-gap’ in many non-Western societies. By profitably communicating Western consumer preferences as the main metaphor of a superior life-style, the new globalisation process has accentuated the global hierarchy of sovereignty while making the transnational more attractive, and hence more difficult to bargain with. The conflict between tradition and modernity, continuing through the colonial era, and

Notes

accentuated by the Cold War process of globalisation, has sharpened within the “Third World” by the appeal of the populist versions of Western modernity profiled through its powerful communication and technology. Religious fanaticism, ethnic divisiveness and regional tensions, stoked as instruments of the Cold War, have found new symbols to survive, with a different impact on the various regions of the global system. But the most critical adverse impact of this process of globalisation is in the sphere of human resources, encompassing technology, management, education, health and creative arts. Sieved through increasingly harsh and selective immigration policies of the rich states, despite their commitment to “free trade,” the best talents in most spheres of creativity after acquiring their skills in the subsidised educational institutions have been attracted to the promised utopia, in exchange for the mediocre talents of transnational executives from the West. Apart from the substantial capital transfer on this account, that replicates the colonial global division of labour, its long-term impact on the global intellectual hierarchy cannot exactly be conducive to universal justice. Despite such an impact of the historical process of globalisation, the end of the Cold War has spawned concerns around democracy, human rights, gender equality and environment within the mainstream of International Relations both at the operational and scholarly plane. Some of these of concerns have also led to global networks of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with motivated and skilled cadres.

While these manifestations of the new globalisation process needs encouragement, there is a need for caution against over optimism. Yet, the globalisation of such concerns has opened new options for justice in International Relations, particularly within such sovereign states where democratic politics has been inadequate either to reflect these concerns within their political discourse or operationalise them in public policies. For example, gender justice, human rights, child labour, deforestation, drug trafficking, in many traditional societies and under-developed economies now have global constituencies to combat against local insensitivities, corrupt governments and powerful local vested interests.

This is also valid for the democratisation process of the “Third” and “Second” world encouraged by the coordinated policies of the donor agencies in the Western world. But the potentials of democratic transformation of entrenched oligarchies exclusively through external inspiration are limited. Besides, the structurally inequitable global system controlled by the rich and the powerful, despite their protestations of democracy, is not exactly conducive to the democratic transformation of its periphery. These historical liabilities of the Cold War global system are not easily adaptable to democratic transformation, less so, within a global system that recurrently manifests the disjunction in the concern for justice at the domestic and international plane. That is the sense in which democratisation of the post-war global system, and its peripheral states, are dialectically linked, to promote universal human security as justice in International Relations.

Check Your Progress 3:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. Discuss the interrelation between Globalisation, Human Security and Justice.

.....
.....
.....

3.5 LET US SUM UP

Within this framework, and the new opportunity within International Relations, it may be possible to build a global consensus, ideally through the network of NGOs, around such normative principles and institutions which have considerable legitimacy, despite their operational inadequacies. This is to ensure that the consensus-building process around principles of justice in its initial phases directed to a path of least resistance. Concurrently three such areas immediately come to mind:

Notes

- a) Democratisation of the UN-system as the “Centre for Harmonising the Actions for Humanity,” as envisaged in its Preamble, particularly its social, economic and humanitarian institutions of universal justice.
- b) Ensuring the enforcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both through the United Nations as well as through NGOs.
- c) Ensuring regional development and external funding based on the index of human development at the national level as the operational version of “entitlement” as justice and with the NGOs monitoring it.

Along with these broad rubrics, gender justice and environmental protection need special emphasis because of their universal legitimacy, despite regional operational inadequacies in specific regions. But to be an effective catalyst at the operational plane, scholarship of International Relations needs to take a critical look at the state of the discipline and its resource base. To be able to undermine the “statist fetishism” of its operation, scholarship of International Relations must insulate itself from the endemic hazards of this source of information and data. The state and the mainstream media even within the “free world,” as exclusive sources of official information, have proved to be particularly vulnerable to disinformations around *raison d’etat* as during the McCarthy era in the United States. Consequently, social and human sciences around related issues could be explored as the alternate resource base of the scholarship of International Relations for circumventing the insensitivity of sovereign states to justice in their respective International Relations. NGOs could be an additional source of empirical data for International Relations. Equally important is the field of creative and visual arts as a source of empirical reality within International Relations, as it has already become in the field of social and human sciences.

For example, Picasso’s *Guernica* as an evidence of Nazi atrocities, or Chaplin’s films as the social reality of economic depression; or the Hiroshima War memorial of the nuclear explosion despite being quantified, are no less convincing evidence of the empirical reality than the official archives. Similarly, Satyajit Ray, Mrinal Sen, Adoor Gopalakrishnan or the Neo-realist films are no less convincing evidence

of the Indian social reality than the quantified official data of governments. It requires creative imagination to incorporate them within the scholarship of International Relations. But as sources of justice they have as much potential as the quantified official records. For justice in International Relations beyond Realism, the resources of the human and social sciences, along with the creative arts, could be explored to advantage till such time as its own scholarship liberates itself from its present roots in facilitating dominance of the powerful, to being a catalyst of universal human emancipation.

3.6 KEY WORDS

Globalization: Globalization is the word used to describe the growing interdependence of the world's economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade in goods and services, technology, and flows of investment, people, and information

Human Rights: Human rights are moral principles or norms that describe certain standards of human behaviour and are regularly protected as natural and legal rights in municipal and international law.

Human Security: Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be at the human rather than national level.

Justice: Justice, in its broadest context, includes both the attainment of that which is just and the philosophical discussion of that which is jus

3.7 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Write a short note on diplomacy as injustice.
2. Why do you think injustice in diplomacy recurs?
3. What are the historical liabilities of scholarship in International Relations?
4. What has been the impact of Realism on International Relations?
5. Discuss the main trends in the historical process of Globalisation.
6. In what sense is the post-Cold War process of globalisation different from the earlier phase?

3.8 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Carlsnaes, Walter; et al., eds. (2012). Handbook of International Relations. SAGE Publications. ISBN 9781446265031. Retrieved 2016-02-24.
- Dyvik, Synne L., Jan Selby and Rorden Wilkinson, eds. What's the Point of International Relations (2017)
- Reus-Smit, Christian, and Duncan Snidal, eds. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (2010)

3.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) See Section 3.2

Check Your Progress 2 2

- 1) See Section 3.3

Check Your Progress 3

- 1) See Section 3.4

UNIT 4: EMERGING POWERS

STRUCTURE

- 4.0 Objectives
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 Middle Powers as Emerging Powers: Some Definitional Issues
- 4.3 Major Approaches to Understanding Middle Powers
 - 4.3.1 Importance of Position
 - 4.3.2 Place of Geography
 - 4.3.3 Normative Approach
- 4.4 Behavioural Approach
 - 4.4.1 General Attributes of Middle Power Behaviour
 - 4.4.2 Concluding Observations on Middle Powers
- 4.5 Middle Powers in the Era of Cold War
- 4.6 Relocation of the Idea of Middle Power and the Emerging Powers
 - 4.6.1 Categorization of Middle Power Activities
 - 4.6.2 Observations - Some of the Emerging Powers
- 4.7 Let us sum up
- 4.8 Key Words
- 4.9 Questions for Review
- 4.10 Suggested readings and references
- 4.11 Answers to Check Your Progress

4.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit we can able to understand the bellows:

- To know about the Middle Powers as Emerging Powers: Some Definitional Issues
- To discuss the Major Approaches to Understanding Middle Powers

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Countries such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan and South Africa are; in some very significant ways, emerging powers in the

Notes

international system of the post-Cold War era. Notably, these are all middle powers-defined and understood in various ways. Middle powers, as emerging powers in the post-Cold War period, are assuming new roles and using innovative diplomatic techniques in some very distinctive ways. At the same time, no doubt, these countries are facing numerous new challenges too. The term 'emerging power' is quite subjective and even misleading. Middle power, no doubt a somewhat ambiguous and vague a term, nevertheless is used more objectively, and yields useful insights into the foreign policy priorities, diplomatic styles and position of such countries in the evolving international order. Therefore, it is from the middle power perspective that the emerging powers, listed in this Unit, have been discussed.

Middle powers are states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system. Despite problems of classification, a consensus has developed that states such as Australia, Canada, Norway and Sweden are middle powers. However, that consensus on middle-power identification is being undermined by the recent inclusion of such states as, among others, Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Malaysia, South Africa and Turkey in the middle-power category. However, this grouping of states as diverse as Brazil and Canada, or South Africa and Sweden together raises the issue of the usefulness of the middle-power concept and risks undermining the concept's analytical power. The aim of this article is to rescue the concept from increasing vagueness by drawing a distinction between traditional middle powers. According to Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, middle powers are recognizable by their foreign policy behaviour. Middle-power foreign policy is not determined by the constitutive features of middle-power states, or by their positions in the world system, although these features do shape their internationalism, however. It is instead, a product of contextually located deliberate action. Attempts at identifying middle powers focus on at least one, but more usually a combination, of the following characteristics: considerations of state capacity, position in the world order, the normative composition of the

middle-power state–societal complex, domestic class interests, and the role and influence of foreign policy-makers. Despite similar ontologies, the theoretical preferences of authors become more apparent when considering the explanatory weight given to the aforementioned constitutive features of middle powers. Liberals (such as Cooper, Higgott and Nossal) emphasize agency in middle-power foreign policy, realists (such as Holbraad) focus on state capacity, whereas neo-Gramscians (such as Cox and Neufeld) privilege the position of middle powers in the global political economy and elite complicity in the neo-liberal project as explanatory variables.

4.2 MIDDLE POWERS AS EMERGING POWERS: SOME DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

Middle power as a category suffers from normative defects. It is, therefore, difficult to define the term neatly. Since the concept is somewhat loose and problematic, scholars have used different criteria to define middle powers and have come up with different lists of countries that meet their respective criteria. Adding to the problems is the fact that all middle powers do not behave in the same fashion. They have different resources, styles and contexts of their foreign policies. Besides, over a period, countries may gain or lose their status and role as middle powers in the international system. Therefore, one should not put too much emphasis on the generic pattern of middle power behaviour.

Nonetheless, the framework remains useful in understanding the foreign policy priorities and behaviour of countries, which perceive themselves as middle powers and are so perceived by others also. The continued relevance of the framework can be gauged from the fact that the framework has withstood the transformative changes witnessed in the international system from the end of the Second World War to the end of Cold War and after.

Constitutive differences between traditional and emerging middle powers

Notes

Traditional middle powers are stable social democracies, whereas democracy in emerging middle powers is often far from consolidated, and in many cases only recently established, with undemocratic practices still abounding. Furthermore, in emerging middle powers democracy often stands superimposed onto a society with deep social cleavages, whether in terms of class (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, South Africa) or ethnicity (e.g. Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa), the popular contestation of these cleavages having been placed largely beyond the scope of polyarchical democracy. Furthermore, democracy in some emerging middle powers often seems of a poorer quality than that found in traditional middle powers, considering, for example, commonplace human rights abuses in Nigeria, Malaysia and Turkey and one-party domination in countries like South Africa and Malaysia. Traditional middle powers qua middle powers came to prominence during the Cold War. The insecure positions of smaller states powerlessly caught in the standoff between the two superpowers resulted in a foreign policy highly concerned with military and political issues. Emerging middle powers rose to assume their internationalist postures after the Cold War. The bygone insecurities of the Cold War meant the reduction of military and strategic concerns in foreign policy and a concomitant increased importance for economic matters. Global poverty-related problems have assumed increasing significance vis-à-vis the receding threat of nuclear annihilation, allowing space (and voice) for economically threatened states (with emerging middle powers often acting as the spokesperson for this group) to draw attention to the threat poverty poses for them (compared with the threat it poses for traditional middle powers). This stands in contrast with the Cold War era when traditional middle powers highlighted the collateral military threat posed to them by their superpower neighbours (although they were not blind to economic matters). The passing of the Cold War has also witnessed much lower tolerance for undemocratic regimes as the United States no longer has to placate its old alliance partners. Even so, it remains rather quiet on the undemocratic practices of many of its strategic partners, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and China. However, generally speaking, liberal

democracy has been posited as a principle all states are expected to move towards.

4.3 MAJOR APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING MIDDLE POWERS

The subject of International Relations has for long dealt with the category of countries that are described as middle powers. Scholars and practitioners of diplomacy have defined middle powers generally in structural terms highlighting aspects of aggregate state power, location in the hierarchy of states, or idealist, normative influences in their foreign policies.

4.3.1 Importance of Position

It is most common to define a middle power by its position in the international hierarchy. In this view, middle powers are said to be those occupying the 'middle' point in a range of bigness and smallness-usually increased by reference to such quantifiable attributes as area, population, size, complexity and strength of the economy, military capability, and other comparable factors. In this first approach, middle powers are sometime equated with medium or intermediate powers. However, such an approach has its own problems. Particularly, how to work out quantifiable measures of power? Nevertheless, such an approach clearly satisfies the need to differentiate between those states, which are not great powers but are not the minor powers either.

4.3.2 Place of Geography

Others, by contrast, have suggested that middle powers are derived from a state's geography. A middle power, it is asserted, is a state physically located 'in the middle' between the system's great powers. The geographical approach has at least two variants. One suggests that a state, which is power within its geographical region, might usefully be thought of as a middle power. In this view, middle powers are actually regional

powers. Another variant, common in the bipolar Cold War period, suggested that middle powers are those, which occupy the kind of a 'middle' position, ideologically, between the polarized great powers. They generally included neutral and Non-aligned states-India, Sweden and Yugoslavia-in this category. The criteria of size and geography have also been used to describe countries, which are regional powers. Regional powers are predominant in their respective sub-regions but really not necessarily be middle powers. Being predominant, they are able to influence the course of events in their regions and, therefore, eligible too many middle power attributes. But one should not take all regional powers to be middle power.

4.3.3 Normative Approach

A third approach, and it is more widely accepted, is the normative view of middle powers. In this view, middle powers are seen as potentially wiser or more virtuous than states positioned either 'above' them (the great powers) or 'below' them (the minor powers). They are thought to be 'good international citizens'; especially middle powers such as Australia and Canada, which claim that their foreign policies are inspired and infused with 'liberal internationalism' the normative view, middle powers are thought to be trustworthy because they can exert diplomatic influence without the likelihood of recourse to force. They also have a good past record of conduct and contribution to the working of the international system, and thereby, they would also have earned some rights and credibility, including in the perception of the great powers. Because of this, countries located 'in the middle' are portrayed as taking their responsibilities in the creation and maintenance of global order seriously.

Such a view that ascribes certain nouns to middle powers however has its own difficulties:

- i) Such middle powers may take high moral ground but their actual conduct does not always stand close scrutiny. Contrast,

for example, Australian and Canadian rhetoric Kuwait's sovereignty in the Gulf conflict of 1991 with their silence on Indonesia's invasion and annexation of East Timor in 1975. They may have the 'arrogance of no power' and end up taking very rigid stands, which certainly is not the essence of inter-state relations.

- ii) A second difficulty with the normative approach is that it tends to exclude a wide variety of states, which might reasonably claim membership in the rank of the middle powers according to other criteria. Their proclaimed idealism and virtuosity alone cannot be the normative basis of middle power category.
- iii) One also notices that such like-minded 'good international citizens' are all developed northern states of middle size- Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden- rather than a broader range of states that might include such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Nigeria or Poland.

Check Your Progress 1:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. Discuss Middle Powers as Emerging Powers: Some Definitional Issues.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

2. Write about the Importance of Position approach.

.....
.....
.....

-
.....
3. Write about the Normative approach.
-
.....
.....
.....
.....

4.4 BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH

It is argued, therefore, that the essence of middle power diplomatic activity is captured best by emphasizing not by what this group of countries should be doing but what type of diplomatic behaviour they do, or could, display in common. This fourth approach, the behavioural, pays more attention to particular behaviours associated with middle powers. According to this approach, middle powers strongly pursue multilateral solutions to international problems. They elaborate compromise and work to build consensual positions in international disputes. They uphold values of 'good international citizenship' to guide their diplomacy. Importantly, and above all, their behavioural is guided by a belief in their technical and entrepreneurial ability to fulfill such roles. 'rec noted Canadian diplomat and scholar, W. H. Holmes has described it as the 'functional' resources for effective performance of' middle power roles.

4.4.1 General Attributes of Middle Power Behaviour

To recapitulate the discussion, it is clear that there is not one scientific definition of middle power. Also, all middle powers do not always behave in the fashion. It also needs to become clear that middle power behaviour has been far from static in nature. As the international system has changed, we have seen dramatic modifications in the behaviour of these states. One cannot also ascribe any permanence to middle powers: countries do gain and lose middle power characteristics. Yet, there

remains something notable about their foreign policies and their conduct in the international system. Let's therefore examine, are the middle powers'? How do they behave and why they behave in the May they behave?

- 1) Middle powers are not great powers, not because they do not have the intensely capabilities or the economic strength of the great powers reality, in terms of size, military capability or economic development level, a middle power may not be different from a great power. But they are not small powers either. Countries perceive themselves as middle powers and position themselves in the international system so as to view it differently, rather independently. This they do, so as to mark their presence in international affairs; and, importantly, not to leave the international system to the vagaries of the great powers.
- 2) Middle powers are multidimensional. At its core, the concept of middle power diplomacy signifies a certain type and a certain content of foreign policy based on an attachment to multilateral institutions and a collaborative world order. A middle power does not view itself to be effective if working alone. Working through multidimensional institutions or in a small group of states: middle powers are capable of systemic impact. The term evokes caution, equivocalness, and issue-specific activism, even leadership. It calls for an agile and flexible form of statecraft on top of a firm sense of international commitment. Middle powers have, so to say, their 'own ways of doing things'; their strength lies in pursuing accommodation, consensus and voluntarism. They are multidimensional and 'good international citizens', though not necessarily always. Only in a norms-based multilateral international system, middle powers can play their due roles and check the arbitrary and unilateral tendencies of the great powers. In some very important ways, middle powers thus challenge the notion that power alone is or could be the basis of international relations.

- 3) Middle powers are 'functional' powers. The principle of 'functionalism' means that middle powers have comparative advantage in certain specific areas. They have requisite resources and skills in select areas, where they can make a difference in the functioning of the international system. Admittedly, these resources and specialized skills are not uniform to all the middle powers; nor do they remain constant. These resources and skills could be, for instance, in the area of international peacekeeping, mediation.

In other words, by working upon their comparative advantage, middle powers contribute in their own distinct ways, what even great powers cannot, to the international system. The 'functional' middle powers are able to check the unilateral tendencies and coercive behaviour: generally associated with the foreign policy of big powers. Their middle range capabilities allow them to pursue, what today is called, 'niche diplomacy'? They are good in international coalition building because they carry a certain weight and credibility in the international system. Since they are unlikely to subordinate their coalition partners to their own ends, they make acceptable leaders. They pursue 'niche diplomacy' because they have the credibility with the weak and the powerful alike. Even great powers on occasions rely on middle powers for their credibility and mediatory skills. Theoretically, even small powers could have issue-specific comparative advantage; but middle powers are capable of holding on to their own in the international system dominated by great powers. Besides, they are able to marshal necessary sources to back up their commitments. Middle powers do not suffer capability gap, which small powers generally do. In short, middle powers are invariably committed to broadening and maximizing, what is called, the 'Grotian perspective' in international politics-promoting rule of law, dialogue and building, etc.

4.4.2 Concluding Observations on Middle Powers

Based on the above: scholars have pointed out other roles which are common in varying degrees to all middle powers: roles of regional, sub-regional leadership, functional leadership, role as system stabilizers, negative roles as 'first followers' and 'fence sitters', and roles as 'good international citizens'. Other scholars have also differentiated middle powers in terms of their ability to keep distance from major power conflicts; a degree of autonomy in their foreign policies from major powers; support for international status quo and stability; and a commitment to gradual reform of the international system. In sum, one may say that middle power ship to use an expression coined by W. H. Holmes-is a set of behaviour. Better describe, it is a process that is always responding to the emerging exigencies. In that way, middle powers have been there in all ages and in all kinds of international system. The concept of middle power, no gainsaying, remains somewhat elusive. W. H. Holnzes has suggested that it should remain ambiguous somewhat 'mystical', and for right reasons. The ambiguity enables middle powers to suitably modify their roles, and advance their perceived political objectives and diplomatic style in the international system. One needs also to accept that middle powers behave in all sorts of ways. Roles associated with them are performed by all sorts of states-super powers, great powers, upper middle powers and lower middle powers: regional and sub-regional powers and small powers-and, no matter, in whatever other manner international hierarchy are described. Nonetheless, what is obvious is that middle powers cannot do some of the things that the great powers can do; in the same way they do certain things that smaller powers cannot. It is said that 'middle powernap ship' is a role always in search of an actor; and scores of states have in different periods and circumstances scripted the role differently for themselves. In the end middle powers may not have the strength of a giant, they have the skills of a dancer; and they will continue to perform those roles whatever be the shape of the international system.

4.5 MIDDLE POWERS IT THE ERA OF COLD WAR

Notes

In international relations, a middle power is a sovereign state that is neither a superpower nor a great power, but still has large or moderate influence and international recognition. The concept of the "middle power" dates back to the origins of the European state system. In the late 16th century, Italian political thinker Giovanni Botero divided the world into three types of states: grandissime (empires), mezzano (middle powers) and piccioli (small powers). According to Botero, a mezzano or middle power "...has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others."

No agreed standard method defines which states are middle powers, aside from the broad idea that middle powers are states that have a 'moderate' ability to influence the behaviour of other states, in contrast to small power, which have 'little' ability to influence. Some researchers use Gross National Product (GNP) statistics to draw lists of middle powers around the world. Economically, middle powers are generally those that are not considered too "big" or too "small," however that is defined. However, economics is not always the defining factor. Under the original sense of the term, a middle power was one that had some degree of influence globally, but did not dominate in any one area. However, this usage is not universal, and some define middle power to include nations that can be regarded as regional powers.

According to academics at the University of Leicester and University of Nottingham:

Middle power status is usually identified in one of two ways. The traditional and most common way is to aggregate critical physical and material criteria to rank states according to their relative capabilities. Because countries' capabilities differ, they are categorized as superpowers (or great powers), middle powers or small powers. More recently, it is possible to discern a second method for identifying middle power status by focusing on behavioural attributes. This posits that middle powers can be distinguished from superpowers and smaller powers because of their foreign policy behaviour – middle powers carve

out a niche for themselves by pursuing a narrow range and particular types of foreign policy interest. In this way middle powers are countries that use their relative diplomatic skills in the service of international peace and stability.

According to Eduard Jordaan of Singapore Management University:

All middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives. However, emerging and traditional middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioural differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviourally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviourally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region.

Another definition, by the Middle Power Initiative: "Middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that give them significant international credibility." Under this definition however, nuclear-armed states like India and Pakistan, and every state participant of the NATO nuclear sharing, would not be middle powers.

Middle power diplomacy

Although there is some conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term middle power, middle powers are identified most often by their international behavior—called 'middle power diplomacy'—the tendency to

Notes

pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide...diplomacy. Middle powers are states who commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace. Middle powers help to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and "go-betweens," and through international conflict management and resolution activities, such as UN peacekeeping. Middle powers perform these internationalist activities because of an idealistic imperative they associate with being a middle power. The imperative is that the middle powers have a moral responsibility and collective ability to protect the international order from those who would threaten it, including, at times, the great or principal powers. This imperative was particularly profound during the most intense periods of the Cold War.

According to international relations scholar Annette Baker Fox, relationships between middle powers and great powers reveal more intricate behaviors and bargaining schemes than has often been assumed. According to Soeya Yoshihide, "Middle Power does not just mean a state's size or military or economic power. Rather, 'middle power diplomacy' is defined by the issue area where a state invests its resources and knowledge. Middle Power States avoid a direct confrontation with great powers, but they see themselves as 'moral actors' and seek their own role in particular issue areas, such as human rights, environment, and arms regulations. Middle powers are the driving force in the process of transnational institutional-building."

Characteristics of middle power diplomacy include:

Commitment to multilateralism through global institutions and allying with other middle powers.

High degree of civil society penetration in the country's foreign policy.

A country that reflects and forms its national identity through a 'novel foreign policy': Peacekeeping, Human Security, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol.

The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), a program of the Global Security Institute, highlights the importance of middle powers diplomacy. Through MPI, eight international non-governmental organizations are able to work primarily with middle power governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Middle power countries are particularly influential in issues related to arms control, being that they are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility.

In quite a number of instances, the role adopted by middle powers encompassed mediatory activity between antagonistic Cold War blocs. In particular, countries such as India, under Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru and Sweden frequently engaged in this type of inter-bloc diplomatic activity. Aligned middle powers Canada and Australia had more often tended to focus more on intra-bloc relations. They were defusing tensions between bloc members; for instance Canada dashed the crisis that had developed between US on one hand and Britain and France the other during the Suez crises of 1956. Canada and Australia had also urged restraint to the alliance leader during the Korean and Vietnam wars; and resisted US tendency towards isolationism. A considerable amount of attention was paid by most of the middle powers to mediation and conflict resolution with respect to regional 'brushfires'. Here, they were often involved in peacekeeping roles in various parts of the world. This is not to suggest that middle powers had only limited role and left no impact on the international system.

Check Your Progress 2:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. Discuss the behavioural approach.

.....
.....
.....

2. Write an essay on Middle Powers in the Era of Cold War.

.....
.....
.....

4.6 RELOCATION OF THE IDEA OF MIDDLE POWER AND THE EMERGING POWERS

Scholars and specialists of international relations nearly concur that especially in periods of major transitions and flash in the international system, middle powers' activism becomes pronounced. They are able to utilize their resources and skills in reshaping and recording the international system away from great power domination and towards a somewhat 'democratized' order. They are able to bring in more of their values of coalition- and consensus building and rule of law. This has been said, for example, of the period immediately after 1945. It has also been true of the detente years of the early and the mid-1970s; and it is being reiterated for the period in the aftermath of Cold War. Some far-reaching political and economic changes are taking place in the present international system. In the changing international system, the idea of middle power can be 'relocated' to more usefully capture the importance and the role of emerging powers under discussion here.

- 1) The very definition of leadership is in flux. As against a more structural determined definition that prevailed after 1945, economic globalisation and interdependence have now put a premium on the technical and entrepreneur definition of leadership. In place of power structures as the basis of leadership (rather hegemony), there

is recognition of the 'role of agents' in the explanations of the world politics.

- 2) Especially when analysing question of international cooperation in an era of uncertainty, there is recognition of the role that less powerful states may play in the process of cooperation building. Wherever the principle of power is being challenged by the necessity and reality of interdependence, middle powers have new windows of opportunity opened to 'them in the international system.
- 3) In the evolving world order, the number of actors-both state and the state-has also increased. Significantly, these actors are both international systematic and domestic, who are capable of exercising non-structural leadership.
- 4) The number of issue areas where non-structural leadership is functioning and is, in fact. Required, has also grown. Changes and challenges in the international economic and political order are such that they are not available to the unrestrained influence of great powers. It is being said that -gales of skills are replacing 'tests of will'. What it all means is that while structural leadership by the great powers remains the most important source of initiative other categories of leadership can also be significant in catalyzing the processes of reform and change especially those requiring considerable cooperation and collaboration.
- 5) Such roles may be better performed by appropriately qualified middle powers in ways different from the past patterns. At the core of such assertion is the changing nature of the international agenda. The salience of new issues of environment, economic cooperation in fact does not lend itself to structural leadership easily. Other words, the structural power as the basis of domination-subordination has declined and is being replaced by qualities of leadership that attract followers on some sound bases of principles.

The assumption of an emerging multi-polar world, it is granted, is very ambiguous. One can assume that US will continue to a central role but the influence of other centers of structural powers viz. EU and Japan will also grow. Along with these centres of structural power, there would also be non- structural powers and actors-be they middle powers or non-state entities. They will also be a source of Leadership- a leadership that is based on persuasion and not force. Since the nature of both leadership and follow is changing, a theoretical reconsideration of middle power behaviour is in order. And other words in the changed international circumstances of today the idea of middle power is in need of 'relocation'. There is equity in the structural leadership and this gap is being filled by the middle powers. And this is what precisely making then emerging powers is. Besides developed economics of US and, more so: of EU countries and Japan they are fitting increasing exposure to the vagaries of economic globalisation demonstrating thereby the degree to which interdependence has deepened in the international system. The middle powers feel even more acutely the impact of this increased interdependence. In other words, there are both opportunities and constraints for middle powers to suitably modify and alliance their roles. The fact that the idea of middle power is getting 'relocated' is evident since the 1980s. Adapting to new circumstances, middle powers have become increasingly quick and flexible in responding not only to some new conditions and circumstances.

4.6.1 Categorization of Middle Power Activities

The third approach is the hierarchical perspective. This approach ranks and categorizes states by applying standards relating to their capabilities. Countries with medium-range capabilities are grouped as middle powers, and great powers and weak powers can be categorized in the same manner. Kim (2009: 19) noted that the hierarchical perspective tends to use statistical indices for categorizing countries such as size of territory,

GDP, the volume of trade and foreign currency reserves, population, and number of soldiers.

The Theoretical Limitations of Existing Perspectives

However, the existing perspectives, functional, behavioral and hierarchical, have several theoretical weaknesses. First, the existing perspectives cover limited aspects and issues of international relations. These perspectives have been elaborated in the liberal-leaning political contexts of western countries, which postulate that the chances of building cooperation among states are high and, accordingly, seek to find the roles of middle powers in this context. For example, the typical behaviors of middle powers identified by the behavioral perspective are catalyst (triggering diplomatic initiatives), facilitator (forming collaborative activities) and manager (building institutions; Cooper et al 1993: 24-5). In other words, “realist” issues such as survival, security and conflict are not considered as decisive factors in defining the concept of middle power by the functionalistic and behavioral perspectives.

Second, although functional, behavioral and hierarchical perspectives approach the notion of middle power in different ways, they all postulate that the main determinants of such power are individual state-level factors: a country’s performance in certain functional areas, its behavior and capabilities calculated in a quantitative way. In other words, the established middle power perspectives presuppose that individual-level features of a country are the first judge of whether or not it meets the criteria of a middle power.

However, it is questionable whether defining middle powers without considering interaction with other political entities is appropriate. This is because the concept of “power”, which is the sole criterion determining where countries fit on the great, middle and weak spectrum, is a relational notion, particularly from the perspective of classical realism. Hans Morgenthau (1965: 30) defined power as “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man”. As power is a phenomenon

with respect to “man over man”, without the existence of other actors and interactions with them, the concept cannot be established. In this respect, this article argues that if this dimension of the nature of power is not considered, the features of middle powers cannot be well reflected and accordingly differentiated from others.

An Alternative Theoretical Perspective: Classical Realism

As mentioned above, the concept of middle power serves as a useful tool for examining IR phenomena, although the existing theoretical trends in middle power approaches are limited in their explanatory capacity. Accordingly, this article argues that an alternative theoretical perspective for studying the concept of middle power is needed. This article proposes a theoretical alternative originating from classical realism, the school represented by Morgenthau, Carr et al. The reasons are as follows.

First, the theoretical viewpoint of classical realism fits well into the assumptions which the concept of middle power presupposes. As partly mentioned above, the discussions focusing on the independent realm of middle powers naturally assume:

- 1) More space for agency in terms of level of analysis
- 2) Contrary to the monolithic nature of the state which neo-realism assumes, a different nature and performance of each state-level agent (a middle power is different from a great power and a weak state).

According to Hobson (2000: 17), classical realism argues that all states have sufficient levels of international agential power to shape the inter-state system. For example, Morgenthau focused on the “intelligence” of a state, the capability of a country to identify a rival state’s foreign policies as “imperial”, “status quo”, “prestige” driven and to counter these different types of foreign policy in a proper manner with “containment”

or “appeasement”. Therefore, classical realism assumes the capability and performance of each state can be differentiated (Hobson 2000: 48; Morgenthau 1965: 6, 70).

Second, classical realism brings security affairs into the center of the investigation of the nature of middle power. Given the fact that the existing middle power literatures leans towards liberalism, middle power discussions based on classical realism expand the boundaries which the concept covers. In other words, the concept of middle power can be applied to the analysis of countries whose foreign policies are centered on security affairs.

4.6.2 Observations - Some of the Emerging Powers

Third, while maintaining the centrality of security issues, classical realism can be compatible with the existing middle power literature. Classical realism argues that along with material strength, immaterial aspects also constitute sources of power. Morgenthau (1965: 9) stated that power reaches from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. For Morgenthau (1965: 186), the most important material aspect of power are armed forces, but even more significant is a nation’s character, morale and quality of governance. In this way, it is possible to say that classical realism does not exclude the roles of middle power in liberal-leaning theories by taking into account sources of power on a broad spectrum. Lee Geun (et al 2001: 181) added that classical realism has something in common with constructivist theory as both consider the ideational factors such as norms, equivalence and identity.

Based on classical realism, this article proposes a tentative working definition of middle power as follows:

A middle power is a state actor which has limited influence on deciding the distribution of power in a given regional system, but is capable of deploying a variety of sources of power to change the position of great

Notes

powers and defend its own position on matters related to national or regional security that directly affect it (Shin 2012).

Middle power as a relational concept exists on the continuum of other state groups such as weak state and great power. Accordingly, to compare middle powers with other types of states helps to make distinctive the nature of middle powers. Elements of the working definition are:

A middle power's "*limited influence on deciding the distribution of power in a given regional system*": How is a middle power different from a great power? Discussing various ways of defining a great power, Wight argued that the most satisfactory definition is that great powers are powers with general interests as wide as the states-system itself (Wight 1978 : 50). Putting Wight's definition of "great power" in Walt's terms (1979: 97), outcomes in the international system are determined by relations among great powers as a group of countries having enough resources to decide the distribution of power of a regional or international political system. In this respect, it is natural to view states which are not great powers, such as middle powers, as having limitations in injecting their power into regional and global scales.

A middle power can "*change the position of great powers and defend its own position on matters related to national or regional security that directly affect it*": how is a middle power different from a weak state? As mentioned above, in reality, some states change behaviors of great powers but others even fail to defend their own position. This fact proves that applying the simple dichotomy, states that have structural level of influence and states who do not, to reality has limitations. The working definition argues that this limitation offers a watershed, separating a middle power from a weak state.

Australia and Canada, the two major resource export-dependent economics, have also been instrumental in the creation of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries. The Cairns Group consists of

both developed and developing economies that are adversely affected by the agricultural policies of protection and subsidies followed by EU and US and are therefore working for a trading system in structure. Middle power is not necessarily regional powers are, as for instance is the case with Brazil, India and South Africa: they exercise considerable influence over their respective sub-regions. Of all the Latin American countries, national capabilities make Brazil a middle power, it is one of the emerging markets of the 1990s in the same way as it was labeled newly industrializing countries (IVICs) or an advanced industrializing countries (ADC) middle power in the 1970s. Its protocol with economic development process has enabled it to be viewed as a regional power that is keen to engage the neighbouring countries in economic cooperation through for example, the South Cone Common Market (McCourt), while holding on to a moderate political position. At the international level too it has opted for a foreign policy of 'interested neutralism' wilily sacking to promote its economic and trade interests. A developing middle power, India has had its skills proved and tested in its leadership of the Non-aligned Movement in the 1950s and the 1960s. It is a multilateralism middle power with comparative advantage in peacekeeping and mediatory diplomacy. It has a complex strategic scenario in South Asia and beyond, which made it take the time-tested route of becoming a nuclear power to ensure its own security. In the 1990s, the country has been engaged in a series of complex strategic dialogues practically with all the major and emerging powers. Its diplomacy is sophisticated and its credibility in the international system makes it a natural coalition leader of like-minded countries on specific issues. The size, its economic riches, and geo-strategic location make South Africa a middle power. However, its ability to lead issue-specific coalitional patterns in the African continent is strongly dependent on its ability to become a multi-racial and a multi-cultural democratic society. Japan's political role never corresponded to its economic might during the Cold War era. Although Japan as the world's largest creditor and aid giver had tremendous economic power, there have been only few signs that Tokyo is prepared to exercise agenda-based leadership. Its priorities have primarily been of avoiding risks and dangers. In contrast to the activism displayed by

Notes

skillful middle powers, its diplomatic approaches remained exceedingly cautious and reactive in nature. Far from taking the lead on specific issues, it tended to hold back and let other actors do the running. International expectations and the decline in its economic strength in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1998 are now making it accept greater responsibilities for international peace and security. Some of the skills that have been utilized by other emerging powers are only now being learnt by Japan. As compared to others, China never perceived itself nor, interestingly, it was perceived by the Western world as a middle power. In the Western perception, it always had the potential of a great power. An emerging economic powerhouse, it is argued that China, once it is fairly developed, is capable of exercising political influence on a much larger Asia Pacific region and would reorder Asia Pacific region in a very different way.

Conventional approaches of size and position, geography and norms have limitations in understanding the foreign policy conduct of middle powers, which are the emerging powers in contemporary international relations. Middle powers do not necessarily behave in the same fashion. However, one finds that they are invariably always multilateralism. They have comparative advantage in certain areas where using their expertise and skills they can and do make a difference in the functioning of the international system. Their preferences for politics of consensus, coalition building, peacekeeping and their distinctive specializations in mediatory diplomacy enable them to impact the international system in some major ways. By their presence in the international system, they question the principle of power being the basis of international relations. By their activism, they make the system remain based on international legal and moral norms. b 1 Cold War had a constraining effect on middle powers. In the post-Cold War period and in the era of economic globalisation, most middle powers are being described as emerging powers. The very concept of middle power has undergone modification, rather relocation' as structural changes in the international system and rise of new agenda items is allowing middle powers to not only assume new roles but also pursue them in very different and innovative manners.

They are filling up the leadership void, and also providing a leadership that is technical and entrepreneurial and not based on power. Their activism is deepening the conditions of interdependence in the emerging multipolar and 'democratizing' world order.

Check Your Progress 3:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. Discuss the Categorization of Middle Power Activities.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

2. What is the Observations of the Emerging Powers?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

4.7 LET US SUM UP

All middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilizes and legitimizes the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives. However, emerging and traditional middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioural differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviorally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially in egalitarian and recently democratized states that

Notes

demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviorally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region.

The terms “middle powers” and “regional powers” are increasingly used by politicians, pundits, and scholars, even though both words remain vague and their meanings are contentious. Middle powers often refer to states that occupy a middle-level position in the international power spectrum, just below superpowers or great powers. The middle powers project significant influence and reveal some capacity to shape international developments. While the origins of the concept can be traced back to the writings of the 16th-century Italian philosopher Giovanni Botero, middle powers were arguably formalized as a category for the first time during the 1815 Paris Conference, when some of the middle powers participated in all the committees, some in one or more, and some in none. There is a lively debate in the current literature regarding the definition, categorization, and assessment of the actions of middle powers. The more conventional approach to defining “middle power” is based on a state’s military capabilities, economic strength, and geostrategic position. A second and more critical approach aims to evaluate a state’s leadership capacity and its impact and legitimacy in the international arena. During the Cold War era, the concept of middle powers was employed more extensively as an analytical tool in examining the role of states that lacked superpower capabilities but still enjoyed considerable influence in global politics (e.g., Australia, Canada, and Sweden). The middle powers traditionally favor multilateralism and rely on “niche diplomacy” to accomplish specific foreign-policy objectives in line with their more restricted power capabilities. Particularly in the post-Cold War era, changes at the systemic level and in global economic dynamics enabled the rise of new states such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). These developments compelled a number of scholars in international relations to differentiate between traditional and emerging middle powers that might pursue different trajectories as significant regional players. A regional power is a

state that projects influence in a specific region. If this power capability is unrivaled in its region, the state could rise to the level of a regional hegemon. The regional powers display comparatively high military, economic, political, and ideological capabilities enabling them to shape their regional security agenda. Overall, the terms “middle powers” and “regional powers” convey capacity, hierarchy, influence, and aspiration. There are also cases in which there is a mismatch between the self-image of a regional power and its actual capabilities and influence. The domestic-international nexus plays a critical role in shaping the material and ideational impact of middle and regional powers.

4.8 KEY WORDS

Globalizing: Globalization or globalisation is the process of interaction and integration among people, companies, and governments worldwide.

Middle Power: In international relations, a middle power is a sovereign state that is neither a superpower nor a great power, but still has large or moderate influence and international recognition. The concept of the "middle power" dates back to the origins of the European state system.

Observation: Observation is the active acquisition of information from a primary source. In living beings, observation employs the senses. In science, observation can also involve the perception and recording of data via the use of scientific instruments

Behaviourism: Behaviorism is a systematic approach to understanding the behavior of humans and other animals. It assumes that all behaviors are either reflex produced by a response to certain stimuli.

4.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Write about the Middle Powers as Emerging Powers: Some Definitional Issues.
2. Discuss the Major Approaches to Understanding Middle Powers.
3. Discuss the Behavioural Approach.
4. Write about the Middle Powers in the Era of Cold War.
5. What is Relocation of the Idea of Middle Power and the Emerging Powers?

Notes

6. Briefly describe the main approaches for understanding the middle powers.
7. Identify the principal behavioural aspects of middle power diplomacy.
8. Explain good international citizenship and multilateralism.

4.10 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- H.H. Herstien, L.J. Hughes, R.C. Kirbyson. *Challenge & Survival: The History of Canada* (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall, 1970). p 411
- Shanahan D (2008) Time to go global, urges Rudd, *The Australian*
- Mehmet Ozkan. "A NEW APPROACH TO GLOBAL SECURITY: PIVOTAL MIDDLE POWERS AND GLOBAL POLITICS" *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* XI.1 (2006): 77-95
- Encarta - The Great Powers. Archived from the original on 20 May 2004.
- P. Shearman, M. Sussex, *European Security After 9/11* (Ashgate, 2004) - According to Shearman and Sussex, both the UK and France were great powers now reduced to middle power status.
- Soeya Yoshihide, 'Diplomacy for Japan as a Middle Power, *Japan Echo*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2008), pp. 36-41.
- Holbraad, Carsten (1984), *Middle Powers in International Politics* (London: Macmillan), pp. 57-67.
- Hurst, Lynda (2007), 'On World Stage, a Best Supporting Actor', *The Star*, 29 September 2007,
- <http://www.thestar.com/columnists/article/261324> (accessed 1 Oct. 2015)
- Morgenthau, Hans (1965), *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf)

- Shin, Dong-min (2012), 'Concept of Middle Power and the Case of the ROK: A Review', Korea Yearbook 2012: Politics, Economy and Society (Netherlands: Brill), pp. 131-52

4.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) See Section 4.2
- 2) See Sub Section 4.3.1
- 3) See Sub Section 4.3.3

Check Your Progress 2

- 1) See Section 4.4
- 2) See Section 4.5

Check Your Progress 3

- 1) See Sub Section 4.6.1
- 2) See Sub Section 4.6.2

UNIT 5: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

STRUCTURE

- 5.0 Objectives
- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.2 Significance of Human Rights
- 5.3 The Concept: Evolution and Meaning
 - 5.3.1 The Ancient Greeks and the Stoics
 - 5.3.2 Dominant Notion Today
 - 5.3.3 Milestones of Development
 - 5.3.4 Right to Development
 - 5.3.5 Diverse Conceptualizations of the Individual
- 5.4 Universal vs. Cultural Relativism
 - 5.4.1 Vasak's Three Generations of Rights
 - 5.4.2 Differences between the Two Covenants
 - 5.4.3 UN's Special Conventions
 - 5.4.4 The UN and Decolonization
- 5.5 Human Rights, Development and Democracy
 - 5.5.1 Helsinki Process
 - 5.5.2 Strategic Shifts in Global Political Economy
 - 5.5.3 USA's Policy on Human Rights
- 5.6 Features of Vienna Declaration on Human Rights
- 5.7 Emerging Challenges to Human Rights Protection
- 5.8 Let us Sum up
- 5.9 Key Words
- 5.10 Questions for Review
- 5.11 Suggested readings and references
- 5.12 Answers to Check Your Progress

5.0 OBJECTIVES

'Human Rights' has become a popular topic. It has got several dimensions and each dimension may require a full thesis for a detailed treatment. In this Unit we will discuss various issues and developments

in Human Rights and International Politics. After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- To identify the concept: evaluation, meaning and its significance;
- To discuss the issues at the global level;
- To explain the position of Human Rights on various issues of development and democracy; and
- To evaluate the role of international agencies in protection of Human Rights in the developing countries.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Human Rights as we hear and read about today are predominantly of the Western heritage. Rights have always been there in every culture and tradition. But the influence of West in conceptualization, standardization and their observance throughout the world has made it possible to identify human rights with its liberal underpinnings. This is however a reductionist way of understanding human rights. A balanced perspective will demand a closer examination of the changing political economy of the globe. Human Rights can acquire lasting importance (really due to them) only in the light of such an analysis which is undertaken in the following sections.

5.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

'Human Rights' is, at once, a simple and a complex concept. The most popular version of human rights refers to having a right as a human being. But on serious examination, it will not be difficult to see that it is a complex notion also. Two factors contribute to making it a complex notion:

- (a) its philosophical features are interwoven with political considerations and
- (b) Over the years, confusing terminologies have been used in various expressions of human rights.

Notes

Despite rich complexity, the meaning of human rights has never moved away from its central plank, namely, provision, protection and promotion of those values through which "we affirm together that we are a single human community". In any sense, respect for human dignity is the essential value which lends meaning to human rights. But when it comes to 'packaging' human rights for implementation, influence of political considerations occupies center-stage. This is an unfortunate development today. However, as we near the end of the 20th century, few will dispute that human rights is the most dominant idea on the agenda of the 21st century, and will continue to be so at least for the initial years in the next century. The significance of human rights today can be highlighted by some of the development indicators given below:

- a) On the initiative of the UN, a World Conference on Human Rights was held in Vienna during 14-25, June 1993 (the first International conference was held in Teheran in 1968). After two weeks of lively proceeding in Vienna, a consensus was reached on the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action which, in the words of the then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali heralded "a new vision "Gob01 action for Human Rights in to the next century" later in March 1995, the world submit for Social Development included in the list of ten commitments to which the world leaders had pledged themselves: "to promote social integration based on the enhancement and protection of all human rights".
- b) In pursuance of the above, member-states have found it necessary to devote the task of Human Rights Education among their people. "The International Decade for Human Rights Education has been proclaimed and it has been in force since 1995. India has set up its National Human Rights Commission in 1993 and the Commission has started working full swing ever since. The national task

and campaign for rights consciousness aim strategically at awareness promotion among its people as well as articulation and campaign for various 'group rights' belonging to women, child, tribals and dalits, consumers, sick and elderly, disabled and the others.

- c) A closer scrutiny of the post-war international politics will reveal that it has increasingly been characterized by "a constantly shifting, often contradictory, but dominant transnational discourse on aid policy" (R.E. Wood). This aid diplomacy focused on question of development and seldom addressed the questions of democracy, good governance and human rights which is the situation today. The shift in focus today has largely been occasioned following the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc. As will become clear later, human rights observance has become unavoidable in their conduct and practice of states in the post-Cold war phase of international relations. All the aid donor countries and agencies have got this incorporated in their aid-policy requirements.
- d) Even those who differed with the aid conditions for human rights observance had their arguments focused on significance of human rights for today's world. These countries, mostly of East and South East Asia in the non-Western world (and without necessarily subscribing to the Western liberal individualism) have offered the arguments of "cultural relativism" as a counter. Briefly, 'cultural relativism' refers to a country's cultural peculiarities which should be incorporated, as the argument runs, in the conceptualization of human rights if the latter are to be effectively observed in practice. No cultural relativist has ever questioned the significance of human rights. If

anything, they have also joined the Western advocates to make human rights real and practicable.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.

- 1) Describe various development indicators demonstrating the significance of human rights today.

.....
.....
.....

5.3 THE CONCEPT: EVOLUTION AND MEANING

If human rights are significant today, it needs to be mentioned here that the evolution of the concept and their practice have got a cheered history. It may be interesting to know that prior to the use of the term human right³ such rights were typically called the Rights of man or Natural rights. This difference is more than terminological. For example, Thomas Paine who is credited to have coined the expression 'human rights' in his English translation of the French Declaration of The Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) wrote the basic book on human rights in 1792 and titled it the Rights of Man. In the same year, (1792), in France only and for the first time in recorded history, Mary Wollstonq craft argued for equal rights for women in her equally classic book A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. The name change from rights of man' to 'human rights' was suggested by Eleanor Roosevelt in 1947 and it has since then been uniformly observed beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which the General Assembly had passed on 10 December 1948.

5.3.1 The Ancient Greeks and the Stoics

The concept of human rights is rooted in the most ancient values as taught by different religions in the world. But the most dominant strand in the conceptualisation of human rights belongs to its western heritage whose philosophers, as a rule, trace the term to the classical Athenian democracy and the Social influence on Roman jurisprudence. It should be interesting to know that as a normative ethical concept, origins of human rights acquired a political connotation which is continuing till date in modern versions. The Classical Greeks views 'nature' as an "objective standard for the instruction of human social conduct" and insisted that natural laws can be known through a systematic description of the behaviour which "ought to occur" in a society. Politically, this only meant that not everybody in the city-state can have natural rights; actually, only the citizens and not others had access to benefits of natural law. But ironically, in their general defence of such inequalities, Plato and Aristotle have also introduced to the knowing world several conceptions of equality which serve as key elements in human rights theory today. To mention some of these prominent contributions:

- equal respect for all citizens (isotimia),
- equality before law (isonomia)
- equality in political power (isokratia) and
- equality in suffrage (isopsephia)
- equality of civil rights (isopoliteia)

But, as said earlier, these benefits were available to the citizen only and they were only half of the Athens' population. The Roman concept of equality however broadened the scope of the rights application. The Stoics were the foremost contributors to the natural law theory. Working within the classical Greek view, they however conceptualised 'nature' as "a universal system of rules" (as embodied in the Roman society) in which all rational human beings were entitled to equal civic status. The Roman doctrine of natural law introduced a revolutionary improvement over the narrow Greek view in that 'local conventional law civil) can co-

exist with the collective principles (Qus gentian) which are observed by all and which by implication, meant that all persons were equal as members of the world community. There is definitely some lesson here to learn viz., coexistence of the general with a plurality of particulars. This has become an important element in the conceptualization and practice of human rights today.

5.3.2 Dominant Notion Today

The dominant conception of human rights today belongs to the Western heritage of natural law philosophy and, as such, even today, human rights discourse cannot be said to be free from the influence of the Greek and the Roman views. Universalism of human rights today is practically possible only when the totality of the argument takes into account local variations. Ideally, human rights should address issues and concerns relating to human dignity regardless of barriers of ideology and political and economic system. It should also focus on diverse groups of humanity in order to empower and restore their dignity. It should provide an element of social cement, "an irreducible human element" through which each member can proudly claim to belong to a single human community regardless of differences. Every religion and social ethos has got its own variant of what we call "Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam". But in these days of aggressive globalization of, economy and finance, universalization of the values of equality and freedom does not appear to be anywhere within sight. For an average student, the picture of human rights has been one presented by the established authorities on the subject. This however is a biased view which equates human rights primarily with:

- a) The protection and promotion of civil and political rights,
- b) The demand for economic rights thrown in at times,
- c) Democracy and more so, liberal democracy, as practiced in the western world. It is argued by the Western policy makers and scholars that it was only under the U.S. president Jimmy Carter's

leadership that the Operations Human Rights began. Later, according to them, human rights became an international concern.

5.3.3 Milestones of Development

However, concepts of democracy and human rights predate Jimmy Carter through he gave the term and usage an official respectability. It thus became a cornerstone of his 1 presidency between 1977 and 1981. The 'Democracy' which entered the Vocabulary of the English language in the sixteenth century, had its birth way back in Athens some 2500 years ago. Similarly, official respect for freedom was sanctified (in the western heritage) by the 1688 English Bill of Rights, the 1776 American Declaration of Independence and the 1789 (French) Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. It is important to remember that all these declarations centered on the nation-state. However, following the Second World War, a more universalistic approach to the question of rights emerged. The first example of this was the 1945 United Nations Charter under which the U.N. is "to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all" and "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal right and self-determination of peoples." Three years later, on 10 December, 1948, (which is today observed as the Human Rights Day) the U.N. General Assembly adopted without dissent (but with abstentions by the Soviet bloc nations, South Africa and Saudi Arabia) the Universal Declaration of ~umah Rights (UDHR) which comprehensively spelled out the concept of human rights. Though only one fourth of the present strength of the U.N. adopted the UDHR then, many nations further committed themselves to respect human rights through a number of international agreements in subsequent years: Some of the international agreements are: a) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), came into force in 1976 b) The European Convention on Human Rights (1950), came into force in 1953 c) The American Convention on Human Right (1969)

Notes

came into force in 1978 d) The Helsinki Accords (adopted in 1975) e) The African Charter on People's and Human Rights (1981). came into force in 1986. Along with the UDHR, both the international Covenants (ICCPR & ICESCR) and their Optional Protocols constitute what is known as The International Bill of Rights (IBR). IBR actually provides the conceptual framework to which other human rights instruments are to conform. Two unique features of the IBR must be mentioned. First the international covenants took the 1948 Declaration a step further by making the given provisions legally binding on the signatory states. Such States are required to open the doors for international monitoring of human rights. The ICPR has been signed by 121 states and ICESR by 123 states. The Indian Government has ratified both these covenants on 10 April, 1979 during the Janata Government headed by Morarji Desai. Secondly, of the thousands of treaties registered with the United Nations, about 5 per cent are multi-lateral, whereas in the human rights field, the opposite is true. Virtually, all human rights agreements are multi-lateral. This speaks for the widest observance of human rights in the world. In view of these developments, the connotation of individual rights has acquired two new dimensions which were unthinkable till 1945. Today, international lawyers and commentators have sanctified and promoted the view that nation-states which are sovereign have however accepted the legal obligations and they do not question the treatment of their citizens under various human rights conventions. Secondly, the right of self-determination of peoples .is now recognized as a legal right. It is also important to note that the United Nations has been the main area within which the international politics of human rights has been played out. It is a different story that the international politics may itself be influenced by the national interest perceptions of a dominant power in today's uneven world. But it cannot be denied that the international norms regarding the rights of the individuals and groups have been established, and necessary institutions and mechanisms created to give concrete expression to these norms only under the auspices of the UN. That is where both the success and failures regarding human rights protection and promotion lie. Whereas the iniquitous politics of the globe have set limits to human rights observance, one also finds efforts of

countervailing forces as represented in various multi-lateral treaties, declarations, resolutions and agreements as well as emergence of powerful regional regimes and the NGOs which have, on balance, made human rights a noble objective for most of the states to pursue. -The Universal Declaration of Human Rights which contains a Preamble and 30 Articles was proclaimed by the General Assembly "as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations." The Indian Constitution also provides for rights and duties for its citizens. Are our rights and duties at variance with the objectives of the Declaration? (Please find out the area of agreement and convergence of rights and duties as given in the Indian Constitution and compare them with that of the Universal Declaration from the lists given in Annexure-I. Remember that the lists contain rights and duties in their abbreviated form only).

The first World Conference on Human Rights held in Tehramin 1968 affirmed these principles contained in the Declaration. It is useful to remember that the General Assembly had passed a resolution in 1950 declaring that "enjoyment of civil and poLitical freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights are inter-connected and inter-dependent." These two characteristics of human rights viz., 'inalienability' and 'inter-dependence to the extent of inseparability' between civil and political rights on the one hand and the economic, social and cultural rights on the other, constituted the building blocks in the final re-affirmation of the content of human rights by the Second World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna in 1993. The nature, content and importance of human rights are no more in dispute today after the Vienna Congress.

5.3.4 Right to Development

1950 to 1993 was a long journey of debate and resistance to the questions .of accepting an essentially Third World position which was that the economic and social rights be treated as inseparable from the civil and political rights. This controversy at the international level was reflected in the efforts of the developing countries backed by the then

Soviet Union to formulate a concept of "the right to development" acceptable to all members of the U.N. Such a demand met hostility and rejection by the Western capitalist countries which denounced the idea of 'collective rights' and the 'global economic reforms' to be given as a concession to authoritarian regimes that curtailed freedoms to their citizens. In other words, right to development conveyed to the western liberals, curbing of fundamental political and civic rights. Despite this opposition, the General Assembly did finally adopt in 1986, a Declaration on the Right to Development after many years of preparation. According to this Declaration, the right to development is: "inalienable rights by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized." A universally acceptable definition of 'development' however is awaited even in the year 1997, that is, more than thirty years after ICESCR was signed in 1966:

5.3.5 Diverse Conceptualizations of the Individual

Western liberalism has its sheet anchor in individualism - a political philosophy which focuses on "the philosophy conception of the individual." That is to say, the sensory of body and not the interrelationships with other individuals and the Nature, is what counts in an individual. As Prof. Bhikhu Parekh has pointed out: "Life, the continuation of the body in time, and liberty, the unhindered movement of the body, became two of the highest moral values." Violence, curtailment/restrictions, sufferings etc. which affect human rights have always been construed in their physical terms. Crying, dying, starving, and such other 'physical' sufferings provoked moral denunciation and condemnation for violation of human rights. But if one sees a child frustrated from developing his abilities for want of money, or a man in despair for lack of gainful employment, one would not generally see a moral problem involved there are believe that its redress becomes just as urgent as prevention of death. The developing countries of the third world therefore found little use in such a narrow conception of human

rights, based on an 'individual' abstracted from his/her society and the surroundings. It is worth remembering at this stage that this 'narrow view of the individual' came to dominate the world of moral concerns from the seventeenth century onwards, beginning, with John Locke, the English political philosopher. Locke was closely associated with the drafting of the 1689 Bill of Rights which spelt out the rights of the individual unambiguously and limited the prerogatives of the Crown. As such, the 1689 Bill of Rights came to contain for the first time in the world. Common Law principles of 'due process' and 'the writ of habeas corpus' (produce the body) besides all those existing rights which protected the subjects from the Crown under the 1215 Magna Carta.

But such efforts at articulating civil and, later, political rights of the individual against the prerogatives of the Crown, though inherently progressive, were however based on narrowing down the meaning and the scope of the individual. The individual had a rich and complex meaning before the so-called phase of modern politics. The ancient Athenians believed that "a man taken together with his land and political rights constituted an individual. Almost up to the end of the Middle Ages, a craftsman's tools were believed to be inseparable from the man. They constituted his 'inorganic body' and were just as much an integral part of his self as his hands and feet" (B. Parekh). The Hindus always believed that the individual is born into a set of social relations, called caste. The Chinese have a highly complex conception of the individual who is born into a family which links his ancestors and the descendants into a 'living union' and therefore remains inseparable from it.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.

1. Prepare a table in the chronological order indicating major dates against the milestones of development in the evolution of human rights concept and practice. Begin with Magna Carta (the great

charter) which was signed by King John in June 1215 under the pressure of the English barons. Your table should end with two developments in the year 1993.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

5.4 UNIVERSAL VS. CULTURAL RELATIVISM

Against such a divergent conceptualization of the individual, human rights in the Asian 'countries, assumes a different but not contradictory meaning. The Chinese representative at the Vienna Congress (1993) made an important observation arguing in favour of plod coexistence of the human rights regimes as against direct and indirect imposition of the West's views of liberal individualism. "The concept of human rights is a product of historical development. Countries at different development stages or with different historical traditions and cultural backgrounds also have different understandings and practices of human rights. Thus one should not and cannot think the human rights standards and models of certain countries as the only proper ones and demand that all countries comply with them. It is neither realistic nor workable to make international economic assistance or even international co-operation conditional on them." Important to note is that the Chinese are not against human rights; they are only against imposition of a single hegemonic model. This has also been the view, broadly, of the developing countries and the Vienna Congress had upheld this principle in paragraph 5 of the Declarations where it said: "While the significance of national and regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of the states, regardless of their political, economic and custodial systems to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms." Significance of this emphasis (to bear in mind the socio-cultural peculiarities of states at different stages of socio-economic evolution) is clearly reflected in the

ever-rising trade-based foreign policy pursuits of developed countries like USA, France and other countries towards China which according to them has not been able to maintain its human rights records properly. The most effective counter argument to the proposition that the cultural diversities will impede the evolution of a common set of global standards of human rights came in the Resolution adopted by the Asian NGOs meeting in the same year in a parallel session at the Bangkok regional human rights conference: "Universal human rights standards are rooted in many cultures. We affirm the basis of universality of human rights which affords protection to all of humanity including special groups such as women, children, minorities and indigenous peoples, workers, refugees and displaced persons, the disabled and the elderly. While advocating cultural pluralism, those cultural practices which derogate universally accepted human rights including women's rights must not be tolerated." While the argument for 'cultural relativism' for human rights concept and practice is valid in its own right, the limitation of such context-specific exercise must be strictly understood so that universality of human rights is promoted strongly. It is within such a conception of universality that the Third World countries will find the thesis of indivisible and inter-dependent rights working actually to the advantage of one and all.

5.4.1 Vasak's Three Generations of Rights

Karel Vasak has sought to classify the historical development of human rights according to the French revolutionary slogan "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity". Liberty or the first generation rights are represented by the civil and political rights which are predominantly "freedoms from" rather than "rights to" types. Equality or the second-generation rights, correspond to the protection of economic, social and cultural rights. They consist of rights to such conditions of living which the state must create and make available for individual's maximal development of personality. Fraternity or the third-generation rights refers to 'collective' or 'group' rights and are the new rights which are being claimed by the Third world States. These states have been demanding as a group for creation of an

international legal and economic order that will guarantee the right to development, to disaster relief assistance, to peace and to a good and clean environment. Implementation of such rights would clearly depend upon international cooperation rather than international constitutional measures.

5.4.2 Differences between the Two Covenants

The two covenants the ICCPR and ICESCR were signed in 1956 but could not become effective until 1976. The preamble and articles 1(3) of both the Covenants are almost identical. The salient difference between them is that while article 2 of the ICCPR provides that the protected rights will be respected and ensured immediately, article 2 of the ICESCR simply provides that the states should 'recognize' the rights and implement them in accordance with specific programmes. Again, whereas the ICCPR establishes the Human Rights Committee (HRC) to supervise implementation of the Covenant and to provide a mechanism by which individuals may petition the HRC, the ICESCR simply relegates the function of supervision to a political body of the UN i.e. ECOSOC.

5.4.3 UN's Special Conventions

Notwithstanding the difficulties in establishing a universal system for protection and promotion of human rights, the UN system is in continuous process of drafting legally binding instruments to deal with specific aspects of human rights. They are a tribute to international struggle for human rights world over.

5.4.4 The UN and Decolonization

An important international development in the field of human rights relates to UN's practice in the field of &colonization. The UN charter provided for transfer of the Mandates (which were created by the League

of relations) to a 'Trusteeship system under the supervision of the steamship Council. Administering states with colonies or one governing territories were placed under an obligation to regularly report to Secretary General of the UN about the wellbeing of the people. Although, the UN charter referred to the principle of self-determination, it certainly did not refer to the right to self-determination. It is now however generally accepted that such a right exists in international law. This view now has been reinforced by the General Assembly - Resolution 2625 and the article I which is common to both the International Covenants which promised 'all peoples to have the right to self-determination.' Inclusion of this right reflects a collective right against an alien domination. But whether the right to self-determination goes further beyond one right to decolonization or to the right of minority cessation is an open question. Certainly the effects of large scale decolonization by the former colonial powers have created a group of new states who have been asking for the third generation rights referred to above.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.

- 1) What is Cultural Relativism? What has Vienna Declaration got to say on this aspect?

.....
.....
.....

- 2) Identify at least two from each generation of rights as Vasak has formulated.

.....
.....
.....

- 3) Differences between the Two Covenants

.....
.....
.....

5.5 HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY

As mentioned in section 20.3.2, the dominant notion of human rights is integrally related to two other liberal tenets of free market-based development and democracy. But this particular accent on human rights acquired its meaning and character from the post-cold war developments in the global political economy.

5.5.1 Helsinki Process

A major international development to note in this field occurred during the period of detente (early 1970s) between the West (USA, France, Canada and -U.K.) and the Communist bloc countries of Europe. Known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (SCE), the Helsinki process (the name is after the capital of Finland where it was first convened in 1973) reflected a significant diplomatic development in the super-power relations during the last days of Cold War. While the Soviet Union got its Western borders recognised under the Helsinki Process, the Western powers got the Soviet bloc countries to recognise and commit themselves to human rights observance as per international standards. With the disintegration of the Soviet bloc countries, the Helsinki process acquired far-reaching importance. Although the primary function of the Helsinki process was to establish a framework for development of peace and security towards human rights and Europe, the institutionalized nature of its not-so-binding agreements became a source of International Politics great strength and momentum for promotion of the cause of democratic government and political pluralism all over the world. Internationalization of human rights movement received its major impetus from the concessions which the Western countries extracted from the Soviet bloc countries. In this form, human rights movement

came to be accentuated to imply democratic government and political pluralism after the liberal democratic ideals of the West which emerged victorious from the cold war. , It is therefore not surprising to note that human rights have emerged from the periphery of international arena to a position of primacy in the foreign policy of a substantial number of states during the post-cold war period. But its emergence has come about in a package of combined developments viz., the triad of human rights, free market and democracy which have become desirable, and attainable as policy objectives for most of the developing countries which are dependent on the economic and other aid from the - developed West. In this connection, students of international relations may do well to recall the historical continuity in which the Soviet Union was brought down to its knees before it gave concessions at Helsinki. The seventies were particularly a decade of foreign policy disasters for the Western capitalist countries. With the quadruple rise in oil prices administered by the OPEC countries, a fear of "Third World Unionization" gripped the USA led bloc as it continuously suffered foreign policy reversals notably in South East Asia. This paved the way for detente. On the other side, taking advantage of the situation, the Soviet Union was indulgently expanding its influence. Soviet forces entered Kabul on the Christmas Day of 1979 and it is now the turn of the Soviet Union to suffer a similar set of foreign policy disasters till the system itself crumbled down.

5.5.2 Strategic Shifts in Global Political Economy

The anti-communism prism through which the American foreign policy planners from George Kenyan onwards viewed and shaped their country's foreign policy now stands shattered with the end of the cold war. The Third World activism which had raised its pitch of revolt during the seventies when it demanded a New International Economic Order also lost its momentum. As William Robinson aptly observes "containing communism; which legitimated US global interventions during the Cold War days has now been-replied by "democracy promotion" and "human rights protection" in order to secure the-same set of objectives of global hegemony as they used to be before. The US post-

Notes

cold-war foreign policy, according to this analysis, has witnessed a shift from "straight power concepts" to "persuasion", from cold war rivalries to, what Prof. Huntington calls "the Third Wave of Democracy." In the economic field, conditions are to be created for the free play of the market forces which will ensure global integration across national borders. Widely referred to the globalization phenomenon, it conveniently overlooked that national economies are unequal among the politically equal sovereign states. Consider this instance: The top two richest industrialists of the world are Americans and their annual proceeds are of the same order as the GDP of India. The globalization process which was unleashed in the wake of the end of cold war is showing contrary trends according to various Human Development Reports published by UNDP (United National Development Programme) annually. The 1992 Report brings out the ever-widening global income disparities: "Between 1960 and 1989, the countries with the poorest 20 per cent of world population saw their share fall from 2.3 per cent to 1.4 percent. The consequences for income inequalities have been dramatic. In 1960, the top 20 per cent received thirty times more than the bottom 20 per cent but by 1989 they were receiving sixty time more". In terms of real consumption, "the North with about one fourth of the world's population consumes 70 per cent of its food." It is now an old story that the capitalist system of European production extended to other parts of the globe mainly through trading relationships. Today, the transnational corporations (TNCs) are responsible for more sales than the trade exports of all the countries in the world put together. In other words, private business of the TNCs is the major economic life lines of the world today and the governments have taken a back seat. In this changed development in the international trade, it becomes important to note that most of these TNCs are in the USA and 80 per cent of the latter's trade transactions with the rest of the world are carried out under the banner of the TNCs. Before the TNCs took charge (which actually represents an aggressive phase of asymmetrical financial globalization), the Third World states were already in debt traps owing largely to foreign aid dependent strategies of development which those countries followed during cold war days. The debt crisis was beyond resolution. Most of

these developing countries came under the conditionality of the World Bank and the IMF (to whom they owed huge sums) and went for Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and liberal economic reforms. These so-called liberal economic reforms virtually meant freeing the economy from the state control and little social safety for the vast majority of the working people. According to a UNICEF estimate, "as many as 650,000 children die across the Third World each year because of this debt." It is common knowledge that there are few members and fewer votes from 'the developing world in the boards of IMF and the World Bank. It is the U.S. led west which dominates political, economic and cultural scenarios of the globe. Even in the media scene, as Chandra Muzaffar has pointed out, about 90 per cent of foreign news and information in the print media circulating in the worlds in controlled in one way or another by four news agencies located in the North. Against this changed background of the post-cold war era, one often hears about broad acceptance of "the triad of human rights, free markets and democracy." As mentioned earlier, neither of these three is new to the world; acceptance of democracy and human rights has always been considered a noble pursuit for societies, though free-market goal was a post-cold war addition to the package. This also is the reason for a biased construction of human rights, and hence, opposition from groups of societies with divergent cultural values.

5.5.3 USA's Policy on Human Rights

The USA always maintained that its standards of maintaining human rights are unrivalled and second to none. 'But a closer scrutiny of the US policy of ratifying Human Rights Conventions gives a different story. The aggression and aplomb with which they won in the sphere of ideology, (capitalism over communism), or international political economy ('Washington' over 'New York,' that is to sa\$ victory of forces of World Bank, IMF etc. over the UN systems like UNDP etc.) are nowhere to be seen in its national policy of ratification of human rights conventions, human rights promotion' is a major plank in the US foreign policy. This situation has more to it than what we read in newspapers

Notes

about USA's inconsistent stand on human rights when it comes to trading with China, for instance. In a set of editorial comments, The American Journal of International Law has brilliantly pointed out this indifference on the part of the United States which has "attached to each of its ratifications a package of reservations, understandings and declarations (RUD) which has evoked criticisms abroad and dismayed supporters inside. These RUDs which have successfully stalled ratification of human rights conventions appear to have been guided by the following principles:

- 1) The US may not respect a treaty which is inconsistent with its Constitutional Provision.
- 2) And it is definitely so, if such a treaty seeks or promises to effect a change in the existing US law and practice.
- 3) It will not submit to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide disputes as to the interpretation or application of human rights conventions.
- 4) Every human rights treaty should be subjected to a "federalism clause" whereby the states can largely have the responsibility of their implementation.
- 5) Every international human rights agreement should be "non self-executing", that to say, the former cannot apply on its own merits. 'With these type of national policies of hesitations and reservations it is not therefore surprising to find that the United States has till 1995 ratified only the following five major treaties (though the second Clinton Administration (1996-2000) appears to be more determined in this direction) In 1989, the Genocide Convention that was adopted in 1948 2) In 1992, the ICCPR that was adopted in 1966. In 1994, the Convention against Torture that way adopted in 1984. In 1994, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination that way adopted in 1965. 5) In 1995, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women that way adopted in 1979. According to the editorial comments again, "It was reported that the Clinton administration would seek Senate

consent also to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted in 1966), the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (adopted in 1969) and the Convention on the Rights of Child (adopted in 1989)". It is important to mention here that the extremely slow progress in the ratification procedure may have been due to some technical snags in undertaking treaty obligations of international scope and application. But since these technical snags have been allowed to persist till date, the criticisms remain valid. More so in the light of developments like aggressive leadership by the US in creating a European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to help the transition process of the Central and East European Countries to free market economies, and its armed intervention in Haiti to "restore" democracy and the like. It may be of interest to note that the EBRD created in 1991 became the only international financial institution with an express i commitment to human rights.

5.6 FEATURES OF VIENNA DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Howsoever skewed in terms of meaning attached to Human Rights in the contemporary international relations, importance of human rights for the entire humankind cannot be overemphasized. But it is crucial to know that the contents of an internationally acceptable set of human rights have been finalized and reconfirmed at Vienna. Let us briefly outline the seminal features of this universally accepted human rights package.

- 1) The universal nature of human rights and freedom is beyond question. Whereas the dissident Asian countries (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, North Korea but not India) could temper their opposition as join the rest in the unanimous acceptance of the human rights as universal, the Western Countries for the first time formally accepted the equal validity of economic and social rights and also of the right to development

- alone with the civil and political rights which, they always thought, represented the quintessence of human rights.
- 2) The human rights as internationally declared and pledged to by most of the countries do not admit of any hierarchy among them and as such, are indivisible and inter-dependent.
 - 3) Similarly, a new linkage has also been forged. According to the Declaration, "Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing." An important development in this direction is that the Human Rights Commission established a permanent working group to .formulate an internationally acceptable right to development.
 - 4) The right of the international community to be concerned with human rights practices in any country was firmly stated. This made a big dent on the concept of state sovereignty.
 - 5) Nowhere is the international obligation of the sovereign states invoked more vividly than in areas that were customarily beyond the state's jurisdiction. The international accountability of the state will focus on the areas of domestic violence involving women and other societal violations like racism, ethnic cleansing, xenophobia, and others.
 - 6) The Declaration called upon the international community and the national governments to mobilize institutionalized efforts to eradicate illiteracy and propagate human rights education. Following the World Conference recommendations, an International Decade for Human Rights Education (1995- 2004) was proclaimed ending years of long debate. Appointment of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was finally approved. The High Commissioner will have the overall responsibility for the UN Human Rights programmes.

5.7 EMERGING CHALLENGES TO HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION

Two trends related to promotion and protection of international human rights may be noted: On the one hand, there is a tremendous drive

towards establishing democratic governments all over the world. Most states feel some legal obligation (at least political pressure) to treat their citizens according to the international standards. More people are becoming conscious of their rights and this wholesome phenomenon is due largely to active facilitation by the Non-Governmental Organizations which have increasingly been playing an important role in human rights activities. The other trend however is the 'increasing incidence of human rights violations which have afflicted the society now. Re-emergence of fascist and undemocratic ideologies like fundamentalism in Europe, North America, Africa and Asia has raised the spectre of 'ethnic cleansing'. Human Rights violations have thus increased. Whether it is Bosnia or Rwanda or Afghanistan, the sordid story of human rights violations cannot be explained in a simple, straight jacket fashion. Taking stock of the human rights situation in the world, the UN Human Rights Centre in Geneva presented to the Vienna Conference the following picture: "At least half of the world's people suffer from serious violation of their economic, social, cultural, civil or political rights. These violations range from torture, execution, rape arbitrary detention, violence and disappearances, to extreme poverty, slavery, child abuse, famine and under-nourishment and lack of access to clean water, sanitation and health care " Most of the Third World governments find themselves more committed to prevention of, economic and political stability as ground realities become from bad to worse whereas the industrialized countries have so far shown little genuine commitment to the "second generation rights" which would have contributed significantly to freeing the Third World rulers from their economic hamstrings. Together, given the needed political will and commitment, these countries would have helped more the world in a direction which would have made it possible for the humankind to realize rights, democracy and development. For this agenda to be carried to its logical end, three agencies need to be conscious, vigilant and assertive: the individual, the non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. It is widely hoped that with the genuine participation of the individual, growing organizational potentials of the NGOs, and the encouragement by the and the spearheading leadership of the UNO, the required political and economic pressure on

the actors and agencies can be generated on the international scene in order to create a world of democracy, human rights and development.

Check Your Progress 4

Note : i) Use the space given below for your answers.

- 1) Identify four undisputed achievements of the Vienna Conference and mention at least ten human rights violations reported to it.

.....
.....
.....

5.8 LET US SUM UP

Human rights and fundamental freedoms are integral to personality development of human beings whose dignity cannot be compromised. International struggle for human rights has made it possible the accountability of the Sovereign States not only against violations within its jurisdiction but also in areas of social living. The picture of human rights in the mind of an average student is usually one which favours the idea that the concern for these rights began under US President Jimmy Carter's leadership. A closer scrutiny however suggests that such a picture is more often biased. It also does not take into account the role of a 'stalking horse' which the US establishment had been using in promoting democracy and human rights as an important foreign policy plank. As the critics argue, the human rights talk today is all 'persuasion' which has replaced the cold war ideological confrontations. More reasons, than the often-cited technical snags, should be seen in the tardy progress in the US ratification of human rights. (So far they have signed only five major treaties). But the World Conference on Human Rights held at Vienna in 1993 finally succeeded in achieving four notable goals:

- 1) Confirmation of universality of Human Right.
- 2) Establishment of equal validity for social and economic rights along with civil and political rights and the right to development.

- 3) Expansion of the sphere of accountability of the sovereign state. It is obligated henceforth to protect human rights not only within its domestic jurisdiction but also conform to international conventions which are multilateral.
- 4) Finally, human rights, democracy and development are now going to constitute a mad of inter-relationships which are critically to influence the policy decisions of the aid donor and recipient countries.

The Human Rights Commissioner has been set up to look after this responsibility. An International Decade for Worldwide Education in Human Rights has already been proclaimed. The support of the international community as well as the national governments including India has been enlisted. All these official efforts represent but only one side of the picture. But no less significant would be a widely hoped co-ordination of efforts of the individual and non-governmental organizations under the spearheading leadership of the UNO. Collectively, joint and co-ordinated activities are expected to mount the needed pressure for building a world where democracy, human rights and development are given due emphasis and respectability. Official and institutional reforms hopefully would complement the individual efforts of Human Rights preservation and promotion.

5.9 KEY WORDS

Declaration: In law, a declaration is an authoritative establishment of fact. Declarations take various forms in different legal systems

Magna Carta: Magna Carta Libertatum, commonly called Magna Carta, is a charter of rights agreed to by King John of England at Runnymede, near Windsor, on 15 June 1215

Human Rights: Human rights are moral principles or norms that describe certain standards of human behaviour and are regularly protected as natural and legal rights in municipal and international law.

5.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

Notes

1. What is Cultural Relativism? What has Vienna Declaration got to say on this aspect?
2. Identify at least two from each generation of rights as Vasak has formulated.
3. Differences between the Two Covenants
4. Identify four undisputed achievements of the Vienna Conference and mention at least ten human rights violations reported to it.

5.11 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Amnesty International (London); Human Rights in India (1993)
Human Rights are Women's Rights.
- Richard Reoch, Human Rights - The New Consensus (London).
- A B Kalaiyah: Human Rights in International Law, New Delhi 1986.
- K P Saksena: Teaching Human Rights: A Manual for Adult Education, New Delhi, 1996.
- R J Vincent: Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge) 1986.
- Various Issues of Human Rights Quarterly.

5.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) See Section 5.2

Check Your Progress 2

- 1) See Section 5.3

Check Your Progress 3

- 1) See Section 5.4
- 2) See Sub Section 5.4.1
- 3) See Sub Section 5.4.2

Check Your Progress 4

- 1) See Section 5.6

UNIT 6: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

STRUCTURE

- 6.0 Objectives
- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.2 Internationalization of Human Rights
- 6.3 The Growth of World Trade: An Overview
- 6.4 The Role of World Trade Organisation
- 6.5 Transnational Corporation's Accountability of Human Rights
- 6.6 Rights of Indigenous People
- 6.7 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
- 6.8 Marginalisation of Poor Countries
- 6.9 Regulating International Trade: Code of Conduct for TNCs
- 6.10 Let us Sum up
- 6.11 Key Words
- 6.12 Questions for Review
- 6.13 Suggested readings and references
- 6.14 Answers to Check Your Progress

6.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to understand:

- To know about Internationalization of Human Rights;
- To discuss the Growth of World Trade: An Overview;
- To know about the Role of World Trade Organisation;
- To understand the Transnational Corporation's Accountability of Human Rights;
- To know Rights of Indigenous People;
- To discuss the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights;
- To know about the Marginalisation of Poor Countries;
- To know about the Regulating International Trade: Code of Conduct for TNCs.

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Contemporary International Relations has been witnessing two significant developments. One, since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 a huge corpus of human rights law has been evolved under its aegis. As a result, the term 'human rights' has become a "catch word" in contemporary discourses. In fact, human rights can be said to have become, as the former Secretary General of the U.N., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, said in his opening statement to the World Conference on Human Rights (14-25 June 1993) in Vienna, Austria, "the common language of humanity and the ultimate norm of all politics". Second, we are witnessing the globalisation of the world economy. There has been a rapid transformation of the world economy: the reduction of national barriers to trade and investment, the expansion of telecommunications and information systems, the introduction of e-commerce, the increasing role of multinational enterprises, global inter-firm networking arrangements and alliances, regional economic integration and the development of a single unified world market.

Under such a milieu, there has been a consistent and faster growth of international trade which has been institutionalised and regulated with the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, which had, for long, controlled economies and markets, has contributed further to this process of globalisation of the world economy and trade. Many scholars and nations assert and believe that the participation of developing/poor countries in international trade will contribute greatly to their economic prosperity and industrial growth and this will consequently help in raising the standard of life of their people. Further, it is assumed that this prosperity might ultimately improve human conditions and the prospects of human rights of everyone. Contrary to such assertions and beliefs of the protagonists of free trade, human rights are at great risk as international trade primarily works on the principle of profit making rather than promoting and respecting them. Professor Upendra Baxi critically remarks that the paradigm of human rights of all human beings is steadily, but surely, subverted by trade-related practices. The main

focus of this unit is to explain how human rights of the people, especially the workers, are violated by profit making Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and industrialised states that are under their tremendous influence.

International trade is the exchange of capital, goods, and services across international borders or territories.

In most countries, such trade represents a significant share of gross domestic product (GDP). While international trade has existed throughout history (for example Uttarapatha, Silk Road, Amber Road, scramble for Africa, Atlantic slave trade, salt roads), its economic, social, and political importance has been on the rise in recent centuries.

Carrying out trade at an international level is a complex process when compared to domestic trade. When trade takes place between two or more nations factors like currency, government policies, economy, judicial system, laws, and markets influence trade.

To smoothen and justify the process of trade between countries of different economic standing, some international economic organisations were formed, such as the World Trade Organization. These organisations work towards the facilitation and growth of international trade. Statistical services of intergovernmental and supranational organisations and national statistical agencies publish official statistics on international trade.

6.2 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

One of the greatest, in fact, revolutionary, developments in the annals of human history is that for the first time in international relations a comprehensive list of “human rights” has been recognised which every individual, irrespective of his/her origin, religion, race, colour, sex, nationality, etc. can claim as a member of human society. Since 1948 the United Nations has adopted nearly 100 human rights instruments (such

Notes

as declarations, conventions, covenants, protocols, and resolutions) on various facets of human rights, covering the entire gamut of human relationship. However, it must be noted that the most important among all these instruments are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966, which together form the parts of the International Bill of Rights. This Bill, the first ever adopted in the history of the world, has brought the matter of promoting human rights on the agenda of international relations.

Let us briefly discuss the rights that are mentioned in the International Bill. The UDHR, which was Magna Carta of mankind, proclaims civil-political and economic, social and cultural rights. The two Covenants of 1966 further elaborate these two sets of rights mentioned in the UDHR. The Covenants are legally binding on ratifying states unlike the provisions of the UDHR. It may be noted that the right to property included in UDHR (Art.17) is missing in the two Covenants. The ICCPR sets out the following rights (under Articles 6-27): right to life; freedom from torture and inhuman treatment; freedom from slavery and forced labour; the right to liberty and security; the right of detained persons to be treated with humanity; freedom from imprisonment for debt; freedom of movement and of choice of residence; freedom of aliens from arbitrary expulsion; the right to a fair trial; protection against retroactivity of the criminal law; the right to recognition as a person before law; the right to privacy; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; prohibition of propaganda for war and of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred; the right of peaceful assembly; freedom of association; the right to marry and found a family; the rights of the child; political rights; equality before the law and rights of minorities. Thus, this is an exhaustive list, and there are more rights in ICCPR than in the UDHR or the European Convention on Human Rights.

Similarly, the ICESCR also provides a detailed list of rights (under Articles 6-15) to be protected by State Parties. These include: the right to work; the right to just and favourable conditions of work including fair wages, equal pay for equal work and holidays with pay; the right to form and join trade unions, including the right to strike; the right to social security; protection of the family, including special assistance for mothers and children; the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing and the continuous improvement of living conditions; the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; the right to education, primary education being compulsory and free for all, and secondary and higher education generally accessible to all and the right to participate in cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.

Thus, these two Covenants provide the most basic human rights. Besides these two UN instruments, there are two other sets of human rights norms which conflict with international trade practices. They are rights of the workers and the environmental rights. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has adopted around 150 Conventions, dealing with, among others, conditions of work, remuneration, child and forced labour, the provision of holidays and social security, prevention of discrimination in employment and trade union rights. There are some 200 multilateral environmental agreements in existence today containing some form of trade measures.

A product that is transferred or sold from a party in one country to a party in another country is an export from the originating country, and an import to the country receiving that product. Imports and exports are accounted for in a country's current account in the balance of payments.

Trading globally gives consumers and countries the opportunity to be exposed to new markets and products. Almost every kind of product can be found in the international market: food, clothes, spare parts, oil, jewellery, wine, stocks, currencies, and water. Services are also traded: tourism, banking, consulting, and transportation

Ancient Silk Road trade routes across Eurasia

Advanced technology (including transportation), globalisation, industrialisation, outsourcing and multinational corporations have major impact on the international trade system.

Increasing international trade is crucial to the continuance of globalisation. Nations would be limited to the goods and services produced within their own borders without international trade.

6.3 THE GROWTH OF WORLD TRADE: AN OVERVIEW

Let us briefly look at the phenomenal growth of world trade in contemporary world. During the last five decades the world exports have increased tenfold, even after adjusting for inflation, consistently growing faster than world Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Foreign investment has risen more rapidly; sales by TNCs exceed world exports by a growing margin, and transactions among TNCs are a rapidly expanding segment of world trade. Foreign exchange flows have soared to more than \$1.5 trillion daily, up from \$15 billion in 1973. According to 1996 annual report of the WTO, there was a strong growth in both merchandise and service trade in 1995. The value of total cross-border trade in goods and services exceeded \$6,000 billion for the first time. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, disclosed in his millennium address to the UN that the market for e-commerce was \$2.6 billion in 1996; it is expected to grow to \$300 billion by year 2002. Another study had estimated that the growth of world trade would exceed \$8 trillion annually by the year 2000.

Check Your Progress 1:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. Discuss about Internationalization of Human Rights.

-
-
-
2. Write The Growth of World Trade: An Overview.
-
-
-

6.4 THE ROLE OF WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION

The WTO was established on 1 January 1995 replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is the result of many rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. The Marrakesh agreement was negotiated as a climax of the Uruguay round of trade negotiations under the umbrella of GATT. The last round of negotiations was concluded on 15 December 1993 and the participating governments signed the Final Act, which included over 22,000 pages, at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 15 April 1994. The “Marrakesh Declaration” affirmed that the new trade law would “strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment, employment and income growth throughout the world.” The Marrakesh agreement was the most comprehensive trade deal in world history, covering everything from paper clips to jet aircraft. The bulk of the document symbolised its breadth. The WTO has a much broader scope in terms of the commercial activity and trade policies to which it applies. GATT applied only to trade in merchandise goods; the WTO covers trade in goods, services and “trade in ideas” or intellectual property (innovations, inventions etc.).

The functions of the WTO include:

- (i) Monitoring the implementation of multilateral trade agreements, which together make up the WTO;
- (ii) Acting as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations;
- (iii) Seeking to resolve trade disputes among trading partners. (The findings of its arbitration panels are binding);

Notes

- (iv) Overseeing national trade policies; and
- (v) Co-operating with other international institutions involved in global economic policy making.

The principles governing international trade system outlined in the WTO Agreements are worth noting. There are four significant principles:

- (i) Trade should be conducted without discrimination among members and between imported and domestically produced merchandise.
- (ii) The WTO agreements seek to ensure that conditions of investment and trade are more predictable by making it difficult for member governments to change the rules of the game at will. The key to predictable trading conditions is often the transparency of domestic laws, regulations and practices. WTO agreements contain transparency provisions, which require disclosure of these rules at the national level or at the multilateral level through formal notifications to the WTO.
- (iii) The WTO promotes open and fair competition in international trade. It is not the “free trade” institution as it permits tariffs and limited forms of protection.
- (iv) The WTO agreements encourage development and economic reform. Many of the underdeveloped countries have been following the policies of economic reforms or liberalisation during the last one decade.

6.5 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION’S ACCOUNTABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS

It has long been recognised that the TNCs that operate across national boundaries have enormous impact on the modern world. If we compare the revenues of the twenty-five largest MNCs with revenues of states, we learn that only six states-USA (\$ 1,248 billion), Germany (\$ 690 billion), Japan (\$ 595 billion), UK (\$ 389 billion), Italy (\$ 339 billion) and France

(\$ 221 billion)- have revenues larger than the nine largest MNCs Mitsubishi (\$ 184 billion), Mitsui (\$ 182 billion), Sumitomo (\$ 168 billion), Marubeni— (\$ 161 billion), Ford Motor (\$ 137 billion), Toyota Motor (\$ 111 billion) and Exxon (\$ 110 billion). Because of their enormous economic power, TNCs are often beyond the effective control of national governments, including those, which are within their own jurisdictions. Moreover, TNCs normally have considerable influence in national political systems, especially through pro-business political parties and personalities. This makes regulation of business difficult to achieve. Today there are more than 38,500 transnational parent companies with their more than 250,000 foreign affiliates. These TNCs and their foreign affiliates produced 25 per cent of global output in 1998, and the top 100 (ranked by foreign assets) had sales totaling \$ 4 trillion. Between 1980 and 1992 the annual sales of TNCs doubled (\$ 2.4 to \$ 5.5 trillion), and the annual sales of many are now greater than the GDP of some states. For example, in 1997, General Motor's worldwide sales (\$ 168 billion) exceeded the combined GDP of Indonesia and Pakistan. (Indonesia: \$115 billion; Pakistan: \$ 45 billion). Again, the combined revenue of two US-based business corporates - General Motors (\$ 168 billion) and Ford Motors (\$ 147 billion) is nearly equal to India's GDP (\$ 324 billion). The primary objective and concern of TNCs is profit making. In order to make profits TNCs often move their capital and production units to those places where they attract cheap labour. There is a global competition to attract TNC investment both among developing and developed countries. In the hope of attracting TNC investment, nations bid against each other to offer the lowest levels of environmental, labour and human rights regulation. This competitiveness is directly contributing towards fewer social benefits, lower salaries of workers and violation of many social, political and trade union rights. One may find many horror stories of unprincipled TNCs making handsome profits at the expense of clearly exploited employees. Various TNCs, from United Fruit to Coca-Cola, actively opposed progressive governments and laws designed to advance labour rights and other human rights. In fact, United Fruit in Guatemala (1954) and ITT in Chile (1973) actively cooperated with the US government in helping to overthrow politicians (Arbenz in

Notes

Guatemala and Allende in Chile) who were champions especially of labour rights for their nationals. What follows here and in the next two sections is a selection of examples where contemporary trade practices lead to human rights violations. Both the TNCs and the elite of national governments demonstrate their intolerance to any alternative world-view expressed by individuals and groups in defense of their economic, social, civil and political rights. When alternatives are expressed, they routinely engage in violating human rights. The statement of former president of Ecuador, Abdala Bacaram, is case in point: he had asserted that “if oil workers seek to halt the production of basic and strategic services such as oil, I will personally witness the police and the armed forces giving them a thrashing to make them return to work.” Though this statement is perhaps more blunt than most, the attitude of many corporations and governments is similar.

Following select examples testify this. Mexico’s maquiladora sector provides a further example. The maquiladora produces \$29 billion in export earnings and offers employment for more than 500,000 people from the poorest, least experienced and least educated groups in society. Human rights violations are reported in many parts of the sector, particularly in relation to attempts by workers to establish free trade unions. Where possible, the corporations operating in the maquiladora prefer to employ women, because they are more committed to the job and are less informed about their rights, less radical than men, more tolerant of substandard working conditions and less likely to engage in politics or trade union activism. Moreover, women employees have faced discrimination during pregnancy. Applicants for jobs are routinely subjected to pregnancy tests before being hired. In some cases employees questioned women about their sexual activities, when they last menstruated and whether they used contraception. If women do become pregnant, managers attempt to create such conditions, which may compel them to resign.

Managers use several methods intended to intimidate, including picking on every conceivable error in the quality of work, no matter how

insignificant it is; they provide substandard machines so that their poor performance will not attract bonus payment; refuse to allow time off to attend the doctor, and transfer them to heavier, more physically demanding work usually not suitable for pregnant women. Since women are desperate to keep jobs, they tolerate discriminatory treatment. Although Mexican labour law forbids such discrimination, the government frequently tolerates such practices. It is regrettable that neither the corporations nor the government seem interested in responding to internationally recognised prohibitions on pregnancy-based discrimination. Under Article 26 of the ICCPR, all people are entitled to equal treatment before the law regardless of sex. Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) condemns all forms of discrimination against women, particularly in the field of employment (Article 11:1). Discriminatory pregnancy-based practices are also a violation of the right to privacy (ICCPR Article 17, UDHR Article 12) and the right to decide freely the number and spacing of children (CEDAW Article 16:1). It may be recalled that Mexico has ratified ICCPR and CEDAW in March 1981.

There is more to it. Trade union rights were suppressed, when maquiladora workers struggled to establish free trade unions, independent of the government-backed Confederation of Mexican Workers (CMW). For example, in 1989, workers at the Ford plant in Hermoville organised a hunger strike in support of their demand for democratic elections to the CMW. In response, Ford began to dismiss workers and blacklist those involved in the action, but protests continued. Of a total of 3,800 workers, Ford dismissed 3,050 before the organisers called off the action. Let us look at another example of the activities of Royal Dutch Shell Oil in the Ogoni region of Nigeria. Human Rights Watch (a NGO) reports (in 1995) that at the end of October 1990, Shell requested police assistance at a peaceful demonstration against the continued destruction of tribal lands as a direct result of oil operations. Due to beatings, teargas attacks and indiscriminate shootings 80 people died. On another occasion, one of Shells' contractors, Willbros, bulldozed crops in preparation for construction work. When local people

Notes

protested, Willbros called in government troops who opened fire to disperse the demonstrators. Willbros defended its right to proceed with the construction, on the grounds that all the necessary formal procedures were adhered to, although the popular Movement for the Protection of the Ogoni People was not invited to take part in the negotiations that sanctioned the contract.

Although Shell has claimed that its contact with Nigerian Security Forces was minimal, a government official admitted to Human Rights Watch that regular contact with Lt. Col. Paul Okuntimo, the Director of Rivers State Security was made. According to one company official, Okuntimo was a “savage soldier”, known for his brutality, who saw his role as making “the area safe for” the oil companies. It is instructive to note that these incidents of violation of human rights led to a stormy meeting of the shareholders in 1997, which called for greater openness and social responsibility. Shell has recently announced its intention to publish an annual audit of social accountability. It remains to be seen whether this approach to taking human rights seriously proves beneficial. Another example concerns the sports goods industry. Indian companies produce many sports goods such as baseballs, footballs, cricket equipment, volleyballs and boxing gloves. Although no official data exist, one NGO (i.e. Christian Aid) estimates that of the 300,000 workers engaged in the industry, some 25,000 to 30,000 are children, either working with their families or in small stitching centres. Some children, aged between 10 and 11 years, work five to six hours a day for as little as Rs.10 or even less than that per football. In addition, tanneries supplying leather to the industry’s main exporters employ children, exposing them to hazardous chemicals. Children and teenage apprentices working in factories or small workshops are routinely paid fraction of the adult minimum wage. Besides poor pay, some adult workers are denied union rights, sick pay and access to provident funds and insurance schemes. It is a common practice to deny continuous appointments to workers so as to deprive them of these rights.

Despite the constitutional and statutory ban on employing children in hazardous industries, child labour in leather tanning, carpet industry, bangle-manufacturing units, matches and crackers factories continue till this day. TNCs also have the potential to do great damage by destroying the livelihoods of people through environmental practices that lay forests bare, deplete fishing stocks, dump hazardous materials and pollute rivers and lakes that were once a source of water and fish. The example of commercial prawn farming reveals the extent of damaging effects of trade on civil and political rights. Many underdeveloped countries have encouraged commercial prawn farming ventures without regard for social and environmental consequences. The World Bank and IMF have supported such ventures to help improve the debt-ridden Third World countries' balance of payments by increasing exports. Commercial prawn farming has the added advantage that it brings high returns on low levels of investment and technology. This is particularly attractive to private investors who wish to make huge profits in the shortest time, as there is a great demand of prawns in Western countries. Moreover, prawn farming is an important source of foreign exchange for underdeveloped Asian and Latin American states. The farming method involves the construction of saline ponds, ranging in size from a half hectare to five hectares. The optimum conditions for prawn cultivation are maintained in a number of ways: continuously pumping water, and adding chemicals to control acidity and alkalinity, fertilizers for growth, antibiotics to control disease and other chemicals to combat parasites. The timescale from stocking the ponds with seedling prawns to harvest is usually four months, allowing companies to take three crops a year. In fact, one crop is often sufficient to cover investment costs.

Many governments consider such ventures as contributing to their economic growth and development. Therefore, they often give government land to prawn producers. This practice leads to many human rights violations. The sites of prawn farming represent a valuable resource for local communities providing them the only available access to pasture fuel-wood and other necessities to sustain life. In some cases prawn farming has taken over land previously used for producing locally

Notes

marketed foods. Moreover, it affects the local fishing communities. Also, the construction of ponds can obstruct the natural flow of water and cause flooding in villages, soil erosion and the saline of soil. Producers often pump wastewater containing cocktail additives (used for prawn production) onto adjacent lands, which pollute the soil. Although many of these practices are illegal, governments generally ignore the violations of laws in their enthusiasm for promoting prawn farming. The result is that people are forced from the land that provides subsistence and their traditional way of life disintegrates, violating economic and cultural rights that are protected under international law of human rights.

Check Your Progress 2:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. Discuss the Role of World Trade Organisation.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

2. Write about Transnational Corporation's Accountability of Human Rights.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

6.6 RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

The international community has become concerned over violations of the rights of indigenous peoples in recent years, after many years of neglect. The United Nations has drafted a declaration on the subject in 1994. The decade 1994-2003 has been declared the UN Decade for Indigenous Peoples. There is also a 1989 ILO Convention on their rights.

Oil, uranium, minerals and timber are found throughout the world on indigenous lands, and TNCs have been permitted to encroach on them in the name of economic development. Indigenous lands in many parts of the world have been trespassed upon in pursuit of traditional medicines, which are then brought onto international pharmaceutical markets. There are many cases concerning the violations of the rights of the indigenous people. We are discussing here only two cases. (In the preceding section we have already discussed the example of Shell Oil in Nigeria's Ogoni region, which violated the rights of tribals). First, in 1985 a complaint against Brazil was brought to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by the Yanomami Indians of Brazil alleging that many of their rights have been violated due to the activities of independent prospectors and companies engaged in exploiting the mineral and timber resources of the Amazon regions inhabited by them. It was alleged that the so-called economic development has resulted in serious violations of their right to health, clean environment, the right to life and the cultural rights.

The Inter-American Commission found that the incursions, which included the construction of a highway through Yanomami lands, caused disruption of the social life of the Yanomami and introduced a number of diseases, which decimated the population. The Commission also found that, in licensing and permitting these activities, Brazil violated the right to life and the right to protection of health provided in the American Declaration of the Rights of Man. A second example concerns the controversy surrounding the proposed construction of a new port by P & O, the developers, in Dahanu in the state of Maharashtra, which placed it conspicuously at the centre of all trade issues. Dahanu is the home of India's few remaining tribal peoples, the Warlis. The proposed port is reportedly eight times the size of Liverpool and will not only bring much needed jobs to the area and regenerate the economy but will also relieve the congestion at Bombay port. An unpublished report commissioned by P & O, however, concludes, "the port will destroy the Warlis way of life. Moreover, 70 per cent of the Warlis were opposed to the port, with only 11 per cent in favour. Contrary to the government of Maharashtra's claim that the port will bring lasting economic benefits, the report concludes

that there is little evidence of this. Indeed, the sustainable use of natural resources has created a flourishing economy, which is self-sufficient and rooted in the natural wealth of the region. If P & O is allowed to go ahead with the construction, the local economy will be destroyed and it will have extensive impact on human rights.

6.7 TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

The agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is one of the pillars of the Uruguay Round agreement, and also one of the most contentious. It tightens intellectual property rights for the creator. It introduces an enforceable global standard by linking intellectual property rights with trade, making them binding and enforceable through the WTO mechanism. TRIPS agreement fails to protect adequately the rights to health, and the rights of indigenous people among others. Its provisions restrain many public policies that promote wider access to health care. National laws of many developing countries have intentionally excluded pharmaceuticals from product patent protection (allowing only process patents) to promote local manufacturing capacity for generic drugs and to make drugs available at lower prices. The move from process to product patents introduced under the TRIPS agreement dramatically reduces the possibilities for local companies to produce cheaper versions of important lifesaving drug, such as those for cancer and HIV/AIDS. Local production of anti-AIDS drugs flucanazole in India had kept the prices reasonable (costing \$55 for 100 tablets) whereas its prices in the other developed and the same under the developed countries ranges between \$ 700 - \$ 1000. Traditional knowledge and resource rights of indigenous people have been greatly affected under the TRIPS agreement. Traditionally life forms, plants and animals-were exempted from patents. But now it is going to change. TRIPS agreement requires all WTO member countries to permit patents on microorganisms and microbiological and non-biological processes. So “bioprospecting” has mushroomed-with scientists “reinventing” and patenting products and processes using traditional knowledge that communities have held for centuries. Patents have been awarded for

using the healing properties of turmeric, for the pesticide properties of the neem tree and other plant properties-all part of traditional knowledge. In a number of such cases the patents were challenged and reversed. The TRIPS agreement mostly benefits technologically advanced countries.

It is estimated that industrialized states hold 97 per cent of all patents, and TNCs 90 per cent of all technology and product patents. Developing countries have little to gain from the stronger patent protection from the TRIPS agreement because they have little research and development capacity. The TRIPS agreement also appears to be incompatible with human rights law and environmental agreements. The International Bill of Rights recognizes the human right to share in scientific progress. It may be recalled that India had invented zero but we have not patented its use, rather the entire world is benefited by its use. The Convention on Biodiversity requires states to protect and promote the rights of communities, farmers and indigenous people in their use of biological resources and knowledge systems. It also requires equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the commercial use of communities' biological resources and local knowledge. There is need to build human rights safeguards into the TRIPS agreement. The African Group of WTO Members has proposed a review of the agreement, particularly for provisions to protect indigenous knowledge. And India has suggested amendment to promote transfer of environmentally sound technology.

Check Your Progress 3:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. Discuss about the Rights of Indigenous People.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

2. Write about Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

6.8 MARGINALISATION OF POOR COUNTRIES

It is true that global economic integration is creating opportunities for people around the world, but it is also leading to widening the gaps between the poorest and richest countries. Many of the poorest countries are marginalised from the growing opportunities of expanding international trade, investment and in the use of new technologies. The UNDP's Human Development Report 2000, which focuses on human rights, provides arresting evidence of how the pursuit of free trade and the systematic violation of human rights go hand in hand besides marginalising poor countries from the bounty of world economy. Let us look at the statistics provided in the report. World exports of goods and services expanded rapidly between 1990 and 1998, from \$ 4.7 trillion to \$ 7.5 trillion. And 25 countries had export growth averaging more than 10 per cent a year (including Bangladesh, Mexico, Mozambique, Turkey and Vietnam), but exports declined in Cameroon, Jamaica and Ukraine. In 1998 least developed countries, with 10 per cent of the world population, accounted for only 0.4 per cent of global exports, down from 0.6 per cent in 1980 and 0.5 per cent in 1990. Sub-Saharan Africa's share declined to 1.4 per cent, down from 2.3 per cent in 1980 and 1.6 per cent in 1990. Although average tariffs are higher in developing than in developed countries, many poor nations still face tariff peaks and tariff escalation in such key sectors as agriculture, footwear and leather goods.

The marginalisation of poor can further be discerned from the data on foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI flows have boomed, reaching more than \$ 600 billion in 1998. But these flows are highly concentrated, with

just 20 countries receiving 83 per cent of the \$177 billion going to developing and transition economies, mainly China, Brazil, Mexico and Singapore. The 48 least developing countries attracted less than \$ 3 billion in 1998, a mere 0.4 per cent of the total. Of course, not everybody is suffering in the global economy. In 1998, the UNDP said the assets of the world's 358 billionaires exceeded the combined annual incomes of countries with 45 per cent of the world's population. In 1999, we learn that the sales of the world's top six firms, at \$ 716 billion, exceed the combined GDP of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The UNDP's report for 2000 disclosed that the super-rich get richer. The combined wealth of the top 200 billionaires hit \$ 1,135 billion in 1999, up from \$ 1.042 billion in 1998. This is in comparison with the combined incomes of \$ 146 billion for the 582 million people in all the least developed countries.

6.9 REGULATING INTERNATIONAL TRADE: CODE OF CONDUCT FOR TNCs

In the preceding pages we have seen how TNCs are conducting their business and often pursue their interests of profit making, often disregarding and violating internationally agreed norms of human rights. Unless an internationally accepted "code of conduct" for TNC operations is evolved and enforced through the United Nations or some multilateral forum, it is extremely difficult to make them socially responsible. Such a code may promote human rights accountability¹⁸ and social auditing of TNCs. While the industrialised countries of the North where TNCs have their base have laid down rules and regulations and parameters within which TNCs and private entrepreneurs could operate, they never supported for such rules and regulations at the international level. Due to demands from the developing countries of South, supported by the communist states, the United Nations attempted to do its part of monitoring the activities of TNCs and preventing their misuse of power. For several years the United Nations also tried to evolve a binding code of conduct for TNCs, which never came to fruition due to blocking action by the capital exporting states whose primary concern was to protect the freedom of "their" corporations to make profits.

Notes

After more than two decades of negotiations and drafting of the code, the attempt was abandoned in the late 1980s. The United Nations department concerned with TNCs was abolished under the US pressure in January 1992. In 1996 the WTO did adopt a declaration, sponsored by the USA, pledging members to respect labour rights. The declaration was non-binding and vague. But some observers were fearful that just as the WTO had struck down some US decisions-based on its environmental regulations as restraints on free trade, so the WTO might prove equally hostile to human rights regulations. It is intriguing that instead of laying down a code of conduct for TNCs, the industrialised states, as represented in OECD (the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), are preparing drafts for Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). In February 1997, a 147- page negotiating text was leaked and is now available on Public citizen's Trade watch web page of the Internet. Although the process to get agreement on the MAI is currently stalled, the OECD continues to argue that its acceptance would make a significant contribution towards completing the global programme of deregulation. In fact, the first draft of the MAI was completed in secret. According to critics, if accepted, the MAI would constitute a significant step towards creating a "constitution of a single global economy" or a "bill of rights and freedoms for TNCs". This constitution would further restrict state powers to formulate independent policy and curtail the rights of people to enjoy the benefits of their natural resources. The practice of imposing human rights-related investment conditions, such as employing local labour, providing education and training and making a contribution to the local economy, would be outlawed under the MAI.

Moreover, MAI draft bans any restriction on "repatriation of profits" and the movement of capital. It also bans "performance requirement" and prohibits governments (of developing countries) from treating foreign investors differently from domestic investors and authorizes TNCs to sue national government for failure to meet the MAI's terms. In short, critics argue that the MAI represents a major step in the attempt to promote free

trade that serves the interests of international investors and corporations, without regard for the rights of workers, communities and the environment. However, it is encouraging to note that a number of corporations have adopted corporate codes of conduct dealing with labour and human rights. The most frequently cited example of company guidelines in this regard are the Levi Strauss and Co. Business Partner Terms of Engagement and Guidelines for Country Selection which are directed to the company's contractors and suppliers. They cover, inter alia, occupational safety and health, freedom of association, wages and benefits, working time, child labour, forced labour and non-discriminatory hiring practices. Also, the OECD has adopted a non-binding code, but it generated little influence. The Reebok Corporation, the New York Skirt, is making similar efforts and Sportswear Association, the National Association of Blouse Manufacturers Inc., the Industrial Association of Juvenile Apparel Manufacturers and the Timberland Corporation. These efforts, if they become sufficiently widespread, will have a positive effect on social situations, but they frequently lack effective monitoring systems and need to be more widely adopted and enforced.

Thus, voluntary codes of corporate conduct have proliferated-but they tend to be weak on two fronts. First, they rarely refer to internationally agreed human rights standards. For example, most apparel industry codes refer to national standards rather than the higher ILO standards. Second they lack mechanisms for implementation and external monitoring and audit.

Check Your Progress 4:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. Discuss the Marginalisation of Poor Countries.

.....
.....
.....

2. Write essay on Regulating International Trade: Code of Conduct for TNCs.

.....
.....
.....

6.10 LET US SUM UP

As the international trade is growing phenomenally in contemporary world and the TNCs share of it is strengthening day by day, the state of many internationally recognized human rights is getting diluted. This unit reveals that many human rights are violated in the cause of trade. With the study of many examples of TNCs' accountability of human rights in the unit we learn that people who stand in the way of trade-related business "routinely" lose the right to self-determination and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development (ICESCR, Article 1:1). In some cases, local resistance to trade-related development projects lead to the isolation of the right to life, liberty and the security of persons (UDHR, Article 3). The right to form and join trade unions for the promotion and protection of economic and social interests (UDHR, Article 23:4; ICESCR, Article 8), is also a target for oppressive measures. The right to subsistence is violated when people are excluded from their traditional means of feeding, clothing and housing themselves (ICESCR, Article 11). The special protection afforded to women under CEDAW seems to attract little respect when there is a need for low-paid obedient workers engaged in the production of export goods. Also, the right to enjoy and share scientific progress (UDHR, Article 27:2 and ICESCR, Article 15:6) is greatly restricted with the coming into force of TRIPS agreement. The trade related practices also lead to violations of the rights of indigenous people besides causing significant damages to environment and natural habitat. Moreover, the pursuit of free trade is benefiting rich countries more and the gap between rich and poor nations is growing further. This is leading to the marginalization of poor nations. Unless the TNCs are made to follow internationally recognized code of conduct, in which human rights dimensions can be built, human rights of

people cannot remain secure as the contemporary trade practices at international level reveal.

6.11 KEY WORDS

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

UDHR: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a historic document that was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its third session on 10 December 1948 as Resolution 217 at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, France.

CEDAW: The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women is an international treaty adopted in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly. Described as an international bill of rights for women, it was instituted on 3 September 1981 and has been ratified by 189 states.

ICESCR: The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966 through GA. Resolution 2200A (XXI), and came in force from 3 January 1976.

6.12 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you understand by the term “International Bill of Rights”? List the rights catalogued in it.
2. “Some of the TNCs have larger revenues than some nations.” Discuss the
3. TNCs’ economic power in the light of this statement.
4. Give examples of violations of women’s rights by certain TNCs.
5. In what way are the environmental rights violated by TNC practices?
6. In which sector is child labour exploited in India by some TNCs?
7. Briefly discuss the violation of the rights of indigenous people by TNCs.
8. Do you think TNCs should be governed by a Code of Conduct?

6.13 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Jones, Ronald W. (1961). "Comparative Advantage and the Theory of Tariffs". *The Review of Economic Studies*. 28 (3): 161–175. doi:10.2307/2295945
- McKenzie, Lionel W. (1954). "Specialization and Efficiency in World Production". *The Review of Economic Studies*. 21 (3): 165–180. doi:10.2307/2295770
- Samuelson, Paul (2001). "A Ricardo-Sraffa Paradigm Comparing the Gains from Trade in Inputs and Finished Goods". *Journal of Economic Literature*. 39 (4): 1204–1214. doi:10.1257/jel.39.4.1204

6.14 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) See Section 6.2
- 2) See Section 6.3

Check Your Progress 2

- 1) See Section 6.4
- 2) See Section 6.5

Check Your Progress 3

- 4) See Section 6.6
- 5) See Section 6.7

Check Your Progress 4

- 1) See Section 6.8
- 2) See Section 6.9

UNIT 7: INDIA IN THE NEW GLOBAL ORDER

STRUCTURE

- 7.0 Objectives
- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.2 The Concept of World Order
- 7.3 The Old Order and its Characteristics
 - 7.3.1 Cold War
 - 7.3.2 The Third World
- 7.4 Break-up of the Old World Order
- 7.5 The New World Order
 - 7.5.1 Salient Features of the New World Order: The Hegemony
 - 7.5.2 Unilateralism
 - 7.5.3 Discriminatory Regimes
 - 7.5.4 Marginalization of the UN
 - 7.5.5 Intensifying of Dependency Relation
- 7.6 Implications for India
- 7.7 Let us Sum up
- 7.8 Key Words
- 7.9 Questions for Review
- 7.10 Suggested readings and references
- 7.11 Answers to Check Your Progress

7.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit we can able to understand:

- To know the Concept of World Order;
- To understand the Old Order and its Characteristics;
- To discuss the Break-up of the Old World Order;
- To know the New World Order;
- To know the Implications for India.

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Notes

Over the last two weeks, US President Donald Trump has claimed that traditional allies such as the EU are “foes”, barely averted a trade war, and has insisted that the US will put its own interests first. What such actions mean for a world order which was underpinned by American economic and military might is not clear. Already, as the global economic centre of gravity shifts towards Eurasia, countries like China are subverting international norms to national interest. This has led to speculation about the New World Order that may emerge.

This phrase tends to enter popular discourse in periods of international turmoil. In the aftermath of WWI, for example, American President Woodrow Wilson outlined Fourteen Points for a “new world”. It is increasingly obvious that we live in a similarly pivotal period. It’s worth asking, then, what kind of new world order will we see, and what would it mean for India?

Planning for the Future

Today, technological innovation, interconnectedness, climate change, and population and economic growth are leading to radical changes in society, industry, and the nature of conflict. Trying to predict where the world is heading might be impossible, but that doesn’t mean that India can’t be prepared for the coming challenges.

One solution is to create a framework that builds *possible* futures, comes up with recommendations for each, and then looks at the most frequently-occurring ones as the basis of an action portfolio. This could use two key trends that contribute to the structure of the international order. That’s exactly what we did in a recent research paper.

In our framework, orders emerge at the intersection of geopolitics and geo-economics. To visualize possible futures, our approach was to come up with possible geopolitical trends (the distribution of power) and geo-economics trends (the distribution and allocation of resources).

The geo-economics trends selected were: a new economic boom, a secular stagnation, a global recession, and a Great Disruption. For geopolitics, we selected a world in the US remains the sole superpower, three “bi-polar” worlds with configurations of the US-China relationship, and one multipolar world with no superpowers. Their intersection provides a total of twenty “New World Order” scenarios. Each scenario has an icon indicating whether the outlook for India is optimistic, pessimistic, or cautious and general principles were derived for India’s actions based on these.

7.2 THE CONCEPT OF WORLD ORDER

Digital Westphalia

A particularly interesting scenario is a multipolar world with no single superpower, coupled with technological advances leading to a Great Disruption. Broadly speaking, disruption would lead to the emergence of two global groupings: those with economic strength derived from technology, and those without.

This would lead to intense international competition, with protectionism and trade wars. Advanced economies may attempt to establish unequal relationships with less advanced ones to seize resources and markets, just as they did in the 18th and 19th centuries. India’s economy would be radically reshaped by the disruption, with many companies being unable to compete and serious risks of job loss.

To manage all this, India must bolster its own position while seeking to manage the effects of disruption. The first step should be to invest heavily in R&D. Foreign investments, a sovereign wealth fund (aiming to secure strategic resources and acquire innovative startups), and promoting immigration to and from India should be used to expand its footprint (especially as climate change is sure to cause rising sea levels). Along with other less advanced economies, India should form a technology-sharing and market-access bloc, or a global technology management regime (depending on the extent and severity of disruption).

What India Needs to Do

Based on an analysis of the most frequently-occurring actions over 20 scenarios, we arrived at the following. Domestically, India must implement labour and factor market reforms, and be an attractive destination for FDI. Creating jobs is going to be a major challenge, as will skill obsolescence. As the population gradually ages, social security will also require attention. On the international stage, India must retain flexibility in alignment, and shift its military alignment towards the sea, towards cyber warfare, and from manpower to firepower.

At the time, India was a colony struggling for independence from the British, and its economy was a meager \$30 billion as compared to that of the U.S. (\$300 billion, 10 times bigger than India) and the UK (\$60 billion, twice the size of India). Not only was it not at the table when decisions were taken, it was not in a position even to articulate its own concerns. Even the British, who were supposed to uphold the interests of the colonies, did not do so.

The prevailing indifference towards Indian issues was made worse by the fact that our two most prominent individuals with an international profile — i.e. Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru — were on tracks opposed to the prevailing western orthodoxy, the entrenchment of the capitalist system.

Mahatma Gandhi was promoting his ideas of village republics as the best suited to the Indian ethos. Pandit Nehru was participating in Socialist International Congresses in the 1930s. Pursuing his belief in the idea of Asian solidarity, Nehru had organised the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March-April 1947 and played a prominent role in the first large-scale Afro-Asian Conference in 1955, the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. The U.S. and UK saw both events as a challenge to western domination.

Simultaneously, Cold War rivalries were developing between the West, led by the U.S., and the U.S.S.R. Developing countries were coerced into joining one or the other camp. So, for example, the Western European countries, Turkey and Pakistan joined western power-led alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and its Asian incarnations, such as the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) while East European and some developing countries, like Egypt, Tanzania and Ghana, were more sympathetic to the U.S.S.R. for ideological reasons, their leaders being left leaning, but also because the U.S.S.R. took anti-colonial postures in the UN. Larger countries, like India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia pushed back through the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.

The Cold War ended in 1989 with the reunification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union the following year. Instead of reconciling with Russia, the U.S. used its unipolar moment to harden the political and economic supremacy of the West. Absolutely no attempt was made to adapt the post-World War II institutions to changing political realities, which included the expansion of the EU and NATO into the former Soviet satellite states in East Europe. One consequence of this was the loss of India's privileged relationship with the U.S.S.R., especially as a partner for defense equipment. Nevertheless, India moved rapidly to repair relations with the U.S., including through market-opening reforms in 1992 under former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao.

Of a piece with western triumphalism was the destabilisation of West Asia, which began with Bush Senior's 1991 war against Saddam after his ill-judged invasion of Kuwait, followed by decade-long sanctions. The Twin Tower attacks in September 2001 prompted the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by Bush Junior's "coalition of the willing", and the endless \$3-trillion "war against terror".

These interventions are intimately connected to the Arab Spring that followed in Egypt and Tunisia and the murderous chaos in Libya and Syria. The irrelevance of the UNSC in all these conflict situations is

Notes

painfully obvious, but there is still no willingness to include countries like India, Brazil, Germany and Japan as permanent members whereas former colonial, but now declining powers, like UK and France, retain their veto in the UNSC.

As short-sighted as the unwillingness to reform political institutions is the refusal to acknowledge that the weight of economic growth has shifted East with the rapid expansion of developing economies, principally China (after its admission into the WTO in 2001) but also India, Indonesia, Brazil and even Russia. These four came together in 2006 to create BRICS. At the heart of this grouping was the idea that the world needed institutions beyond the control of the West: this was evident in, for example, the dominance of the dollar in global trade and as a store of value, the control over the transmission of payments through SWIFT and the denomination of oil in dollars. But when the 2008 crisis began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers the G7 was found inadequate and the G20 finance ministers' forum was upgraded to the level of heads of government.

Nevertheless, the West continues to be strongly resistant to the reform of the IMF-WB for the increase of the voting rights of developing countries, except for a small increase for China: this has brought it on par with economies one third its size, such as Japan and Germany.

Equally unfair and even a little ridiculous is the situation in the WTO which, for example, classifies American and European subsidies for agriculture to an "amber box", and so they are not up for discussion. But India's Public Distribution System (PDS), which is intended to serve the poor, is constantly under pressure as a market-distorting system. While the West has pushed for the removal of all restrictions on the movement of Capital it does not allow discussion of the "Movement of natural persons" (labour and professionals) because developed countries equate it with immigration. But this is of the utmost interest to India and other labour-exporting countries. And the provisions for trade in services are

both inadequate and biased against countries like India where they have a big and growing share in the GDP.

Three important developments in 2016 precipitated the unraveling of the global order, already weakened by the western resistance to reform institutions that were failing to cope with the new political and economic realities. The three precipitating events were: the Chinese rejection of the judgment of the tribunal of the Law of the Seas against its expansive claims in the South China Sea, the vote for Brexit in the UK and the election of Donald Trump in the U.S.A.

The Chinese economy has grown at an average of 10% per year, raising per capita GDP almost 49-fold, from \$155 to nearly \$7,950 since 1978. It is the biggest trading partner of the world's major economies, including the U.S., Germany, Japan, South Korea etc. China is the largest investor in most Asian, Arab, African and Latin American countries. Clearly the Chinese have judged that their moment has arrived. President Xi Jinping said at the 19th Communist Party Congress in October 2017, "The Chinese nation, with an entirely new posture, now stands tall and firm in the East." He also proclaimed, "It will be an era that sees China moving closer to centre stage and making greater contributions to mankind."

China's Belt and Road Initiative is the most ambitious, but also probably, the most rapacious, connectivity project in history. And it surrounds India through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor in Pakistan; the indebtedness of Sri Lanka, symbolised by the handover of the Hambantota port to China for 99 years; the defiance shown by the Maldives in making whole islands available to China; and Nepal talking about "balancing" relations with India and China. Already dominant in Asia, China now seeks parity with the U.S.A., calling it "a new type of Great Power Relations".

Brexit, the decision of the UK to exit the EU, has shown up the weaknesses afflicting member countries of the EU, being torn apart by the convergence of stagnant economies, the crisis of the Euro which has

Notes

moved from Greece to Italy, the influx of refugees from Syria and North Africa and the strengthening of right-wing political parties opposed to immigration. Although the EU remains the richest part of the world its members' pursuit of nationalistic agendas has gutted its internal cohesion. The slide in the EU's influence in global affairs has been aggravated by the American President's encouragement of Brexit, praise of extreme right wing leaders such as Marine Le Pen in France and Victor Orban in Hungary, his dismissive pronouncements on NATO and accusations that the EU was established to exploit the U.S.

In the U.S., Trump has shown himself to be a completely different type of leader – blatantly an America “firster”, rejecting liberal orthodoxies, and explosive in the style in which his tweets ride rough-shod over allies and rivals alike. In the 18 months that he has been in office, Trump has shaken up the old global order, much to the chagrin of western allies who depend on NATO for their security and their global market access for their prosperity and economic primacy.

Trump has been dismissive of the UN system and taken his country out of the Human Rights Council. This may have had some immediate benefit for India since this Council, on 14 June 2018, issued a biased, tendentious report, alleging human rights violations in Kashmir, especially by the Indian Armed Forces. Under a different type of government it would have been the U.S. that led the charge against India.

The U.S. President disdains multilateral trade agreements, preferring bilateral deals. Therefore, he has demanded a renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, pulled the U.S. out of late stage negotiations on the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in the Asia-Pacific and Western Europe respectively and ignored WTO regulations. India was not among the countries included in the TPP negotiations because we do not have membership of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Nor could we have accepted the trade dispute resolution mechanisms which gave MNCs powers to override sovereignty conditions. Moreover,

the government of India is in the process of reviewing (and delaying) Free Trade Agreements even with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries because of our experience of rising trade deficits, especially with China.

But Trump has also disrupted global supply chains and trade flows by re-imposing sanctions against Iran, tightening those against Russia and North Korea, and begun what is being termed a “trade war” with China. Unless this progression is checked it could result in the disruption of global supply chains which will impact all economies, including India, which are plugged into China- centred production lines.

Trump pulled the U.S. out of the Paris Climate Change Convention – but the agreement was inadequate in slowing carbon emission to prevent warming by more than 2 degrees Celsius before the end of the century. Moreover, its framers ignored the concerns of the developing countries and set aside the historical responsibility of the developed world without offering any assurance of financial assistance for mitigation or adaptation. India not only moved rapidly to increase the contribution of solar and wind energy to its power mix, but also took the initiative to promote a solar energy alliance, led jointly with France.

Trump has further shaken up an already inflamed West Asia: he has copied up to Saudi Arabia, terminating U.S. participation in the Iran deal and moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem with an undisclosed plan for resolving the Israel-Palestine dispute.

The heightened Shia-Sunni rivalries and renewed sanctions against Iran have already raised the global price of oil, with adverse effects on India’s fiscal deficit, and again disrupted the oil supply relationship, the development of the Chabahar port and the North-South connectivity project. More troublingly, such turbulence and uncertainty in the region can have very negative implications for the over 7 million strong Indian diaspora in the Gulf.

Notes

The countries most anguished by the disruptions brought about by Trump's smash-and-grab tactics are the already nervous Western European ones. They have been deeply dependent on the U.S.-led NATO for their security and global market access with American support. Typically introverted, the Europeans are very concerned about a resurgent Russia, but ignoring the threat posed by China's inroads into Southern Europe through investment in Port Piraeus in Greece, into Eastern Europe through infrastructure investments in the Visegrad 4 group of countries, and its acquisition of high-tech companies, like Kuka, the German manufacturer of industrial robots and solutions for factory automation.

In the latest G7 meeting in Canada in Quebec, Trump not only called for the readmittance of Russia to make it G8 again, he bluntly signalled to the leaders of the other rich countries that the U.S. was no longer prepared to enable Europe to retain influence and relevance in global affairs. This led European countries to seek to strengthen relations with China and India.

Trump, through his June 2018 meeting with the North Korean leader, was pointing to that country's nuclear and missile programmes being able to target U.S. cities on the west coast. He similarly signalled Asian Treaty allies, Japan and South Korea: they cannot expect the U.S. to assure their security at the cost of American interests.

A collateral benefit for India from the Trump-Kim summit in Singapore for the denuclearisation of North Korea was the apparent irrelevance of the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (which had constrained India's high-tech collaborations in the past), hopefully terminating the nuclear and missile collusion between North Korea and Pakistan. But it is by announcing a summit with the Russian president on July 15 that Trump made clear his complete disdain for the western alliance and institutions, such as NATO and the WB-IMF, set up to sustain its dominance. The significance of this meeting lies in its potential reordering of global alliances. Just as the Nixon-Mao meeting in 1972

split the communist alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China so the Trump-Putin meeting could signal the end of the western alliance. A normalisation of U.S.-Russia relations and a consequent reduction in Russian reliance on China could help India hedge against Chinese hegemonic tendencies.

Of course, all this turbulence affects India in numerous ways. But we should not allow the dominance and shrill outcry of the West, amplified by the English language media, to distort our perspective. India has taken numerous initiatives to hedge the adverse consequences of the changes underway. In the security arena, it has built closer relations with the West through the Quadrilateral Security Initiative (QUAD), defence collaborations and weapons purchases from the U.S., Israel and France and joint military exercises with ASEAN countries. Under Modi, relations with West Asian countries have become strategic – witness the exchanges with Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but also with Iran. India has entered into close cooperation with Central Asian countries against terrorism and joined Asian security organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

7.3 THE OLD ORDER AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS

7.3.1 Cold War

- Nonalignment's Flexibility: Participants acknowledged that historiography on India's foreign policy during the Cold War has limited its focus to the umbrella concept of nonalignment. While nonalignment represented an unwillingness to partake in formal alliance structures, it did not shackle India's foreign policy choices, they said. Participants argued that Indian policymakers were acutely conscious of the balance of power during the Cold War period, and responded to it based on their conception of the role India should aspire to play in international politics. Further, they emphasized the importance of examining these role-

Notes

conceptions in order to understand how policymakers approached questions of national interest, security, and the use of force.

- **Nehru and Indira Gandhi Periods:** Decisions regarding India's foreign policy were concentrated in the office of the Prime Minister, participants said. While acknowledging that both Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi rejected Indian military involvement in conflicts between other powers, the participants also discussed the significant differences between their foreign policy approaches. They agreed that while Nehru envisioned India as a "peacemaker" within the larger Asian system, Gandhi's approach was that of a "security seeker," with a greater focus on the balance of power in the subcontinent. Participants also emphasized the importance of examining India's foreign policy in the 1950s to understand Nehru's approach. They noted that Nehru perceived India's security interests through a wider frame of operation. He sought to accommodate competing international interests—among China, the great powers, and other Asian states—to create a peaceful regional order, they said. Participants went on to discuss the radical shift under Gandhi that prioritized Indian interests in the subcontinent, displayed an inclination toward balance-of-power politics, and a greater willingness to use coercive tactics and force. However, they noted, this did not represent a clean break from past approaches. They added that the deliberations between Gandhi and her advisors, some of whom continued to prescribe to the Nehruvian approach, revealed the tensions between continuity and change.
- **Proactive Approach:** Participants discussed how the book challenges conventional narratives of Indian foreign policy during the Cold War, which argue that India was only reacting to external developments, such as the Cold War's bloc structure and the U.S.-Pakistani alliance. They added that by considering, both, deliberations among Indian decision-makers and the alternative decisions they could have made, the book reminds readers that India's leaders proactively devised India's role in international politics. Participants emphasized the continued relevance of the

questions that Nehru and Gandhi engaged with: whether India should aim to become a great power despite domestic economic underdevelopment, and whether India should use its influence to push for its own interests or resolve problems on the world stage. Participants also asked whether India could aspire to be more than just a part of a “global coalition of rule-makers.”

- **Moving Forward:** Participants noted that India punched far above its weight during the Cold War by leading the Non-Aligned Movement, which enabled India to be the “voice for the voiceless.” While nonalignment may have prevented power accretion, they stated that India was more concerned about the costs of alignments than its benefits. They emphasized that it is important to study prior patterns of decision-making to guide India’s future choices on the world stage.

7.3.2 The Third World

During the Cold War, the term Third World referred to the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the nation’s not aligned with either the First World or the Second World. This usage has become relatively rare due to the ending of the Cold War. In the decade following the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991, the term Third World was used interchangeably with developing countries, but the concept has become outdated as it no longer represents the current political or economic state of the world. The three-world model arose during the Cold War to define countries aligned with NATO (the First World), the Eastern Bloc (the Second World, although this term was less used), or neither (the Third World). Strictly speaking, "Third World" was a political, rather than an economic, grouping.

Since about the 2000s the term Third World has been used less. It is being replaced with terms such as developing countries, least developed countries or the Global South. The term "Third World" arose during the Cold War to define countries that remained non-aligned with either NATO or the Communist Bloc. The United States, Canada, Japan, South

Notes

Korea, Western European nations and their allies represented the First World, while the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and their allies represented the Second World. This terminology provided a way of broadly categorizing the nations of the Earth into three groups based on political and economic divisions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the term Third World has been used less and less. It is being replaced with terms such as developing countries, least developed countries or the Global South. The concept itself has become outdated as it no longer represents the current political or economic state of the world.

The Third World was normally seen to include many countries with colonial pasts in Africa, Latin America, Oceania and Asia. It was also sometimes taken as synonymous with countries in the Non-Aligned Movement. In the dependency theory of thinkers like Raúl Prebisch, Walter Rodney, Theotonio dos Santos, and Andre Gunder Frank, the Third World has also been connected to the world-systemic economic division as "periphery" countries dominated by the countries comprising the economic "core".

Due to the complex history of evolving meanings and contexts, there is no clear or agreed-upon definition of the Third World. Some countries in the Communist Bloc, such as Cuba, were often regarded as "Third World". Because many Third World countries were economically poor and non-industrialized, it became a stereotype to refer to poor countries as "third world countries", yet the "Third World" term is also often taken to include newly industrialized countries like Brazil, India, and China; they are now more commonly referred to as part of BRIC. Historically, some European countries were non-aligned and a few of these were and are very prosperous, including Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland.

To counter this mode of thought, some scholars began proposing the idea of a change in world dynamics that began in the late 1980s, and termed it the Great Convergence. As Jack A. Goldstone and his colleagues put it,

"in the twentieth century, the Great Divergence peaked before the First World War and continued until the early 1970s, then, after two decades of indeterminate fluctuations, in the late 1980s it was replaced by the Great Convergence as the majority of Third World countries reached economic growth rates significantly higher than those in most First World countries".

Others have observed a return to Cold War-era alignments (MacKinnon, 2007; Lucas, 2008), this time with substantial changes between 1990–2015 in geography, the world economy and relationship dynamics between current and emerging world powers; not necessarily redefining the classic meaning of First, Second, and Third World terms, but rather which countries belong to them by way of association to which world power or coalition of countries — such as the G7, the European Union, OECD; G20, OPEC, BRICS, ASEAN, the African Union, and the Eurasian Union.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

- 1. The Concept of World Order

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

- 2. Discuss the Third World.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

7.4 BREAK-UP OF THE OLD WORLD ORDER

The trade war started by Trump could be seen as him keeping his election promise of renegotiating US trade relations with the world. Or as the world's only superpower, the US, confronting what many believe is the emerging and next global superpower, i.e. China—but by all indications, it could be much more than that.

Aside from economically confronting China, President Trump also threatened trade barriers against the EU and Canada, should they not soften some of their trade restrictions against the US. Invoking “national security” as his rationale, Trump recently enforced tariffs on aluminum and steel from the two traditional US allies under section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act.

This prompted the EU to impose tariffs on 2.8 billion euro worth of US products last week, invoking immediate threats of counter-measures from Trump, who essentially spelled out that Canada and the EU need the US more than the US needs them, and that they know that. This may, however, prove to be an underestimation of the options available to other countries.

China, for instance, stopped purchasing soybeans from the US and started purchasing a lot more from Russia and Brazil in response to US tariffs on goods from China. But for western countries to follow suit could mean the end of what George H W Bush, after the fall of the USSR, termed as the “New World Order”, or the neoliberal world order, long-established by the Euro-Atlantic powers since at least as early as the 1990s—which increasingly is becoming the “Old World Order”.

As far as European leaders are concerned, what Trump is fundamentally doing is disrupting the old western world order. As with his way of negotiating, what will become of the World Trade Organisation set up by the west, where the west collectively made most of the rules? And what becomes of NAFTA, and relations between the US and UK after Brexit?

Yet, the idea that the US has been the biggest victim of the neoliberal world order as Trump suggests isn't necessarily true, as it is US corporations that have benefitted most from it over the years, although, the average American, arguably didn't. Additionally, it can also be argued that it is the US and other western corporations that potentially have the most to lose as a result of Trump's policies, as the rules of trade established under the old order were not even negotiated between states but were created by corporations—the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement which allows corporations to sue sovereign states is a perfect example of that.

Consequently, according to John Merrill, Former Chief of the North East Asia Division of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the US State Department, “There are doubts about alliances” within the Trump administration, “particularly when there is a perceived asymmetry between burdens and interests”. Trump also believes that “traditional alliance management emphasis that” the US “have had” with the EU and others “has fostered excessive dependency and created moral hazards” in relations. As a result, he is considering shaking up relations with traditional US allies (and vice-versa), potentially ending the dominance of the Euro-Atlantic bloc when it comes to influencing world order.

But the fact is that America has “had to pay a price for that, and the price it paid was that it was running massive trade deficits with everybody.” For a long time, this “didn't matter very much because as long as the dollar was the world's reserve currency the trade deficits would eventually all go back to America. But now, Trump has sensed that that American economic supremacy is under challenge with the rise of China and the China-Russia bloc.” Ironically, however, this is also what makes a trade war against China unwinnable for the US.

With or without Trump's trade war, countries such as China, Russia and Iran have increasingly been de-dollarizing their trade for years now. With the recent introduction of the petro-Yuan by China and the growing

Notes

willingness of countries who feel hard done by the western-led economic order to adopt it, experts now believe that the dollar hegemony that the US enjoyed since the Second World War is close to its end.

So while the US may push the EU and other western countries that have become overwhelmingly dependent on it around, it can no longer do the same to China. This is what most western countries have failed to recognise—that with the rise of Eurasian and Asian powers and closer ties among them, the world has already started to move away from the old western world order, and Trump may just be the first western leader to recognise that.

This could explain why under the guise of confronting China his trade policies are looking more threatening for the EU, Canada and the likes. However, that does not mean that the trade war that he started could not backfire on the US or escalate further to a point where it could negatively affect many other countries, including China, as among the uncertainty that exists because of the changing world order, it is becoming more and more difficult to predict the outcome of such decisions.

This is why world leaders would be well advised to remember that we are currently in uncharted territories. And that in times like this, it is best to avoid confrontations which, as history teaches us, can spiral out of control at any moment causing massive damage to the world economy, as well as to whatever world order is to emerge out of it.

7.5 THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc implies the emergence of a unipolar world order. The last decade of the 20th Century witnessed the hegemony of the, US in military and economic spheres in trade and technology. Western European nations, Japan, China, India, etc. were left on the margins of this new power structure. Let us to get together some of the features of this New World Order.

7.5.1 Salient Features of the New World Order: The Hegemony

The term "new world order" has been used to refer to any new period of history evidencing a dramatic change in world political thought and the balance of power. Despite various interpretations of this term, it is primarily associated with the ideological notion of global governance only in the sense of new collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacity of individual nation-states to solve.

The phrase "new world order" or similar language was used in the period toward the end of the First World War in relation to Woodrow Wilson's vision for international peace;^[a] Wilson called for a League of Nations to prevent aggression and conflict. The phrase was used sparingly at the end of World War II when describing the plans for the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system partly because of its negative associations with the failed League of Nations. However, many commentators have applied the term retroactively to the order put in place by the World War II victors as a "new world order."

The most widely discussed application of the phrase of recent times came at the end of the Cold War. Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush used the term to try to define the nature of the post-Cold War era and the spirit of great power cooperation that they hoped might materialize. Gorbachev's initial formulation was wide-ranging and idealistic, but his ability to press for it was severely limited by the internal crisis of the Soviet system. In comparison, Bush's vision was not less circumscribed: "A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known". However, given the new unipolar status of the United States, Bush's vision was realistic in saying that "there is no substitute for American leadership". The Gulf War of 1991 was regarded as the first test of the new world order: "Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very

real prospect of a new world order. [...] The Gulf war put this new world to its first test"

7.5.2 Unilateralism

Unilateralism is any doctrine or agenda that supports one-sided action. Such action may be in disregard for other parties, or as an expression of a commitment toward a direction which other parties may find disagreeable. Unilateralism is a neologism which is already in common use; it was coined to be an antonym for multilateralism, which is the doctrine which asserts the benefits of participation from as many parties as possible.

The two terms together can refer to differences in foreign policy approached to international problems. When agreement by multiple parties is absolutely required—for example, in the context of international trade policies—bilateral agreements (involving two participants at a time) are usually preferred by proponents of unilateralism.

Unilateralism may be preferred in those instances when it is assumed to be the most efficient, i.e., in issues that can be solved without cooperation. However, a government may also have a principal preference for unilateralism or multilateralism, and, for instance, strive to avoid policies that cannot be realized unilaterally or alternatively to champion multilateral solutions to problems that could well have been solved unilaterally.

Typically, governments may argue that their ultimate or middle-term goals are served by a strengthening of multilateral schemes and institutions, as was many times the case during the period of the Concert of Europe.

Unilateralism is an approach in international relations in which states act without regard to the interests of other states or without their support.

Unilateralism is usually contrasted with its opposite approach, multilateralism. Multilateralism is acting cooperatively with other states. Though unilateralism is often used in a negative way, experts agree that there are positive aspects to occasionally acting unilaterally, such as in issues of national self-defense.

Example of Unilateralism in International Relations

Some politicians and international experts support unilateralism, at least for certain issues. An example of a unilateral action is the American President Donald Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord in 2017. The Paris Climate Accord was negotiated and approved by nearly 200 nations around the world, and involved climate change--an issue that is impossible to combat significantly if countries are not united in fighting it.

President Trump decided to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord, saying that it hurt American jobs and thus American interests. Trump's decision was opposed by many experts and average people around the world and in the United States. Most international relations experts have three main critiques of such unilateral actions.

Criticisms of Unilateralism in International Relations

One common criticism from international relations experts is that unilateralism will lead other countries to form opposing alliances. This criticism is a result of balance of power theory. The Balance of Power theory says it is desirable not to have one strong country acting against weaker countries, as those countries will join together. For example, after Trump announced the United States would withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord, a writer at The New York Times said that the unilateral action would 'reorder the world's power structure' and would encourage many of America's adversaries to join together.

A second common criticism is that many important issues require the involvement of many countries. For example, climate change, terrorism, global economic policies, the spread of diseases, and so on. This concern is a result of institutionalism in international relations. Institutionalism refers to approaches in international relations theory that focus on the rules, practices and organizational orders in international relations. President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord is easy to critique from this perspective since without the cooperation of the United States, climate change will continue at a quicker pace.

7.5.3 Discriminatory Regimes

In a real-effort experiment we vary two determinants of pay regimes: discrimination and justification of payments by performance. In our Discrimination treatment half of the workforce is randomly selected and promoted and participate in a tournament (high-income workers) whereas the other half receives no payment (low-income workers). Afterwards, antisocial behavior is measured by a Joy-of-Destruction game where participants can destroy canteen vouchers. The data show that low-income workers destroy significantly more vouchers than high-income workers. Destruction behavior is driven by workers who receive payments that are not justified by performance. When all payments are justified, that is in our Competition treatment where all workers participate in a tournament, the difference vanishes. By using a treatment with random payments, we show that unjustifiably-paid workers destroy less when they had equal opportunities to receive a high payment, i.e., when they were not discriminated by the pay regime.

7.5.4 Marginalization of the UN

The latest Human Development Report, released annually by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), found that while many people have greater access to education, health and sanitation, for example, more

focus needs to be paid to who has been excluded and why.

“By eliminating deep, persistent, discriminatory social norms and laws, and addressing the unequal access to political participation, which have hindered progress for so many, poverty can be eradicated and a peaceful, just, and sustainable development can be achieved for all,” said UNDP Administrator Helen Clark, speaking at the report launch in Stockholm, alongside Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven and the report’s lead author and Director of the Human Development Report Office, Selim Jahan.

Entitled Human Development for Everyone, the report noted that one in three people worldwide continue to live at a low level of human development, as measured by the Human Development Index – essentially a ranking of countries based on strides made with a peace-centric model of progress.

According to the report, women and girls are systematically excluded by economic, political, social and cultural barriers.

“Women tend to be poorer, earn less, and have fewer opportunities in most aspects of life than men,” according to the report.

Authors found that in 100 countries, women were legally excluded from some jobs because of their gender, and in 18 countries, women needed their husband’s approval to work.

The report also points to “dangerous practices,” such as female genital mutilation and forced marriage, which continue to hamper the development of women and their inclusion in society.

In addition to women and girls, the report points to “patterns of exclusion and lack of empowerment” of people in rural areas, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, migrants and refugees, and

members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community.

The report calls for far greater attention to empowering the most marginalized in society, and recognizes the importance of giving them greater voice in decision-making processes.

The report also warns that key development metrics can overstate progress when they focus on the quantity, rather than the quality, of development. For instance, girls' enrolment in primary education has increased, but in half of 53 developing countries with data, the majority of adult women who completed four to six years of primary school are illiterate.

7.5.5 Intensifying of Dependency Relation

Dependency Theory developed in the late 1950s under the guidance of the Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, Raul Prebisch. Prebisch and his colleagues were troubled by the fact that economic growth in the advanced industrialized countries did not necessarily lead to growth in the poorer countries. Indeed, their studies suggested that economic activity in the richer countries often led to serious economic problems in the poorer countries. Such a possibility was not predicted by neoclassical theory, which had assumed that economic growth was beneficial to all (Pareto optimal) even if the benefits were not always equally shared.

Three issues made this policy difficult to follow. The first is that the internal markets of the poorer countries were not large enough to support the economies of scale used by the richer countries to keep their prices low. The second issue concerned the political will of the poorer countries as to whether a transformation from being primary products producers was possible or desirable. The final issue revolved around the extent to which the poorer countries actually had control of their primary products, particularly in the area of selling those products abroad. These obstacles to the import substitution policy led others to think a little more

creatively and historically at the relationship between rich and poor countries.

1. The Structural Context of Dependency: Is it Capitalism or is it Power?

Most dependency theorists regard international capitalism as the motive force behind dependency relationships. Andre Gunder Frank, one of the earliest dependency theorists, is quite clear on this point:

...historical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries. Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole.

Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," in James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank, and Dale Johnson, eds., *Dependence and Underdevelopment*. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 3.

According to this view, the capitalist system has enforced a rigid international division of labor which is responsible for the underdevelopment of many areas of the world. The dependent states supply cheap minerals, agricultural commodities, and cheap labor, and also serve as the repositories of surplus capital, obsolescent technologies, and manufactured goods. These functions orient the economies of the dependent states toward the outside: money, goods, and services do flow into dependent states, but the allocation of these resources is determined by the economic interests of the dominant states, and not by the economic interests of the dependent state. This division of labor is ultimately the explanation for poverty and there is little question but that capitalism regards the division of labor as a necessary condition for the efficient allocation of resources. The most explicit manifestation of this characteristic is in the doctrine of comparative advantage.

Notes

Additionally, the Marxist theory of imperialism is self-liquidating, while the dependent relationship is self-perpetuating. The end of imperialism in the Leninist framework comes about as the dominant powers go to war over a rapidly shrinking number of exploitable opportunities. World War I was, for Lenin, the classic proof of this proposition. After the war was over, Britain and France took over the former German colonies. A dependency theorist rejects this proposition. A dependent relationship exists irrespective of the specific identity of the dominant state. That the dominant states may fight over the disposition of dependent territories is not in and of itself a pertinent bit of information (except that periods of fighting among dominant states afford opportunities for the dependent states to break their dependent relationships). To a dependency theorist, the central characteristic of the global economy is the persistence of poverty throughout the entire modern period in virtually the same areas of the world, regardless of what state was in control.

Finally, there are some dependency theorists who do not identify capitalism as the motor force behind a dependent relationship. The relationship is maintained by a system of power first and it does not seem as if power is only supported by capitalism. For example, the relationship between the former dependent states in the socialist bloc (the Eastern European states and Cuba, for example) closely paralleled the relationships between poor states and the advanced capitalist states. The possibility that dependency is more closely linked to disparities of power rather than to the particular characteristics of a given economic system is intriguing and consistent with the more traditional analyses of international relations, such as realism.

2. The Central Propositions of Dependency Theory

There are a number of propositions, all of which are contestable, which form the core of dependency theory. These propositions include:

- Underdevelopment is a condition fundamentally different from undeveloped. The latter term simply refers to a condition in which resources are not being used.

- The distinction between underdevelopment and undeveloped places the poorer countries of the world in a profoundly different historical context. These countries are not "behind" or "catching up" to the richer countries of the world.
- Dependency theory suggests that alternative uses of resources are preferable to the resource usage patterns imposed by dominant states. There is no clear definition of what these preferred patterns might be, but some criteria are invoked. For example, one of the dominant state practices most often criticized by dependency theorists is export agriculture.
- The preceding proposition can be amplified: dependency theorists rely upon a belief that there exists a clear "national" economic interest which can and should be articulated for each country. In this respect, dependency theory actually shares a similar theoretical concern with realism.
- The diversion of resources over time (and one must remember that dependent relationships have persisted since the European expansion beginning in the fifteenth century) is maintained not only by the power of dominant states, but also through the power of elites in the dependent states.

3. The Policy Implications of Dependency Analysis

If one accepts the analysis of dependency theory, then the questions of how poor economies develop become quite different from the traditional questions concerning comparative advantage, capital accumulation, and import/export strategies. Some of the most important new issues include:

- The success of the advanced industrial economies does not serve as a model for the currently developing economies. When

Notes

economic development became a focused area of study, the analytical strategy (and ideological preference) was quite clear.

- Dependency theory repudiates the central distributive mechanism of the neoclassical model, what is usually called "trickle-down" economics. The neoclassical model of economic growth pays relatively little attention to the question of distribution of wealth.
- Since the market only rewards productivity, dependency theorists discount aggregate measures of economic growth such as the GDP or trade indices. Dependency theorists do not deny that economic activity occurs within a dependent state.
- Dependent states, therefore, should attempt to pursue policies of self-reliance. Contrary to the neo-classical models endorsed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, greater integration into the global economy is not necessarily a good choice for poor countries.

Check Your Progress 2:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. What is Unilateralism?

.....
.....
.....

2. Discuss the Intensifying of Dependency Relation.

.....
.....
.....

7.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Aside from tangible measures of national defense, such as standing military and security forces and hardware, are various institutional

structures of government and functionality that have less to do directly with military or security factors, but more to do with underlying public attitudes and risks. These institutional structures and perceptions have had their own challenges and adjustments after the Cold War.

Strong impressions were made and continue to affect national psyche as a result of close brushes with all-out nuclear warfare. In some cases this had resulted in aversion to warfare, in other cases to callousness regarding nuclear threats. Peaceful applications of nuclear energy received a stigma still difficult to exorcize.

Heightened fear of nuclear risk can result in resistance to military draw down. What at one time was fastidious attention regarding nuclear security, secrecy, and safety could deteriorate to lax attitudes.

Public impressions and insecurities gained during the Cold War could carry over to the peacetime environment. Continuing support for the weapons establishment depends on public support despite diminished threats to national security. Agencies and departments created during a time of crisis no longer need to fill the same role.

In fact, these same institutional structures can be modified to carry out knowledgeable new missions associated with the cleanup and storage of highly dangerous and toxic materials. Some materials can be converted to non-military uses. Others need to be secured and safely stored almost indefinitely.

Also, misunderstandings that were prominent during the Cold War now need clarification so that closure can be reached, especially about the ability to demilitarize and peacefully use nuclear materials.

Underhanded practices in the name of national security are no longer countenanced. The existence of many third-world insurgencies and interventions is now being uncovered as the former cloak of secrecy unveils or their perpetrators confess.

Among the more specific consequences of the Cold War was a huge fiscal mortgage placed on many domestic economies. Financial obligations included those necessary to avoid further dislocations while the change took place from a wartime footing to a peacetime environment. National military establishments and alliances had to be reconfigured. Highly dependent institutional frameworks were to be restructured, and new obligations were acquired by nations that were once bystanders to the East-West confrontation.

In the wake of the Cold War, freed or newly founded nations inherited expenses, commitments, and resources for which they were not prepared. The successor states also found themselves with contemporary national-security burdens and substantial environmental contamination legacies, all to be financed while new or revised civilian economies had to be instituted. Since the superpowers carried much of the confrontational burden, both Russia and the United States ended up with substantial economic liabilities.

Check Your Progress 3:

Note: i) List out the space below for your answers

1. What is the implication of Cold War for India?

.....
.....
.....

7.7 LET US SUM UP

With the understanding of this Unit 7 we can able to sum up the main theme of India’s situation in the era of Cold War. The Cold War has had many effects on society, from the end of the war up until today. Primarily, communism was defeated. In Russia, military spending was cut dramatically and quickly. The effects of this were very large, seeing

as the military-industrial sector had previously employed one of every five Soviet adults and its dismantling left hundreds of millions throughout the former Soviet Union unemployed.

After Russia embarked on economic reforms in the 1990's, it suffered a financial crisis and a recession more severe than the United States and Germany had experienced during the Great Depression. Russian living standards have worsened overall in the post-Cold War years, although the economy has resumed growth since 1995. It wasn't until 2005 that the average post-communist country had returned to 1989 levels of per-Capita GDP, although some are still lagging far behind. The legacy of the Cold War continues to influence world affairs. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the post-Cold War world is widely considered as unipolar, with the United States the sole remaining superpower. The Cold War defined the political role of the United States in the post-World War II world: by 1989 the United States held military alliances with 50 countries, and had 1.5 million troops posted abroad in 117 countries. The Cold War also institutionalized a global commitment to huge, permanent peacetime military-industrial complexes and large-scale military funding of science.

Military expenditures by the US during the Cold War years were estimated to have been \$8 trillion, while nearly 100,000 Americans lost their lives in the Korean War and Vietnam War. Although the loss of life among Soviet soldiers is difficult to estimate, as a share of their gross national product the financial cost for the Soviet Union was far higher than that of the United States.

In addition to the loss of life by uniformed soldiers, millions died in the superpowers' proxy wars around the globe, most notably in Southeast Asia. Most of the proxy wars and subsidies for local conflicts ended along with the Cold War; the incidence of interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, as well as refugee and displaced persons crises has declined sharply in the post-Cold War era.

7.8 KEY WORDS

Cold War: The Cold War was a period of geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union with its satellite states, and the United States with its allies after World War II. The historiography of the conflict began between 1946 and 1947. The Cold War began to de-escalate after the Revolutions of 1989.

Third World: During the Cold War, the term Third World referred to the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the nations not aligned with either the First World or the Second World. This usage has become relatively rare due to the ending of the Cold War.

International relations (IR), or International studies (IS), the study of foreign affairs and global issues among states within the international system

International law, implicit and explicit agreements that bind together sovereign states

United Nations (UN), an international organization to facilitate international cooperation

World Trade Organization (WTO), an international organization designed to supervise and liberalize international trade

World Bank, an international financial institution

International Monetary Fund (IMF), an international organization that oversees the global financial system

International organization, an organization with an international membership, scope, or presence

Non-governmental organization (NGO), a legally constituted, non-governmental organization with no participation or representation of any government

New world order (politics), a post–Cold War political concept promulgated by Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush

World government, the notion of a single common political authority for all of humanity.

World-system within the world-systems theory, a socioeconomic theory associated with thinkers such as Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein

Hegemonic stability theory (HST), a theory that the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single nation-state is the dominant world power and Power (international), state power, including economic and military power.

Anarchy is in international relations, a concept in international relations theory holding that the world system lacks a global authority.

7.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Discuss the Concept of World Order.
2. Write about the Old Order and its Characteristics.
3. Discuss the Break-up of the Old World Order.
4. Describe the New World Order.
5. What is the Implications for India?

7.10 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Maçães, Bruno. *The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the New World Order*. Penguin UK, 2018.
- Li, Xue, and Cheng Zhangxi. "What Might a Chinese World Order Look Like?" *The Diplomat*. April 17, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/what-might-a-chinese-world-order-look-like/>.
- Wilson, Thomas W. Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace ("Fourteen Points") Speech, Joint Session of Congress, Washington, DC, January 8, 1918.
- Planning Commission, Government of India, *Statistics: Macro-Aggregates 1950-1997* <http://planningcommission.gov.in/data/central/stat/statistics2.pdf>
- GDP, U.S. Government Spending, US Gross Domestic Product GDP History United States 1950-2010 (Federal State Local Data) https://www.usgovernmentspending.com/spending_chart_1950_2010USb_15s2li011cn__US_Gross_Domestic_Product_GDP_History

Notes

- GDP, U.K. Government Spending, UK Gross Domestic Product for United Kingdom 1950-2010 (Central Government Local Authorities)
<https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/spending_chart_1950_2010_UKb_17c11i0111cn__UK_Gross_Domestic_Product#view>
- Eckart, Jonathan, '8 things you need to know about China's economy', World Economic Forum, 23 June 2016
- Aijaz, Ahmad (1992). In theory: Classes, nations, literatures. London: Verso.
- Bauer, Peter T. (1981). Equality, the Third World, and economic delusion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Buchanan, Pat J. (2006). State of emergency: The Third World invasion and conquest of America. New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin's Press.
- Escobar, Arturo (2011). Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World (revised ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Furtado, Celso (1964). Development and underdevelopment. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Huffington, Arianna S. (2010). Third World America: How our politicians are abandoning the middle class and betraying the American dream. New York: Crown Publishers.

7.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) See Section 7.2
- 2) See Sub Section 7.3.2

Check Your Progress 2

- 1) See Sub Section 7.5.1
- 2) See Sub Section 7.5.5

Check Your Progress 3

- 1) See Section 7.6